**What is Your Citizenship Status? Racial and Citizenship Profiling by Law Enforcement along the U.S.-México Border**

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The data used in this study is based on a survey funded by the National Science Foundation (Award 1251897, PI- Ted Curry, Co-PI Maria Cristina Morales, and Co-PI Harmon Hosch) examining the immigration crime paradox. Work on this Working Paper was supported by the Graduate School, University of Texas at El Paso.

The Black Lives Matter movement has brought to light systemic racist practices in police departments in urban centers across the U.S. Racial profiling, the use of race alone as criteria for deciding to stop or detain someone, is an issue that has taken on new salience after a series of killings of unarmed Blacks by police officers. Blacks, followed by Latinos, are keenly aware of the bias against them, particularly after they have contact with law enforcement (Weitzer and Tuch, 2005). Indeed, Rios (2011) describes the process whereby stigmatized labels are imposed on young Latino and Black males as a “labeling hype” where agents of social control, including law enforcement officers, systematically target them as criminal risks, thus creating a cycle of criminalization.

The overall objective of this study is to examine citizenship profiling, or who is suspected of being undocumented and thus questioned about their citizenship status by law enforcement. To many, the answer to this question is “Mexican.” Statistically, an unauthorized immigrant, in most minds, is Mexican (Provine et al., 2016), although that raises questions of what constitutes the “Mexican” phenotype. Despite such perceptions, Heyman (2014:111) reminded us that “illegality is not simply a state of being, but rather a matter of social-political construction and struggle.”

Mexicans, have historically been systematically labeled as “criminals,” “*bandidos* (bandits),” “foreigners,” and “illegals” (Mirande, 1987; Saenz and Morales, 2015; Rios, 2011). Today, Mexicans, and Latina/os in general, continue to be disproportionately racially profiled by law enforcement (see American Civil Liberties Union, 2008). The racial profiling of Latina/os has occurred despite evidence of low criminal behavior from Latino immigrant groups or what scholars refer to as the *Latina/o Immigrant Crime Paradox* (Burchfiekl and Silver, 2013; Hagan and Palloni, 1999; Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez, 2002; 2008; 2013; Martinez and Lee, 2000; Martinez and Stowell, 2012; Martinez and Valenzuela, 2006; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009; Sampson, 2008; Sampson and Bean, 2006; Stowell et al., 2009; Thomas, 2011).

Despite the low crime rates among foreign-born Latina/os, immigration policing, where police take on the role of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to enforce civil and criminal violations of immigration, has grown across the nation. Post 9/11, marked the growth of interior policing of immigration in addition to patrolling the “line” or the political boundary at the U.S.-Mexico border (Coleman 2007; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Ngai 2004; Nguyen and Gill, 2016; Provine 2016). Immigration enforcement became “…operationally diffuse and inward-looking power focused on resident immigrant populations” (Stuesse and Coleman, 2014:106). Such measures have entailed security and surveillance to expand from the federal government to state, county, and local law enforcement agencies (Provine et al., 2016; Salter, 2004).

Historically the policing of immigration was the responsibility of the federal government, but this has changed given the rise of restrictive immigration policies at the state-, county-, and local-levels (see Armenta, 2016; Chavez and Provine, 2009; Varsanyi, 2009). There are a range of subnational actors involved in the detection and removal of immigrant residents who lack the legal right to remain in the U.S. Endorsing such processes are several political initiatives including laws, city ordinances, and administrative policies at the state and local-levels. Most notably is Arizona’s Support of Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act or SB1070, later amended to H.B. 2162, that legalized intensified surveillance of Latina/os resulting in more arrests and detentions by state and local police (Heyman, 2010; Saenz and Morales, 2015; Saenz et al., 2011). Local and county governments are also increasingly involved in immigration policing, although most of these efforts are in new migrant destinations and/or those with an increasing Latina/o population (Armenta, 2016; Sáenz, 2010; Shahani and Greene 2009. Eagly (2013), for example, described Maricopa County (Phoenix, AZ) as illustrative of an “illegal alien punishment” model that makes immigration enforcement central to local policing. Hazelton, Pennsylvania passed the Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA) in 2006 that relied heavily on racialized rhetoric of the war on crime that socially constructed Latina/os as “illegal” and “unlawful” further marginalizing immigrant communities (Longazel, 2013). The surveillance of immigration has also expanded under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act via the expansion of state and local police functions under 287(g) policies where state and local law enforcement agencies enter agreements with the Attorney General to perform immigration law enforcement functions (see Armenta, 2012; Provine et al. 2016). Similarly, Secure Communities is an administrative initiative facilitating local- and state-level law enforcement to partner up with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) for immigration policing, typically applied at the time of booking into jail or prison after arrest, but before trial or conviction. Secure Communities allowed for local and state law enforcement officers to automatically send fingerprints to the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to check against its immigration databases. If these checks reveal that an individual is unlawfully present in the U.S., ICE takes enforcement action and the removal of individuals who present threats to public safety. Secure Communities ended in November 2014 and replaced with Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Both programs share similar objectives to utilize state and local criminal police and courts for civil immigration enforcement, but differ in that ICE no longer requests that local law enforcement detain a migrant unless he/she has been convicted or is considered a national security threat (García and Hernández, 2015). The unprecedented convergence of criminal and immigration law at the levels of statute, policy, and implementation has been referred to as “crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2006).

This large-scale restructuring marked by a shift from national to local immigration policy gave rise to a new regime in immigration enforcement that makes the distinction between citizens and noncitizens more important than before (Coutin, 2011).

The programs, such as the ones mentioned above, were implemented with no safeguards against racial profiling and pretextual stops targeted at those suspected of being undocumented (Provine et al. 2016). Policy reports on Secure Communities highlighted racial profiling and a disproportionate number of Latina/os arrested, detained, and placed in detention (Provine et al., 2016). Secure Communities failed to reach its intended goals where over half of those detained had no prior arrests or only minor infractions (Provine et al., 2016). Advocacy organizations along the U.S.-Mexico border argued that the policing in the name of national security is not consistent with “community security” given that increased surveillance contributes to the marginalization of the border region and the criminalization of its largely Latina/o communities (Saenz and Morales, 2015). Furthermore, some of these policy initiatives have been proven ineffective and/or a violation of civil rights. In *Arizona v. United States* the federal government blocked some of the provisions behind SB1070 in 2012 and other similar state laws in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, among others (Provine et al., 2016). 287(g)has resulted in increased fear and distrust against law enforcement among immigrants, which compromised police-community relations (Nygun and Gill, 2016). Currently, 287(g) is being phased out given it is costly and inefficient (Provine et al., 2016), although it is uncertain whether it will return under the Donald Trump Presidency.

Even in locations where state, county, or local law enforcement do not have agreements with the federal government to participate in immigration enforcement, local law enforcement have daily encounters with immigrants. Scholars have argued that the growth in immigration policing at the local level is a response to rapid increase in the growth of immigrant populations and/or the browning of the population (Armenta, 2016; Sáenz, 2010; Shahani and Greene 2009). Yet, the “browning” and immigrant growth across the U.S. (Saenz and Morales, 2015) suggests that even states, counties, and local law enforcement departments without agreements with federal government to police immigration law enforcement are interacting more than ever with immigrants.

With the expansion of policing of immigration, citizenship profiling has been an issue of increasing concern, yet we do not know much about who is profiled as an undocumented immigrant. Most of the studies on the policing of immigration have analyzed policies such as 287(g), Secure Communities, PEP, and SB1070 and/or have used a range of qualitative tools to examine police discretion (e.g., Armenta, 2016; Golash-Boza, 2015; Motomura, 2011; Provine et al., 2016). So far, these studies on immigration policing have raised concerns about how state, county, and local policies can disproportionately impact *individual* Latina/os, regardless of citizenship status but have focused on the removal and detention of undocumented immigrants. We built upon this research by providing a statistical profile of who law enforcement suspects of being undocumented on the basis of *individual-level* factors (generational status, Latina/o ethnicity, sex, and age) and consider how contextual factors at the *group-level* (residing in poverty and ethnic enclave neighborhoods) might affect who law enforcement questions about citizenship.

We base this study on primary research consisting of 677 surveys collected in 2014 in El Paso, Texas, a city along the U.S.- México border neighboring Cuidad Juárez, Chihuahua, México. The question of who is profiled as undocumented is particularly pertinent to examine in El Paso given it is subjected to widespread and heavy-handed border enforcement and thus becomes a crucial location for creating rights of immigrants and for human rights in the United States in general (Heyman, 2004). We will begin by testing the hypothesis that law enforcement is more likely to ask first- and second-generations about their citizenship status than third generations and later. Then, we test for the influence of neighborhood effects on the likelihood of individuals being asked about their citizenship status utilizing Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) procedures. Specifically, we will determine if individuals who reside in poverty neighborhoods or ethnic/immigrant enclaves are more likely to be subjected to citizenship profiling.

CITIZENSHIP PROFILING

There is limited research on citizenship profiling and thus to better establish a conceptual picture we draw from a range of literatures. Most of the literature on the policing of immigrants has focused on individual-level factors. Therefore, we begin by discussing how race and citizenship status interlock together affecting who law enforcement questions about citizenship status. We then examine discretionary policing practices especially as it concerns policing immigration. Lastly, we turn to contextual factors at the neighborhood-level that may affect who law enforcement questions about citizenship status.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL

Racial and Citizenship Profiling

The practice of detecting undocumented immigrants also raises the obvious concern of racial profiling. The impact of the law enforcement approaches to policing immigration has particularly target Latina/os, especially poor Mexicans and Central Americans (Chavez, 2008; Ngai, 2003; Provine and Sanchez, 2011; Provine et al., 2016). As argued by Provine and Sanchez (2011), municipal policing practices aimed at immigrant removal has led to ethno-racial profiling, hyper-surveillance, and abusive stops. The interlocking of race, class, and citizenship status shape social constructions of immigrants as criminals affecting U.S. born Latina/o citizens (Aranda et al., 2014) and even native non-Latina/o and nonimmigrants (Chavez, 2008; Kil et al., 2009).

The racialization of detecting undocumented immigrants has led to the disproportionate deportation of Latina/os (Provine et al., 2016), mostly with minor offenses (Golash-Boza, 2012). Indeed, only 12 percent of those deported in 2013 had committed a serious crime which points to how Latina/o appearance, rather than criminal misbehavior, guides police officer discretion (Kennis, 2011; Provine et al., 2016). Provine et al. (2016, 108) argued that “What is clear is that racial profiling to achieve deportation outcomes has occurred and is likely to continue unless it is no longer effective” and has continued even when the federal government has redesigned its focus on the enforcement of immigrants who committed serious crimes.

In conjunction, even before the rise in the policing of immigration, Latina/os, including citizens, legal permanent residents, reported that they feel they are more frequently stopped, have negative perceptions of the police, and are less likely to report crimes (Vidales et al., 2009). Indeed, there are not vast differences between foreign-born and native-born Latina/o groups on perceptions regarding the local policing of immigration enforcement (Saenz and Morales, 2015). Based on the Pew Hispanic Center’s National Survey of Latinos (2008), Saenz and Morales (2015) found that Latina/os generally disapprove of local police handling immigration enforcement that is normally the responsibility of the federal government. Specifically, over 80 percent of Mexicans (foreign-born and native-born), Salvadorans (foreign-born and native-born), Other Caribbean Islanders (foreign-born and native-born), and foreign-born South Americans believe that immigration enforcement should be the responsibility of the federal government and not local police. When it comes to actual stops, Saenz and Morales (2015) found that close to 10 percent of Mexicans-origin individuals, both native- and foreign-born, have been stopped by the police and asked about their immigration status. This is in line with the 834 U.S. citizens were mistakenly detained under Secure Communities (Provine et al., 2016).

Policing Discretion and Immigrants

To answer who is stopped and questioned by law enforcement for suspected of being undocumented is difficult to answer in part due to the wide discretion that police work entails. Provine et al. (2016:105) argued that “Local law enforcement is intensely individualistic work in which officers on the street are generally beyond the view of their supervising officers and enjoy wide discretion regarding how to investigate, and whom to question, stop, and arrest.” Moreover, officers can almost always find probable cause to pull over a driver. For instance, officers can have some intuition or level of suspicion and follow a car to find probable cause (i.e. not wearing seatbelts) and stop for technical violations such as a broken taillight or dirty license plate (Provine et al 2016). Under such circumstances the real reason for a stop differs from the violation that someone is cited.

To date, the scholarly literature on law enforcement in the context of immigration is based on ethnographic and in-depth interviews that demonstrate the high degree of discretion that officers practice when deciding who to question. Immigrants are part of the community and thus it is highly likely they will be in contact with local and/or state law enforcement officers (Armenta, 2011). Decker et al. (2009) found wide variation on the circumstances under which police departments inquire about citizenship status. Regardless of whether a department has policies on the enforcement of immigration law or not, the power of departmental policy on frontline decisions is not clear given the wide amount of discretion that law enforcement use on the streets (Provine et al., 2016). Due to the discretion of police work, law enforcement decisions are often made per the officer’s moral calculus of getting the “bad guys” rather than a legal one (Herbert 1998). Indeed, at times what the police officer determines is the “right thing” may even conflict with the law (Herbert 1998).

Alternatively, immigration policing also occurs in departments with no policies aimed to enforce federal immigration policies or happens through the “through the back door.” Based on a study on the Phoenix metroplex Varsanyi (2008) found that the policing of immigrants occurs through the “back door” via ordinances on the use of public space that directly or indirectly exclude undocumented individuals. Perhaps the most common “back door” policing of immigrants is through traffic offenses. Indeed, the most serious charge for over half of the immigrants deported in 2013 was a traffic violation (Provine et al., 2016). In a study of 287 (g) in Nashville, Armenta (2016) found that department culture prioritizes traffic stops which inevitably places local police in contact with unauthorized immigrants who because of ineligibility for driver’s license and identification cards are vulnerable to arrest. This is a concern for undocumented immigrants who, with a few exceptions, do not have access to a state IDs and drivers’ license, as thus they are committing an infraction with the very act of driving.

Another challenge to the policing of immigrants is the lack of acculturation to American policing standards. For instance, police are suspicious of individuals who do not follow the American practice of pulling over to the right side of the road during traffic stops (Khashu, Busch, and Latif, 2005; Lewis and Ramakrishnan, 2007). This is a concern for immigrants who are not familiar with American policing practices. In return, immigrants also are reluctant to trust police officers due to the negative experiences they have had with law enforcement in their home countries (Davis et al., 2001; Menjivar and Bejarano, 2004), although in the case of Chinese immigrants the comparison with policing in their home country is associated with favorable views of law enforcement in the U.S. (Wu et al., 2011). Moreover, recent immigrants are less aware of community policing practices which has implication for police-community relations (Davis and Miller, 2002).

POVERTY AND ENCLAVES AND CITIZENSHIP PROFILING AT NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL

Despite an individual’s race/ethnicity and immigration status, the neighborhood context in which individuals reside could provide important contextual information about who is asked about their citizenship status by law enforcement. To date, most of the literature on policing and Latina/os and immigrants has focused on how individual-level factors influence questioning and detention by police rather than characteristics associated with neighborhoods in which individuals reside. Moreover, most of the literature on policing and neighborhood context has focused on ethnographic scholarship on the experiences of poor urban Blacks and has highlighted punitive surveillance, disproportionate number of citations, and disrespectful treatment (for example, Desmond and Valdez, 2013; Goffman, 2009; Rios, 2011), among other negative impacts. Moreover, the literature on concentrated neighborhood disadvantage and race has focused on crime, while the literature on immigrant neighborhood clustering falls under the context of the ethnic enclave, both of which have given limited attention to policing. Below we draw some useful insights from both the scholarship on the influence of concentrated neighborhood disadvantage and crime and ethnic enclaves.

There is less survey research on neighborhood context and policing that has examined the influence of poverty and race/ethnicity. An important exception is the work of Sampson and associates (Sampson and Bean 2006; Sampson and Wilson 1995) who conceptualized the *racial invariance thesis* that highlights the importance of concentrated disadvantage and racial segregation on explaining black-white racial disparities in crime. The *racial invariance thesis* has also been found to be relevant for Latina/os (Martinez 2003; 2008). Blacks and Latina/os are relegated to reside in geographical areas marked by concentrated disadvantage due to an array of economic and social disparities (e.g., joblessness, welfare dependency, poverty, family disruption, and residential instability) all of which are associated with crime (Martin et al. 2011).

Yet, when it comes to immigrant neighborhoods there is less clarity about the influence of what is referred to as concentrated disadvantages on crime and policing. Expanding upon Sampson’s and associates *racial invariance perspective* (e.g., Sampson and Bean 2006; Sampson and Wilson 1995), Martinez (2002, 2013) and Martinez and Valenzuela (2006) developed the *immigrant revitalization theory* to describe how immigration revitalizes impoverished urban neighborhoods with hard-working families and new businesses, both of which lower crime. Vélez (2009) on the other hand, agrees that recent immigrants reinvigorate disadvantaged neighborhoods but found recent immigrants increased local homicide levels in disadvantaged neighborhood contexts.

When examining the influence of neighborhood clustering the immigrant literature has focused on the concept of the ethnic enclave. First coined by Hanna and Hanna (1967), Alejandro Portes and his associates (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1985; and Portes and Stepick 1985; but see also Model 1985) theoretically developed the concept of ethnic enclave by including immigration in addition to ethnicity. Portes (1981:291) defined the enclave economy as involving “immigrant groups which concentrate in a distinct spatial location and organize a variety of enterprises serving their own ethnic market and/or the general population. Their basic characteristic is that a significant proportion of the immigrant workforce is employed in enterprises owned by other immigrants.” The term ethnic enclave economy has come to stand for the economic advantage of location clustering (Light and Gold 2000), including protection from discrimination (Portes and Bach 1985; Zhou 1992). As such, ethnic enclaves compensate for background deficits and discrimination that ethnic groups encounter in the general labor market.

In contrast, some argue against the protective features of ethnic enclaves. In particular, ethnic enclaves are found to detrimental labor market conditions (e.g. Sanders and Nee, 1987Chin, 2005Schrover 2001 Sanders and Nee, 1987). In the case of Mexicans and Central Americans, rather than an ethnic controlled economy where workers can exert power (Light and Gold, 2000), co-ethnic concentrated jobsites are associated with inequality found in segregated employment (Morales, 2009). Thus, there is also strong evidence that group clustering of immigrants and ethnic minorities is associated with the negative features of segregation and concentrated neighborhood disadvantage.

Even though ethnic enclaves have come to be more widely understood as immigrant clusters in neighborhoods within urban centers (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996), most of the scholarly attention on ethnic enclaves has focused on economic outcomes with limited attention to how residing in an enclave can influence interactions with law enforcement. Yet, there are indications that Latino and immigrant neighborhoods are targeted for the presumed illegality of its residents. Most notable is Romero (2006) who found the Chandler Roundups in Arizona or “Operation Restoration” where the Chandler Police Department in Maricopa County in Arizona target residents for their “Mexicanness,” speaking Spanish, and being in a Latina/o neighborhood.

In sum, while there is limited attention to ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods and whether residents are more likely to be questioned by law enforcement about their citizenship status, we can draw some important insights from the literature above. First, the influence of residing in poor neighborhoods on policing has largely focused on the experiences of urban Blacks who are subjected to a range of negative effects associated with a disproportionate criminalization. Second, there is mixed evidence for whether ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods are associated with disadvantages or social protections. Third, there is some evidence that the local policing of immigration is associated with excessive surveillance of Latina/o and immigrant neighborhoods (Romero, 2006).

DATA AND METHODS

Sampling

This study is based on primary data consisting of 46 neighborhood clusters and 677 individual surveys. Our sampling design follows Robert Sampson’s and associates (1997) Community Survey Component of the *Project on Human Development for Chicago Neighborhoods* (PHDCN*)* dataset. We operationalize neighborhoods by aggregating census tracts that were similar in terms of geographic information (such as interstates, roads, and other landmarks), demographic and economic indicators from the American Community Survey (ACS) (2015) 5-year (2008-2012) census tract data on economic, foreign-born, language, and Latina/o, and a rapid ethnographic assessment where we gain information from the streets about whether the census tracts should be considered stand-alone neighborhoods or joined with neighboring census tracts. We then randomly selected neighborhood clusters and randomly selected 20 households within each neighborhood.

Data was collected between March and August of 2014 in El Paso, Texas. Once selected at random, we mailed a letter notifying respondents that their household had been randomly selected to participate in the study and asked if they volunteer to participate. Respondents were given the option to either call and schedule an appointment or a research assistant will show up to their household in 3-4 days to conduct the interview or schedule an appointment. Respondents were paid $20.00 for participating in the study.

Context

This study is based on El Paso, Texas that is located along the U.S.-Mexico border and is the sister city of Cuidad Juárez, Chihuahua, México. El Paso represents an ideal site to conduct a study on perceptions of citizenship illegality given that according to the U.S. Census estimates 25.5 percent of the population is foreign-born and 82.2 percent Latina/o (of which 76.6 percent is Mexican-origin). Moreover, consistent with the Latina/o Immigrant Crime Paradox, El Paso has been ranked as the safest or among the safest metropolitan statistical area in the U.S. for the last ten years (Borunda, 2013).

As a border city, El Paso is also subjected to hyper-surveillance policing measures. In this region, residents have frequent encounters with federal law enforcement agents, in particular border patrol. Indeed, El Paso has been characterized as militarization region given the use of war-like discourse, technology, and even the use of military personnel as part of border control initiatives (Bejarano et al., 2012). Today, such legal and administrative polices that focus on national security measures and increase surveillance have extended to the interior of the nation (Coleman 2007; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Provine and Sanchez, 2011; Salter 2004; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), making the border region an important site to investigate how increase law enforcement profiles an undocumented immigrant.

El Paso also has no 287 (g) agreements but did practice Secure Communities, now PEP. It is important to emphasis that even in cities that resists cooperation with federal efforts to engage local policing of immigration are still exposed to the national emphasis on enforcement (Provine et al. 2016). Moreover, even though most of the literature on the policing of immigrants has focused on new migrant destinations, citizenship profiling and pretextual stops is still a concern given that policing immigrants occurs any time field officers encounter immigrants (see Armenta, 2011). In such instances, even departments who may not adhere to partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security must still police, arrest, and protect immigrants.

Level-1 Dependent, Independent, and Controls

The dependent variable in the analysis is based on the question, “In the last five years, other than at ports of entry or immigration checkpoints, how often has law enforcement personnel ever asked you about your citizenship status?” Although the question allows for individuals to indicate if they have been stopped more than once, due to statistical concerns with missing data and low frequencies of individuals that have been asked about their citizenship status in over five different occasions, we operationalize the dependent variable as “1” if respondents were asked about their citizenship status, “0” if otherwise. A limitation is that we lack data on where individuals where asked about their citizenship status and the activities that they were involved in at that moment (i.e. driving, working, hanging out, etc…), yet characteristics of the neighborhoods individuals reside in can reveal the impact of structural conditions on the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status.

The independent variable is generational status. The first generation consists of individuals who were born outside the United States. The second generation consists of individuals who were born in the United States and whose mothers are foreign-born. The third and/or later generations include individuals who were born in the United States and whose mothers were also born in the United States. Generational status is measured using two dummy variables (first and second generation), with individuals who are third and/or later generations being the reference group.

At the individual-level we also included controls for the demographic variables of Latina/o ethnicity, sex, and age. Latina/o ethnicity is entered as a dummy variable (1= Latina/o ethnicity, 0= otherwise). Sex is also entered as a dummy variable (1= male, 0= otherwise). Age is measured as a continuous variable. Unfortunately, we are not able to include a control for social class at the individual-level due to a large number of missing values.

Level 2: Ethnic Enclave and Poverty Neighborhoods

To capture the degree to which a neighborhood is an enclave we used a combination of survey and census data (ACS 2008-2012). We began by constructing a continuous scale based on transnationalism (survey), acculturation to México (survey), percent foreign-born, percent foreign-born not naturalized (ACS), percent Spanish only at home (ACS), and percent Mexican-origin (ACS). Items for the scale were converted to z-scores and averaged. The responses to these items were summed to create a scale measure of “enclavishness.” Cronbach’s Alpha for the enclavishness items is .824. Factor Analysis extracted a single component and lowest loading is .771. Background analysis determined that the influence of neighborhood degree of enclavishness on being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement is not linear so we constructed dummy variables representing low enclave neighborhoods (1= z-scores representing the bottom 30th percentile; 0= otherwise) and mid-level enclave (1= z-scores between 31st and 60th percentile; 0= otherwise), with the reference category representing neighborhoods with high levels of enclavishness (z-scores above the 61st percentile).

**Table 1.** Description of variables in the analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Variables | Description | N | Mean | S.D. |
|  | Dependent Variable |  |  |  |  |
|  | Asked Status | 0=No 1=Yes | 677 | .18 | .38 |
| **LEVEL 1** | *Individual-Level* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Age | Continuous | 677 | 40.89 | 15.38 |
|  | Sex | 0= Female 1=Male | 677 | .50 | .50 |
|  | First Generation | 0= No 1=Yes | 677 | .25 | .43 |
|  | Second Generation | 0=No 1=Yes | 677 | .28 | .45 |
|  | Third Generation | Reference | 677 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **LEVEL 2** | *Neighborhood-Level* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Quantitative Enclavishness  Scale Low | 0=No 1=Yes | 46 | .30 | .47 |
|  | Quantitative Enclavishness  Scale Medium | 0=No 1=Yes | 46 | .33 | .47 |
|  | Quantitative Enclavishness  Scale Large | Reference | 46 | .37 | .49 |
|  | Percent of Household that earn  less than $10,000 | Continuous | 46 | 11.42 | 8.32 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

To capture neighborhood poverty, we used ACS (2015) 5-year (2008-2012) census data pertaining to each neighborhood cluster. Specifically, the poverty variable is a continuous variable based on ACS data on the percent of households that earn less than 10,000 dollars that pertains to each neighborhood cluster (census tract(s)). For neighborhood clusters with more than one tract, the data for these clusters were averaged across tracts.

HGLM Analysis

Hierarchical linear modeling analysis is required since individuals are nested in neighborhoods and not randomly distributed (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). Multilevel data violates that assumption that low-level observations are independent leading to biased standard errors, inflated Type I errors, and even incorrect inferences thus multilevel techniques are suitable for this study (Hox 2010). Multilevel modeling was applied to cluster structures, indicating that individuals (Level 1) are nested within neighborhoods (Level 2) and can exert cross-level interactions effects.

Since our dependent/outcome variable is binary it is appropriate to use multilevel logistic regression also referred to as hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) to analyze nonlinear structural models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Unlike HLM, HGLM use a binomial level-1 sampling model and a logit link. We are interested in the probability of law enforcement asking about citizenship (1 if yes, 0 if no) and every level-1 record corresponds to a person with a single binary outcome so the model type is Bernoulli (Raudenbush et al., 2011). We used Bernoulli distribution because the dependent variable is binary and EM Laplace iterations to produce a unit-specific model of EM Laplace estimation output.

Three models were used in this study. A null model (Model 1) examined the utility of multilevel modeling (Hox, 2010) and served as the benchmark for comparison with the other models. We then ran a random coefficients model (Model 2) with Level-l predictors so that we could assess whether any of the slopes were significantly different from zero when allowed to vary across neighborhoods. This model was used to explore whether the individual-level factors contribute to law enforcement asking individuals about citizenship status varied by neighborhood. A population-average model with robust standard errors (model 3) examines the relations between neighborhood-level factors and the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status accounting for individual-level factors. The population-average model allows for random variation of the neighborhood-level error term and thus estimates the expected change in the mean outcome across the population, not just for neighborhoods that share error variance. This feature is contingent on the nonlinear logit function. Model 3 constitutes a full multilevel model examining the probability of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement:

Level-1 Model

Prob(Y=1|B) = P

log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1\*(AGEQ235) + B2\*(SEXQ236) + B3\*(HISPANIC) + B4\*(FIRSTGEN) + B5\*(SECGENB)

Level-2 Model

B0 = G00 + G01\*(LESSTHAN) + G02\*(ENCLARLO) + G03\*(ENCLARME) + u0

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AGEQ235 has been centered around the grand mean.

LESSTHAN has been centered around the grand mean.

Level-1 variance = 1/[P(1-P)]

Mixed Model

eta = G00 + G01\*LESSTHAN + G02\*ENCLARLO + G03\*ENCLARME

+ G10\*AGEQ235

+ G20\*SEXQ236

+ G30\*HISPANIC

+ G40\*FIRSTGEN

+ G50\*SECGENB

+ u0

RESULTS

Background analysis showed an association between generational status and being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement. Specifically, 23.5 percent of second-generation individuals have been questioned about their citizenship status at least once, followed by 20 percent of first-generation individuals and 13.3 percent of those who are third-generation or later (*χ2= 9.120, p.<.01*). In regards to ethnicity, 87.2 percent of those questioned about their citizenship status were Latina/o but results are not statistically significant. This is not surprising, given that El Paso is 86 percent Latina/o and thus citizenship, rather than ethnic profiling, is more salient. Thus, bivariate analysis provides some preliminary picture of who is profiled as a non-citizen by police.

Table 2 presents the HGLM multilevel models predicting being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement. The null model (Model 1) is a preliminary model that determines the expected log-odds of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement. Model 1 excludes individual-level and neighborhood-level predictors. In this case, the expected log-odds corresponds to a probability of 1/(1 + exp{1.542819}) = .18 of individuals being asked about their citizenship status by law enforcement. The intercept was significantly different from zero (*p-*value <0.001), meaning the rate of individuals who get asked about their citizenship status by law enforcement are significantly different from the those who did not get asked and that being asked varies across neighborhoods.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 2. HGLM Analysis for Odds of Being Questioned about Citizenship | | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| **Level-1** |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.098\*\*\* | 0.073\*\*\* |
| First-generation |  | 1.830\* | 1.937\* |
| Second-generation |  | 1.860\* | 1.890\* |
| Latina/o |  | 1.329 | 1.346 |
| Male |  | 1.311 | 1.302 |
| Age |  | 0.975\*\* | 0.974\*\*\* |
| **Level-2** |  |  |  |
| % Poverty |  |  | 1.028\* |
| Low-level enclave |  |  | 1.301 |
| Mid-level enclave |  |  | 1.648\* |

Model 2 introduces individual-level variables predicting who is asked about citizenship status and it allows for intercepts and slopes to vary across Level 2. Results show that between neighborhood differences observed in Model 1 remain statistically significant after accounting for individual attributes. As expected, being first- or second-generation has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of law enforcement officers asking about citizenship status net of the influence of Latina/o ethnicity, sex, and age. In particular, being first-generation, in contrast to third-generation and later, is associated with an increase in the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement by 83 percent. Being second-generation increases the likelihood of being asked about citizenship by law enforcement by 86 percent, in contrast to those who are third- and later-generations. Among the demographic controls, only age is statistically significant. Specifically, a one-unit increase in age is associated with a 97 percent decrease in the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement. Interestingly, identifying as Latina/o is not associated with a greater likelihood of being asked about citizenship status. Again, we suspect that this occurrence may be attributed to El Paso, where the study is situated, is 86 percent Latina/o. Thus, law enforcement may be looking for identifiers, other than ethnicity, to determine who may be undocumented.

Model 3, the population-average model with robust standard errors, contains valuable information concerning neighborhood effects (third column of Table 2). The neighborhood-level predictors of poverty and enclavishness do extend our understanding of who is asked about citizenship status. Living in a neighborhood that is considered mid-ranged in terms of enclavishness (i.e. acculturation to México, percent foreign-born, percent foreign-born not naturalized, transnational, percent monolingual Spanish at home, and percent Mexican-origin), as oppose to large levels of enclavishness, influences the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement by 52 percent. This is an interesting outcome. Insights from the literature suggest that foreign-born tend to live in ethnic enclaves (e.g., Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Manning 1985; and Portes and Stepick 1985; but see also Model 1985) and that undocumented immigrants may restrict their driving to avoid interactions with law enforcement given traffic violations is a form of “back door” policing of immigration (see Armenta, 2016; Provine et al., 2016). We suspect that those who live in neighborhoods with mid-levels of enclavisheness may be integrated into the city and more mobile than those who live in high enclave neighborhoods whose mobility is constricted in these segregated neighborhoods. Another possibility is that those residing in mid-level enclave neighborhoods may be more aware of being profiled and more willing to report the incident in contrast to the residents living in neighborhoods with high levels of enclave characteristics. Unfortunately, we do not have data to test this hypothesis further. In regrades to neighborhood-level poverty, a percentage increase in households that earn less than $10,000 a year corresponds to an almost 3 percent rise in the odds of being questioned about citizenship status by law enforcement.

We determined that neighborhood-level factors do moderate the relationship between individual-level factors and being questioned about citizenship status, although the significance and direction of influence of individual-level factors remains the same. The effect of generational status exerts a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement, even after introducing individual- and neighborhood-level variables. In particular, the likelihood of being asked about citizenship status by law enforcement was 93 percent higher among first- and 89 percent higher among the second-generation, in contrast to third-and-later generations.

CONCLUSION

Based on primary research on 677 individuals residing in 46 neighborhoods, this study used HGLM methods to investigate the likelihood of being questioned about citizenship status by law enforcement along the U.S.- México border city of El Paso, Texas. The answer to this question has implications for understanding racial and citizenship profiling particularly among Latina/os who are the numerical majority in this region. Moreover, as noted by Coutin (2011) given the shift from national to local immigration policing efforts it is more important than ever before for law enforcement to make distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Furthermore, we also examine the neighborhood effects on who is asked about citizenship status, thus investigating the structural impact on citizenship profiling. We found that even in El Paso who has no formal agreements with the federal government for the policing of immigration, not only do law enforcement interact with immigrants, but they also engage in citizenship profiling.

So, who does law enforcement perceive as undocumented? Building upon qualitative research, our study found statistical evidence that first- and second-generation are more likely to be questioned about their citizenship status by law enforcement than individuals who are third-generations and later regardless of sex, Latina/o ethnicity, age, and the neighborhood characteristics of poverty and level of enclavishness. The implications of our finding for the first-and second-generations are vast. First, both first- and second-generation individuals are subjected to constricted freedom and more prone to criminalization in contrast to third- and later-generations, since they are subjected to heighten levels of surveillance. Second, in regards to policing, questions arise about the implications of citizenship profiling for community policing that involves the protection and collaboration of all residents including immigrants. Third, being that first generation are disproportionately subjected to citizenship profiling and that among them are undocumented migrants it is important to evaluate policing procedures on what type of identification is accepted and consider given the consequences of arrest that can lead to deportation.

The effects of neighborhood-level factors of poverty and level of enclavishness on being questioned about citizenship status were accessed. Residents in poverty neighborhoods are more likely to be questioned about citizenship status by law enforcement. Thus, the salience of poverty and heighten levels of policing also apply to the issue of citizenship profiling. To access the neighborhood-level impact of ethnic enclaves we used an array of indicators based on survey and American Community Survey data on transnationalism (survey), acculturation to México (survey), percent foreign-born, percent foreign-born not naturalized (ACS), percent Spanish only at home (ACS), and percent Mexican-origin (ACS). We found that those who reside in neighborhoods that with mid-levels of enclavishness are more likely to be questioned by law enforcement about their citizenship status than those living in high enclave neighborhoods. This advanced our understanding of ethnic enclaves in a couple of ways. First, the concept of the ethnic enclave has largely been examined for its economic implications and we found it is also influences the policing of its residents. Second, we found that the impact of ethnic enclaves is not linear when it comes to policing. In line with the ethnic enclave literature that described these neighborhood clusters as protective (e.g. Portes and Bach 1985; Zhou 1992), residents in high enclave neighborhoods are less likely to be questioned about citizenship status than those who reside in neighborhoods that exhibited less enclave features (mid-level of enclavishness). We suspect that those who reside in mid-level enclave neighborhoods are more likely to be asked about their citizenship status because they may be more integrated into the city and thus more visible and mobile in contrast to those who live in high enclave neighborhoods who may be more segregated. Unfortunately, data limitations did not allow for us to test this theory further.

Therefore, a limitation of this study is not having information on where and the types of activities that individuals were involved in when they were questioned by law enforcement. Having this information can strengthen our analysis of neighborhood effects. We do not know if individuals were question in their neighborhoods or elsewhere, what we do know is that where you live matters and there is neighborhood variation in who gets targeted for questioning about their citizenship status. Another limitation is not having accurate information on undocumented status. While we did try to capture undocumented status, we could not use this variable because of missing data.

In sum, our primary data was designed to conduct a multilevel analysis on citizenship profiling along the U.S.- México border that allowed for an investigation of individual and neighborhood effects. To date, we have gained important insights on the implications of policing immigration at the individual-level from qualitative and policy analyses that revealed an array of negative consequences including racial profiling and criminalization of Latina/os (Heyman, 2010; Kennis, 2011; Longazel, 2013; Provine et al., 2016; Provine and Sanchez, 2011; Saenz et al., 2011), removal and deportation (Armenta, 2016; Provine et al., 2016; Golash-Boza, 2012; Motomura, 2011), and compromising community policing efforts (Nygun and Gill, 2016). At the neighborhood-level there has been less attention given to the policing of immigration. An important exception is Mary Romero’s (2006) analysis of the Chandler Roundups in Arizona who found residents of Latina/o neighborhoods being disproportionately targeted. We contribute to this scholarship by establishing that first- and second-generation individuals and those who reside in neighborhoods characterized by poverty and mid-level of enclavishness are disproportionately questioned about their citizenship status by law enforcement.

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