
US borders are being reconfigured as part of the security rhetoric. The construction of ‘both a borderless economy and a barricaded border’ to accommodate NAFTA and national security is in place now (3). Andreas characterizes pre-9/11 border enforcement as politically successful (in that it garnered much approval) but a policy failure in that it did not significantly intercept illegal drugs and crossers. Another aspect of failure is that it redirected said drugs and crossers past more dangerous territory. Border officials face intense pressure to stop migrants, drugs, and 100% of terrorists. The shift from processing workers to detecting terrorists has been placed on INS and they are using the old strategies for drug and migrants to do so. Another change that 9/11 brought was lumping various organizations under DHS and blurring the lines between local law enforcement and national security. Speaking about the US-Canadian border, Andreas argues that there has been a Mexicanization of US-Canada border policies, where the northern border is finally seen as a dangerous vulnerability as well. Security is a barrier to legitimate trade and the US risks a self-imposed trade embargo (7). Canada and Mexico are much more dependent on the US for trade than the opposite so they face much more pressure to appease the US on their border policies. The migrant policing on Mexico’s southern border showcases Mexico’s allegiance to another countries’ security model, even calling security “an interdependent matter” (10). Andreas argues that if Mexico and Canada don’t want to risk a shut-down of their perspective borders with the US, they must conform to US pressure about national security. Future border trajectories include choosing between a fortress America or a fortress North
America but the latter would be very difficult to coordinate. While the border shifts back and forth on its policies depending on the decade, the new concern is not warfare with another country but transnational terrorist actors who use “the same cross-border transportation and communications networks that are the arteries of a highly integrated and interdependent economy” (14).


Recent studies have identified multiple forms of capital that Latino students acquire in their homes and communities. Influenced by these studies, this article examines how transnational students of Mexican origin use various forms of their community’s cultural wealth as tools to survive situations of violence here in the US and in Mexico. In this article, we present how children experience violence, particularly drug-related violence across the border and symbolic violence in their school in the US. We also discuss the ways in which the students’ resiliency (resistant capital) helps them in their daily lives. We focus on how students, despite their experience with violence, draw on their border rootedness, on transnational knowledge, and on resilient resistant capital in order to meaningfully participate in an elementary school English-Spanish dual language immersion program.


This article focuses on the question of: what will we do about inevitable future traffic at ports of entry? Texas makes up 75% of trade at ports of entry on the US-Mexico border. If traffic is not controlled, the economic benefits of NAFTA may be thwarted. Traffic congestion can cost billions in delay costs and produces more tailpipe emissions. It also causes car spill back to highways. Using a simulation model on the Zaragoza Bridge in El Paso to calculate what would be the best method for easing traffic congestion, the avoidance of closing the east tollbooth (versus its current 20 minute closing for personnel exchange at 11:30 am and 12:30 pm) was deemed as the best option. Less effective alternatives included decreasing the lunch-break time at
the east tollbooth or adding a third tollbooth (though these would still have lengthy waiting times).


This report looks at literature published on various methods of vehicle emission reduction at POE. The difficulty with producing broad suggestions for POE is that they differ in their layout, capacity, vehicle types, traffic, and location. For example, a method that requires engines to be turned off would be undesirable if not impossible in a desert POE. The four categories of emission reduction are 1) fuel technologies 2) engine and vehicle technologies 3) system optimization/operational efficiency and 4) smart/sustainable growth (16). The most effective practices were found in vehicle technologies and system optimization/operation efficiencies. Various strategies have been developed for vehicle emission reduction. Some focus on the cargo itself- how to make the vehicle load lighter, remove excess packaging and so forth. Others focus on the drivers- training them to drive in ways that reduce emissions like anti-idling. Others focus on the facilities and how ‘smart growth’ planning can help reduce future emissions. Technology like diesel oxidation catalysts and diesel particulate filters transform pollutants into less harmful versions or capture solid particulate matter so it is not released into the air. Incentives for companies to reduce emissions (and in turn fuel costs) are also supported. Again, important to note that while one strategy worked well for one vehicle type or POE, it was not applicable everywhere. Reducing border crossing times would also help, both in the emissions produced and the amount of exposure time to inspection staff. Framing eco-driving as beneficial towards public health, environment, and economics while providing incentives for companies and drivers, habits can change over time. For future planning the CEC suggests greater information sharing between transnational transportation agencies, seminars, workshops, support for emission reduction policy, and easy information access to groups and projects working on this issue. The report ends with a literature review of other projects which also looked at vehicle emissions on POE (worth having a look at).¹

¹ For further recommendations see the SCERP conference paper of Quintana, Penelope JE, Paula Stigler, Gabriela Muñoz Melendez, Margarito Quintero-Nuñez, and Jose Guillermo Rodriguez Ventura. "White Paper: Health
The objective of this research is to identify bottlenecks at U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry and to develop action plans to facilitate border crossing, thereby easing the movement of people, passenger vehicles, and commercial traffic between the two countries. The research focuses on measures for improving international commercial flows, transport logistics, and physical infrastructure. Our intent is that these proposals provide a knowledge base that will enable the Border Facilitation Working Group to develop approaches for improved functionality at border ports of entry. This, in turn, would increase regional, national, and bilateral competitiveness.

The study assumes the premise that excessive delays at crossing points on the U.S.-Mexico border and other related obstacles to commercial flows offset much of the trade gains that have been realized due to the lowering of import tariffs under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the shift to modern international shared production systems, known locally as the maquiladora export industry (IME).

We believe that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, generated a shift in inspection policies at U.S. border points of entry, increasing the emphasis on national security, to the detriment of attention to economic activity. Exacerbating delays due to the surge in crossborder commercial activity driven by NAFTA and IME, the U.S. government tightened controls at border ports of entry after 2001, further slowing the movement of people, passenger vehicles, and commercial transport in the border zone.

We conceive of the ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border as a strategic bilateral infrastructure whose construction, operation, and maintenance must be determined and assessed bilaterally. We also recognize that, even though several governments of Border States have commissioned studies of problems at their own border ports, still pending is an integral, borderwide assessment that is based on reliable data and that takes into account the views of local governments and pertinent stakeholders.

The research findings indicate that there are many measures that hold strong potential for

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improving capacity and efficiency at border ports through the introduction of targeted measures at the principal points of entry between the two countries: Tijuana-San Diego, Nogales-Nogales, Ciudad Juárez-El Paso, and Nuevo Laredo-Laredo. These measures are aimed at creating the conditions already identified as prerequisites for transforming border ports into pathways for expediting, not hindering, commercial exchanges (Alianza para la Seguridad y la Prosperidad de América del Norte, 2005). These requisite conditions line up along three axes: secure infrastructure, the secure movement of people, and the secure movement of goods.


Drawing on sociocultural approaches to literacy and literature on the communal spaces of teaching and learning of Latinas, I share one Mexicana’s life story and analyze her literacies and ways of knowing in order to give consejo. Using data gathered through individual interviews and observations, I present the case of Lucía, the owner of a burrito’s restaurant. She read and wrote with the goal of giving consejo to her children, siblings, friends, and her customers. She reads the Bible, the newspaper, and self-help books in order to give consejo to her customers about marriage and life in general. In addition, Lucía writes prison inmates giving them consejo and hope. This literacy practice had the purpose of sharing information, maintaining social networks, and helping each other out. It is part of the communal spaces of teaching and learning that Latinas create in order to build community. This paper adds to the growing body of literature that identifies Latina’s pedagogical tools in family and community contexts and challenges deficit views of transnational Latinas.


This paper presents part of the results of a qualitative study about literacy practices of Mexican transnational mothers, who live in and frequently cross the border between two countries (the United States and Mexico). Drawing on sociocultural approaches to literacy and literature on transnationalism, I analyze one practice: leer juntas (reading together). Leer juntas is a literacy
practice that mothers shared with their daughters, as a part of maintaining the Spanish language as well as Mexican ways of living and being. It is also a transnational literacy practice, which connects the mothers with other relatives across the border. Finally, in some cases it is a biliterate practice, where daughters and mothers use both English and Spanish. The paper concludes with recommendations for practice.


The purpose of this article is to discuss the ways in which young transfronterizo students who live between the two worlds of El Paso (USA) and Ciudad Juárez (Mexico) bring their literacy practices and content to the classroom. Drawing on the data gathered during a 3-year ethnographic study, we illustrate how transfronterizo texts and content are used for academic purposes, in particular in the context of learning narrative writing. We present the case of one transfronteriza teacher who successfully facilitated literacies crossing numerous borders. We frame our discussion of transfronterizo literacy practices drawing on literature from dual language education, the Continua of Biliteracy Model, and the New Literacy Studies. We show the recontextualization and transcontextualization of texts and practices. These processes help us understand biliteracy development in this border area, which is both global and local. We argue that developing awareness of how transfronterizo literacies are used in classrooms can provide teachers and researchers of linguistically minoritized students in other contexts with a better and complex understanding of the resources students bring to school in order to recognize ways in which to capitalize on these mobile resources for relevant educational experiences.

Research on transnational literacies has generally focused on youth who live in one country and communicate using digital literacies across national boundaries. Our work contributes to this literature by providing a view of transnational literacies that are unique to the USA–Mexico border region. The students in this ethnographic study navigate two countries, two languages, and two homes on a weekly and sometimes daily basis. This article describes the literacies that these transfronterizo youth acquire as border crossers. Our focus is on the print and digital literacies learned outside of the classroom and how these are being used by the students in academic settings.

Los estudios sobre prácticas letradas transnacionales se han enfocado principalmente en jóvenes que viven en un país y atraviesan fronteras nacionales al utilizar prácticas letradas digitales. Nuestro estudio etnográfico contribuye a este conjunto de estudios desde una perspectiva transfronteriza (EEUU–México). Los participantes del estudio navegan diariamente o semanalmente dos países, dos idiomas y dos hogares. Este artículo describe la literacidad de estos jóvenes transfronterizos. Nos centramos en las prácticas letradas impresas y digitales aprendidas fuera de los salones y cómo estas prácticas son utilizadas por los estudiantes en contextos académicos.


Budget constraints are forcing many governments to consider implementing tolls as a means for financing bridge and road expenditures. Newly available time series data make it possible to analyze the impacts of toll variations and international business cycle fluctuations on cross-border bridge traffic between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. Parameter estimation is carried out using a linear transfer function ARIMA methodology. Price elasticities of demand are similar to those reported for other regional economies, but out-of-sample forecasting results are mixed.

The article analyzes meaning-making practices in a two-way dual-language (TWDL) program on the U.S.-Mexico border among transfronterizo and Mexican-origin youth. In the article, we show that emergent bilingual learners and their teacher participate in activities that mediate understanding of science content knowledge. We show how the teacher of a fourth-grade TWDL classroom creates a borderland space in which the full repertoire of students’ languages, including translanguaging, is recognized and validated. We illustrate how the teacher, Ms. O, guides students to use strategies and meaning-making tools in both languages to construct meanings of the science content. We also demonstrate how she scaffolds students’ language development, develops students’ higher-order thinking, and involves all students in constructing understanding. We end with a discussion and suggestions for dual-language teaching.


Indirect Transportation Costs (ITC) is the “average extra cost spent throughout the export process when trading goods and services” (170). Samuelson’s iceberg theory is utilized, which is the idea that goods start off with a certain value and due to transportation costs and other factors by the time the product reaches its destination some of the value has melted. The longer goods have to travel, the more costs it will incur along the way. Some statistics are given from different authors (for example: each additional day in transport reduces the probability of trade with the US by 1-1/5%; estimation of trade costs is between 2-15% of the total value; an additional day in the transportation time is equivalent to 0.8% tariff; if costs could be reduced by 1% the profit would be $40 billion worldwide; each hour spent waiting to cross costs the US $62.5 per truck). Mexico depends on trade with US more than the opposite. Demand between the two countries is ever-growing and when this happens bottlenecks occur. ITC have decreased from 1995 to 2009 and this can be partly explained by NAFTA policies taking effect. With NAFTA there was an expectation that transportation costs would decrease over time and while this may have occurred, the increase in trade and bottlenecking have offset this profit.
It is well known that merchandise trade flows respond to exchange rate policy changes over time. This topic, known in the economics literature as the J-curve effect, has been the subject of numerous studies. Exchange rate policies also impact commuter traffic between international metropolitan areas, but there has been much less attention devoted to understanding the effects of currency valuation shifts on border crossings between nations such as the United States and Mexico. While there has been some research conducted with respect to employment impacts on annual crossing volumes, the analysis has been limited to static models. The research at hand attempts to partially fill this gap in the existing literature by examining the response in international commuter flows to exchange rate valuation shifts. In order to gain better appreciation of the temporal aspects of border crossing reactions to policy changes of this nature, all of the analysis is conducted within a dynamic framework.

El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, jointly comprise a large cross-border metropolitan economy. El Paso is an important port-of-entry for international cargo, as well as a key transit point for regional trade flows in the southwestern United States. Reflective of those traits, the borderplex econometric forecasting system includes two blocks of transportation equations. One subsystem models northbound surface traffic across the international bridges from Ciudad Juárez. The other deals with passenger, cargo, and mail flows at El Paso International Airport. To gauge model reliability, an analysis of borderplex transportation variable forecast accuracy relative to a random walk benchmark is completed. Empirical evidence is mixed with respect to model precision for the 1998 to 2003 sample period for which data are currently available.
Although not directly targeted by any of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the El Paso – Ciudad Juárez borderplex economy was impacted by related administrative events that subsequently occurred. To examine what areas of the regional economy were affected, a series of statistical tests are employed. Similar to what has been documented for the New York metropolitan economy, many sectors of the borderplex escaped the aftereffects of 9/11 without observing large scale changes. Several other sectors, however, were impacted in statistically significant manners.


Border region transportation forecast analysis is fraught with difficulty. In the case of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, dual national business cycles and currency market fluctuations further complicate modeling efforts. Incomplete data samples and asymmetric data reporting conventions further confound forecasting exercises. Under these conditions, a natural alternative to structural econometric models to consider is neural network analysis. Neural network forecasts of air transportation and international bridge activity are developed using a multi-layered perceptron approach. Those out-of-sample simulations are then compared to previously published forecasts produced with a system of simultaneous econometric equations. Empirical results indicate that the econometric approach is generally more accurate. In several cases, the two sets of forecasts are found to contain complementary information.


Increases in international merchandise trade plus growth in the northern Mexico maquiladora sector have caused the volume of cargo vehicle flows through border metropolitan areas to expand in recent decades. In order to examine whether the trends associated with these developments can be successfully modeled, short-term time series characteristics of cross-border cargo vehicle traffic through El Paso, Texas are analyzed. Econometric methodologies employed include both univariate and transfer function ARIMA analysis. Data are drawn for the January 1980 - December 1999 sample period. Empirical results indicate that Ciudad Juárez maquiladora
employment, El Paso nonagricultural employment, inflation adjusted exchange rate, Mexican industrial activity, and U.S. industrial performance play important roles in determining month-to-month fluctuations in border region cargo vehicle traffic flows.


This study examines whether economic conditions in Mexico influence public transportation ridership levels in the border cities of Brownsville and Laredo, Texas. Besides the standard variables generally utilized to model bus ridership, additional indicators included in the empirical analysis are northbound pedestrian traffic and the real exchange rate index. Seemingly unrelated regression parameter estimates suggest that the volume of pedestrian border crossings in both cities is positively related to changes in ridership. The real exchange rate index in Laredo is negatively related to fluctuations in ridership, implying that peso appreciation increases transit utilization in this border city.


Empirical research for public transport demand has uncovered numerous interesting commonalities across metropolitan economies. This study examines the demand for municipal bus services over time in El Paso, Texas, USA. El Paso is one of the largest metropolitan economies in the USA located directly adjacent to an international boundary with another country. This study not only models the demand for municipal bus services as a function of traditional variables such as price, income and weather, but also includes regressors designed to measure the potential impacts of cross-border economic conditions on El Paso ridership. Results from a Linear Transfer Function (LTF) modelling approach indicate that rider volumes are affected by domestic as well as international economic conditions in this border metropolitan area.

Although there have been a small number of empirical studies that analyse northbound border crossings between Mexico and the United States, very few examine the potential impacts of both tolls and exchange rates on the various traffic categories. This effort attempts to partially fill that gap in the applied economics literature by modelling northbound traffic flows at one of the largest regional economies along the border. Results indicate that business cycle fluctuations, variations in the real exchange rate, and changes in real toll tariffs all influence cross border traffic volumes. Tolls on northbound traffic into the United States are assessed by Mexico. The results also indicate that tolls can provide a reliable revenue stream for international bridge infrastructure finance in Mexico.


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Prior research establishes that the price of parking in the city centre often impacts the decision to travel downtown and the mode of transportation utilized. Other factors that influence the decision to drive and park downtown have received less attention. This study uses time series data to analyse the demand for metered parking spaces in El Paso, Texas, USA. In addition to meter rates, the determinants of demand include personal income, gasoline prices and the price of a substitute good, parking garage spaces. Because international bridges connect downtown El Paso to neighbouring Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, the impacts of transboundary traffic flows, bridge tolls and other cross-border economic variables are also included as potential determinants of metered parking demand. Results indicate that parking meter rates, other transportation related costs, and economic conditions in both countries affect meter use.


The authors looked at crossing times deemed as extreme (more than 2 hours or the largest 1% of crossing times on the Pacific Highway POE (U.S.-Canada border). Observing these extreme waiting times, the authors determined that this delay was not due to primary inspection (as is usually assumed). These long crossing times are even more disruptive than normal ones because
the company does not incorporate this expected disruption into their estimated delay costs. The volume of vehicles does not necessarily correlate into longer crossing times. During business hours long waiting times are usually due to congestion. Outside of business hours (when a vehicle is more likely to experience very long crossing times) this is because “almost all very long delays are incurred at least in part, by nonprimary sources of delay” (935). The authors recommend more resources outside of peak business hours to combat this.


This chapter covers the process of securitization in ways generally applicable to all types of ports, especially to U.S. ports of entry at the Mexican border. It brings a wide range of sources, including firsthand observation of ports of entry and interviews with border inspectors, to bear on the question of whether U.S. borders can be successfully secured against outside threats via new computer databases and sensing technologies. As U.S. pursuit of global trade integration expands international commerce, it also effectively stimulates emigration from countries being opened to U.S. goods. Consequently, the challenge to port inspectors, of simultaneously facilitating authorized entry and egress and interdicting unauthorized goods and people will increase greatly, probably exceeding the capability of either advanced technology or human monitoring. The interdiction efforts at ports of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border collide frontally with the economic imperative of permitting rapid and massive passage of goods and people across international frontiers.


Is current US border policy at the Mexican border effective towards capitalism? Since NAFTA goods and capital travel easily across borders but not so much people. It would seem that capitalism would benefit from the easy migration of people as well (for labor purposes) but perhaps it benefits from its current practices. Capitalism is contradictory. For example much attention and money is channeled between ports of entry but Border Patrol officers are bored at
their post. Meanwhile, ports of entry are underfunded at significant time delay cost to the capitalist economy. Immigration enforcement puts migrants in a vulnerable position to be exploited but it also can’t be so heavy-handed and absolute that migrants are unable to enter the country (the U.S. needs their labor). Another contradiction is both the economic presence and social separation of the working class, expressed through their public stigmatization. In conclusion, rather than viewing capitalism as purely functional, it should be seen as a partner of the territorial nation-state which must juggle the demands of diverse groups and which contains its own “instabilities, contradictions, and costs” (276).


Ports of entry are structured to perpetuate existing inequalities despite the promises of global economic freedom. Not all borders are made equal- some are more strictly controlled than others. POE are important to study because they highlight how the U.S. attempts to implement power. Information, goods, and people are the various types of crossers but they differ in scrutiny. People are becoming increasingly surveillanced and restricted as seen by our passport systems. World systems framework allows us to conceptualize borders as ever-changing “unequal exchange across space” (305). A curious thing occurs at border ports of entry- people and the goods they make change value. Ports can reveal our contemporary world system. Inspection can never be objective because port officers need to make interpretative guesswork on the criminality of the crossers.


U.S. and Mexican ports of entry are the historical bases of most twin border cities, and their importance continues today. San Ysidro, between Tijuana in Lower California, and San Diego County in Upper California, is the most heavily traversed land port in the world. Surprisingly little scholarly work has been done on U.S.-Mexican border ports of entry (but see Arreola and Curtis 1993: 192-201). This article aims to rectify that neglect, viewing the U.S. ports in three ways. It first reviews the basic operations of ports, and then turns to the people who operate the port, balancing their work lives and their place in border society. It finishes by examining ports
as an arm of the U.S. state. In this regard, the considerable localism of ports on the southern boundary creates tension between the port’s mandate to enforce national policies and its adaptation to immediate social, economic, and cultural circumstances. The conclusion offers suggestions for further studies of this vital but neglected institution.


9/11 made ‘immigration a homeland defense concern’ (749). The challenge with national security is that nations, and the US especially, often derive their economic strength from international exchanges of labor, information, and transportation. If the US purports itself to be a democracy, it cannot violate civil rights in the name of fighting terrorism. The 9/11 attacks revealed many vulnerabilities in migration toward the US, but some counter strategies have been counterproductive and/or discriminatory. For example, denying drivers’ licenses to undocumented people will not help find terrorists, but will ensure that they are not in the system at all (755). Aside from this, border policies also perpetuate an environment in which criminal activities can flourish, such as exploitative smuggling (which really undermines the entire concept of security). Finally, policies that profile on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race alienates the community and their cooperation with law enforcement. Kerwin’s overall argument is that many ‘national security’ policies are not actually effective and negatively affect migrants and refugees (to the worst case scenario of sending people back to their country to die).


Focusing on the US-Canadian border, Klug provides the historical justification for ports of entry. After 1907 ports of entry established themselves as the only way to cross legally into the U.S., and consequently all aliens needed to provide evidence of their legitimacy to enter the country. Among the first undesirable categories: criminals, prostitutes, anarchists, contract laborers, insane or diseased (contagious) persons, those found guilty of moral turpitude and those likely to become a public charge (398). In contrast with first class passengers at seaports, steerage
passengers faced more intrusive physical and verbal examination. Additionally, those with proper “appearance, talk, carriage, etc.” were waved through faster. Klug also mentions the ‘type’ of inspector desired for the job and how crowd heckling and rowdiness lowered the morale of the inspector. The last section of the paper is dedicated to various complaints of delay and treatment by rude officials. The INS accepted written complaints but had no resolution mechanism. Usually only the people with the vocabulary and confidence to confront a government agency did so (upper class in other words). While ports of entry attempted to be highly controlled and regulated “the unpredictable human element remained” (411). The role of law enforcement was inverted at the border- instead of receiving protection people experienced interrogation.

Koslowski, Rey. "Smart borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: Homeland Security Choices for the United States and Canada." *Law & Bus. Rev. Am.* 11 (2005): 527-550. Koslowski compares the different borders proposed after 9/11, though focusing on Canada. One of the first proposals was an EU-type of North American perimeter. Electronic data tracking utilizing biometrics is considered as part of the ‘virtual borders’ strategy. Different but related is the argument for ‘smart borders’ which are preventative immigration occurring away from physical border lines by way of bilateral security cooperation (all of this without disrupting trade and travel). 9/11 illustrated how intertwined the US and Canada were, especially in regards to just-in-time trade. The hijackers used black market methods to move in the US and could have been intercepted by authorities. Terrorists then and now could utilize the same methods that (non-terrorist) undocumented migrants use to get into the US. Current infrastructure was intended for NAFTA accommodation, not meticulous screening. For the US, Canada (and maybe Mexico) to create smart border coordination would be extremely difficult because all three countries would need to 1) have a customs union 2) harmonize visa policies and 3) harmonize asylum policies (which are currently quite different due to the different relationships those countries have with international investors). Virtual borders require vast cooperation as well and trust (540). A blend of smart borders plus the ‘no border’ EU model could also be used but they all have various political challenges.

Being heterogeneous, Hispanic populations display different types of trans-border mobility. Hispanics in the border region suffer from poorer health due to poverty levels, lack of health care access and coverage. Interviewing border residents they found that mobile residents (defined as those who travel to Juarez more than once a year) do so because it is less expensive to get certain resources there. The data showed that mobile crossers tended to be less educated, poorer, and less likely to own a car than non-mobile residents. They were also more likely to do the interview in Spanish, have gone to school outside the US, and have spent less time living in the US than their non-mobile counterparts. Mobile residents were more likely to use Juarez to get health care, medicine, and groceries, cross the border for work and business, and commute between the two cities to visit family. Finally, non-mobile residents had higher acculturation levels, were less likely to have Hispanic friends. Social support and networks were measured as similar between the two groups however. The authors write “perhaps because they have fewer economic resources, mobile respondents travel to Juarez for various goods and services, including relatively less expensive health care” (269). The conclusion draws attention to the possibility that perhaps because of language, immigration, or other socio-cultural challenges, mobile respondents tend to have lower socio-economic status than their non-mobile counterparts.


In this study, the authors examine the language practices of first- and second-year college students as they build disciplinary literacies within a cocurricular engineering leadership program. Conducted by two teacher educators and literacy/biliteracy researchers situated in the highly diverse U.S.-Mexico borderlands, the study examines the role of disciplinary language and literacy development among 12 "transfronterizo" (border-crossing) engineering students who crossed the U.S.-Mexico border on a regular basis, with a particular focus on the experience of two students. Drawing on systemic functional linguistics as well as sociocultural theories of literacy/biliteracy, the authors illustrate the ways in which these students moved fluidly between Spanish and English, as well as multiple registers and modalities, to make sense of engineering
concepts. Findings build on recent studies of "transfronterizo" literacies and shed light on pedagogical practices that encourage students' use of their full linguistic repertoires in order to develop disciplinary literacy practices in engineering.


The increasingly diverse and multilingual character of U.S. schools, combined with the increasingly digital nature of communication in U.S. society, necessitate a re-envisioning of teachers’ pedagogical – as well as epistemological and ontological – stances towards teaching and learning in the 21st century. At the heart of this re-envisioning is teachers’ (multi-)literate practice, that is, the ways in which teachers understand and engage in reading and writing pedagogy across multiple languages, literacies, and modalities. One site to explore teachers’ conceptions of future (multi-)literate practice is in teacher education programs, particularly those that are focused on working with culturally and linguistically diverse students.

This qualitative study is based in one such context: a teacher education program located in the bilingual/bicultural context of the US-Mexico border. Drawing on sociocultural theories of literacy/biliteracy (Barton, 1994; Hornberger, 2003; Street, 1984), transnational literacies (Jiménez, Smith, & Teague, 2009; Warriner, 2007), and multiliteracies (Cope &Kalantzis, 2000; New London Group, 1996), as well as situated perspectives on identity (Holland, Skinner, Lachicotte, and Cain, 1998), we explore the literacy practices and multi-literate identities of transfronterizo pre-service teachers who cross the U.S.-Mexico border on a regular basis and whose social interactions straddle two nations. In keeping with Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), we see the border as a space of contestation, where symbols, meanings, and ultimately identities sometimes co-exist, but often collide with one another. The experiences of border-crossing pre-service teachers can provide a valuable glimpse into these “cultural collisions” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p.100) within and across educational contexts.

The questions that formed the basis of this study included:
1. What are the literacy practices of transfronterizo pre-service secondary teachers in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands?
2. What are the (multi-)literate identities of transfronterizo pre-service teachers in the borderlands, and how do they construct and enact these identities within a teacher education setting?
3. How do transfronterizo pre-service teachers envision the incorporation of multiple literacies into their future teaching?

In this paper, we focus on the multiliterate identities and practices of six border-crossing pre-service teachers, drawing primarily on interviews and written reflections produced as part of a Content Area Literacy course that we taught. In our analysis we highlight some of the tensions and contradictions present in these pre-service teachers’ representations of their own literate engagement with digital tools and technologies, and with their ideas about the use of technologies as future teachers. In particular, we show how all six of the pre-service teachers used digital technologies as a resource for their own academic learning but how, at the same time, they expressed ambivalence toward the use of technology in their own classrooms. This ambivalence, we argue, is tied to conflicting cultural models of literacy, teaching, and learning that could stem in part from the participants’ social locations as border-crossers.


This article isn’t about ports of entry per se but Mojica compares the Canadian and US laws for native peoples crossing the border. Firstly, many tribes recognize other tribe boundaries but are not historically bound by notions of national borders. Secondly, Canadian natives are allowed to cross into the US and are recognized by their tribal cards but US natives crossing into Canada are simply ‘Americans’. Of Canada and US Mojica writes “from an Indigenous point of view, both American and Canadian cultural identities have the same root. They both come from ‘over there’, across the ocean. Both cultures have developed around justifications for invasion and colonization and, in doing so, have separated themselves from lands and the histories that they came from” (38). This article reminds us of pre-national perspectives on borders and territory.

Focusing on ports of entry on the U.S-Canada border, Mountz argues that ports of entries function as mobile islands which restrict migrants’ mobility. Borders and ports are mobile in that they “disappear for some, only to reappear elsewhere for others” (320). Mountz uses an ontology of exclusion to understand covert state actions such as offshore detention sites. States attempt to control migration by 1) choosing the types of refugees allowed to enter 2) collaborating with other countries on returning asylum seekers or acting as a buffer between the migrants and the U.S. Displacement and enforcement work together; the mobility of one group often limits the mobility of another. In asking where ports of entries exist, Mountz suggests that they are increasingly anywhere and more mobile than ever.

North American Development Bank, Felipe Ochoa y Asociados (FOA Consultores) y Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI). *Analysis of International Port-of-Entry Projects on the U.S.-Mexico Border* (also available in Spanish as *Análisis de los Proyectos de Puertos de Entrada Internacionales en la Frontera México–Estados Unidos*), 2015

[link](nadb.org/pdfs/publications/NADBANK%20POE%20English%20091015.pdf)

The study addressed four specific tasks:

1. Summarize the institutional vision of both governments related to the border and international crossings and bridges.

2. Map existing international crossings and bridges between Mexico and the United States (U.S.), as well as those currently in the process of being implemented and those proposed in the future. Likewise, organize the infrastructure projects in the short and long term based on their current status and other criteria as determined by the relevant federal agencies. Review the implementation process for binational infrastructure projects in both Mexico and the U.S., ranking the status of each one using information from existing studies, including regional border master plans (RBMPs), prepared by the state governments and specifying those projects identified as a high priority.

3. Evaluate current financing mechanisms and identify new options.

4. Create an information technology (IT) system so that the pertinent federal, state, and local authorities in both countries may follow up on the status of existing infrastructure, projects in the process of being implemented, and new project proposals. In addition, it will serve to support the
development process for regional border master plans. The database will be the exclusive property of the two governments and will be administered by the federal agencies assigned by the two governments.


Focusing on CBP abuses on travelers/migrants, this article focuses on a complaint filed by ACLU to the DHS. After the brutal death of Anastasio Hernandez Rojas at the hands of Border Patrol agents there was widespread outcry at the impunity of CBP officers. The U.S.-Mexico border, including its violent foundation, “reflects and reproduces who gets what rights and resources” (66). Authorities denied Hernandez Rojas’s life twice- the first time when they deported him and separated him from his family; the second time when they literally killed him. Nevins concludes that the border is not the problem but rather the entire CBP culture, as seen from their activity in further locations like detention.


9/11 stopped the increasingly integrated US border in its tracks. Focusing on border crossings at POE for 2001, they found differing patterns for different states. There are many factors to consider in measuring the influence of 9/11 on border crossings. The ‘hardening’ of the border caused people to change their crossing patterns. In places where car crossings decreased, pedestrian activity increased due to people avoiding the longer lines. Similarly, people traveled with more members in their car, had someone pick them up or shifted to public transportation. For commercial cargo, there was a 2001 recession that had already influenced the region. Other factors such as peso devaluations and just-in-time deadlines also put pressure on the economy. The authors conclude that while economic effects of 9/11 may be roughly measured, by far the biggest effect has been the social and political annihilation of an open border. What this article points out (published in 2005) is that pre Juarez violence El Pasoans were already reluctant to cross into Juarez because of the long waiting times.

Provides proof that standing vehicles at the International Bridge of the Americas contribute to UFPs (ultrafine particles). Because of their small size the particles can seep into the human body and affect the bone marrow, lymph nodes, spleen and heart. UFPs “have been shown to impact the cardiovascular, pulmonary, and central nervous systems” (289). Because ports of entry are not isolated from communities, populations in the surrounding areas such as churches, schools, law enforcement, street vendors, commuters, and commercial vehicle drivers are at higher risk.


Using an environmental justice framework, this article looks at pollutants on the US-Mexican border, which has seen substantial growth since the passage of NAFTA. Because of the many agencies and differences in law, politics, and environmental requirements between the US and Mexico, international coordination is difficult. In the past when POE were constructed, environmental and public health concerns were usually not considered, especially when built near residential or commercial areas. Causes of air pollution include vehicle exhaust, power plants, industrial facilities, brick kilns, dust, trash burning, agricultural operations and field burning (3). Additionally the geography of the border has airsheds, inversion layers, and plentiful sunshine that keep pollutants trapped to the region. Some health consequences of pollutants include respiratory illness, asthma, cardiovascular disease, increased mortality, and negative birth effects. Children, the elderly, and pregnant women are especially susceptible. Because the majority of border residents are poor Hispanics, this provides an example of how environmental disparities disproportionately affect already marginalized communities. The hardening of the border not only costs in terms of economic and social ties but it is also a site of concentrated pollutants due to the waiting time crossing. It is difficult to get an exact number because the type of vehicle, the time of day, the time to cross, and the vehicle speed and load can affect levels (9). Some suggestions for mitigating exposure to pollutants include increased POE staffing, improved technology, increased capacity, reductions in emissions per vehicle, anti-idling
measures, separating pedestrians from traffic, vegetation barriers, rerouting traffic away from schools and proactive city planning and design (9). Long term solutions include state-mandated vehicle emission regulation and clean public transportation. The most effective method however is reducing wait times at POE.


Ramirez investigates how border security has changed since 9/11. Prior to 9/11 NAFTA promoted economic integration, investment, and trade in North America. Bill Clinton stated that with the passage of NAFTA illegal immigration would decrease as economies would stabilize in migrants’ home countries. So NAFTA was actually pitched as a solution for undocumented migration (69). In addition to the creation of the US-VISIT program, after 9/11 CBP officers began to be cross-trained in three previously separated roles, immigration, customs, and agricultural inspection. Concurrently the CBP officer was absorbed into the DHS system, with the primary mission shifting to terrorist interception. Using linear regression, Ramirez wants to stress the type and significance of 9/11 but is not measuring the magnitude. Unexpectedly in some areas like California, Arizona, and Texas border crossings increased and in other places 9/11 had no effect. This may be explained by people wishing to “get in” the U.S. amongst fears that it would close. The extremely long waiting lines may have also pressured personnel to work on bringing border activity back to pre-9/11 disruption. Ramirez argues that the long history of US-Mexico economic, social, political, and cultural integration has been stronger than any effects the DHS era has had on it.


Inspections at borders are necessary for national security but these inspections drive up costs related to trade. More complex costs include the need to move unfinished goods quickly so that they can be completed in a neighboring country. The simulation used consisted of adding one imaginary CBP officer at 33 ports of entry on both the Canadian and Mexican border (including major airports). Doing so would have the impact of 64.8 million dollars in GDP, 1084 jobs, and
21.2 million in value of time gained (165). One consequence to consider however is that when waiting times decrease at ports of entry, this encourages people to make more trips (which causes more traffic and causes the benefits to be cancelled somewhat). One final interesting point: the longer the waiting queues are at POE the faster primary inspection officers work (in other words they feel pressure to go faster to the risk of less stringent inspection occurring; 174).


Globalization is often seen as an opening of borders for the purpose of circulating money, people and goods. Real world examples like the EU showcase that while this may occur for insider membership regions, the border still exists for outside members (especially for migrants coming from poor, war-torn, or undesirable ethnic countries). The EU does this in two ways- traditional protection at POE and distant “remote control” intelligence sharing to stop people before they even reach the border. The human cost? Migrants take more dangerous routes; exploitative human smuggling increases as well. Meanwhile this structural violence has no sole entity to blame. In other words, no one is charged with migrant deaths.


In this (at the time) limited release summary Richard Stana evaluates and recommends ways to better inspection at POE. Two previously separated agencies, INS and Department of the Treasury’s Customs Services were merged into CBP and as a result the inspection process was changed. Some vulnerabilities found: “inspectors can experience difficulties in verifying the identity of travelers, traveler inspections were not always done consistently and according to policy, and inspectors did not always receive the training they needed” (2). In addition data systems were difficult to access for inspectors and there was no protocol for the collection and analysis of intelligence at POE. Stana writes that the purpose of POE is to determine whether someone is a US citizen and if not (an alien), if they are allowed to enter. He goes on to describe commuter lanes for low-risk crossers but with new legislation passing from 1996 to 2002, a new automated entry and exit system would be established. The introduction of US-VISIT is also
mentioned. A few times Stana writes that the purpose of these plans is in response to the terrorist threat to the country. Finally he writes “as a newly established department, DHS is tasked with expeditiously integrating multiple agencies and units into a cohesive and effective organization” (4).


This report evaluates the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at land POE. Travelers without proper documentation are directed to secondary inspection, which CBP is not equipped to handle at a potential increase of 73%. CBP also has not finalized its plan for verifying the identity of travels without proper documentation. The reason for the initiative was due to the passing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which in effect cancels the waived document requirement from the Immigration and Nationality Act (2). This Act allowed US, Canadian, and Bermudian citizens to orally declare citizenship and pass through at POE. Now an ID or passport proving citizenship was required. This study found that the southern border had lower complete WHTI compliance rates than the northern border (low 90% versus high 90%). If a 100% compliance rate was achieved it would mean a possible 1.7 million noncompliant travelers being directed to secondary inspection, which CBP is not ready for, personnel or infrastructure-wise. CBP has no official protocol (steps) for determining citizen and identity verification (12). Allocating too many resources to noncompliant travelers takes away from actual security risk individuals (19). Requirements for improving the current situation are on pages 12-13.


Here the Office of the Inspector General for DHS evaluates CBP protocol for intercepting terrorists at POE. One problem CBP has encountered is limited information availability to make sure the person who matches names with a terrorist is the actual terrorist themselves (1). As terrorist interception efforts have increased, the effectiveness of intercepting drugs or false
documents has decreased (1). While CBP provides reports of individual encounters at POE, this information is not used as intelligence nor given to an agency that does intelligence analysis. The lack of security clearance from CBP officers makes it difficult to collaborate with law enforcement agencies over a watchlisted individual. Here are their recommendations: 1) “expand biometric information collection program to include volunteers who would not normally provide this information when entering the US 2) authorize POE supervisors limited discretion to make more timely admissibility determinations 3) review port of entry staffing models to ensure the current workforce is able to perform the entire range of CBP mission 4) establish a policy for more consistent reporting to intelligence agencies the details gathered during secondary interviews and 5) ensure all counterterrorism personnel at POEs are granted an appropriate security clearance” (2). Skinner goes on to describe the APIS and TSDB lists, which are respectively descriptive lists of people on flights and vessels heading to the US and a terrorist watchlist. There are numerous examples of (innocent) people with matching names to a terrorist being intercepted again and again at POE, which frustrated CBP officers (a Washington Post Op-Ed is attached by a man who experiences this routinely). The US-VISIT program is proposed as possible solution because of its biometric identification.


Is there an inherent trade-off between effective security (detailed inspection) and traffic flow at ports of entry? Instead of proposing more inspection stations, the authors considered what could be done with current infrastructure. They tested three policy changes: 1) increasing inspections that opened vehicle compartments (to standardize primary inspections) 2) directing more vehicles to secondary inspections and 3) including more vehicles in the SENTRI lanes (which would need a reduction in enrollment costs). All of these options had challenges and there was no clear consensus on an obvious choice.

Border regulatory requirements and administrative practices changed subsequent to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks in the United States. Research in this study examines the manners in which transportation cost data for merchandise imports from Mexico behaved before and after 2001. Evidence is obtained that confirms results earlier tabulated for imports from Canada. Empirical results further indicate that, beyond freight cost changes, growth in the value of imports from Mexico was disrupted by events associated with the aftermath of 9/11.


Observations of traffic inspections at a U.S. land border port of entry in El Paso, TX indicate that the process is highly variable. In a series of 24 half-hour observation periods of ordinary non-commercial traffic, the average inspection duration ranged from 16.6 s to 56.6 s. The proportion of inspections which involved some physical search of the vehicle, as indicated by the inspector leaving the inspection booth, varied from 5% to 56% in different observation periods. In 4 out of 10 cases, the log-mean of inspection duration in simultaneous observations of parallel lanes of traffic differed significantly (p<0.05). This suggests that differences in inspector behavior are responsible for much of the variability of the inspection process. Similar results are found for the SENTRI program. A survey of public perception reveals that a majority of English-language respondents perceive the inspectors to be fair while a majority of Spanish-language respondents (both U.S. and Mexican citizens) perceive the process to be more arbitrary, as they state that fairness "depends on the inspector." Spanish-language respondents are also more likely to report having to submit to additional searches than English-language respondents. A common theme that emerges from the analysis of these two datasets is that efforts to standardize some aspects of inspections, while preserving inspector autonomy, may improve the performance of the process by eliminating variability which organized criminal groups may be able to exploit.

Because of the 1971 Immigration Act, the power to deny entry to asylum seekers entering the United Kingdom lies with Immigration Officers. This authority (and accompanying detention facility growth) has gone unchecked and we see a “prison management” being applied to detention centers (1). In response to accusations that detention assignment is subjective and in violation of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, governments have defended their decisions. Reformers want to change the structure so that from the outset decisions are made correctly, rather than relying on ever-growing complaints and appeals (2). Ports of entry were chosen for observation because detention decisions were made there. The authors interviewed immigration officers, legal representatives, and asylum seekers who were detained. Some findings: people were caught and subsequently lied about their identity or connections lost their credibility and increased their risk for detention (9); people who applied for asylum after a period of time (rather than immediately upon landing) also lost some credibility (11); the immigration officers did not consider themselves intimidating so did not understand why people would fear them (12); past immigration history, including failed asylum attempts were considered relevant (13); those with criminal backgrounds were often held in prison rather than in detention and the officers felt some level of responsibility for intercepting future-criminal migrants (15); officers acknowledged the influence of human elements such as tiredness, cynicism, or impatience with attitudes in their ability to carry out their job (17); nationality often influenced perceptions on the character of the asylum seeker (20); the strength of their asylum claim and expected processing time affected the chance of detention (22; 24); certain factors like age and gender affect detention potential (very old or very young people are not detained; women are less likely to be detained with some exceptions); splitting families was undesirable unless it worked as a mechanism for ensuring the family would stick around for the male head of household (though this didn’t always work)\(^2\) (34); sick people or those with injuries were usually not detained but there was no protocol for torture victims (38); mental health reduced the chance of detention as well (38); some asylum seekers desire to be detained because they don’t have anywhere to go and officers were split on this (“we’re not a hostel” vs “we didn’t want to put them out on the street at night”) (42); having a sponsor can work both ways - it might assure that a person will come back to follow through or

\(^2\) This point more than any other highlights the way immigration officers depend on stereotypes to make decisions. For example if a Gypsy father was detained but not his family, the family would leave without him because of their nomadic culture. So here detaining the male head of household would not ensure that the family stayed, versus another culture (34).
it might mean that they will disappear forever (43); sometimes detention was impossible simply because lack of beds (44); prison could be considered for criminal or national security candidates when detention beds were full but this was usually avoided (47).

When deciding whether to detain or not, many factors are considered rather than a single one (51); stereotyping nationalities routinely happens to the point of robotic processing (52). In contrast, interviewing legal representatives revealed that factors significantly associated with detention included special procedures, irregular entry, delayed asylum claim, previous applications or breaches, status of travel documents, and arrival without dependents. Factors not significantly associated with detention included gender, age group, ill health, torture, address/contacts on arrival and doubt over identity/nationality (54). Weighing factors on whether or not to detain was summarized as an individual judgement rather than an exact science (55).

While officers claimed there was a weighing of factors in determining whether or not to detain, selectivity of certain information became a pattern. Officers often made typifications of individuals, such as single young males versus families. Some things to consider are that officers are not trained for medical diagnoses, evidence gathering for asylum can fail, and the level of disclosure asylum seekers feel comfortable in expressing (71). The decision-making process was made up of personal, procedural, and protective dimensions (72). The purpose for detention were determined as the following: “to prevent absconding while asylum applications are processed; to facilitate initial processing; to effect removal where a quick refusal is expected; to expedite the processing of individual cases or selected categories; to gather general intelligence information; to avert risks to public health, safety or security; to protect the welfare of the asylum applicant; to deter ‘systematic breaches of the control’; and to encourage withdrawal of claims perceived to be ‘abusive’ (72). Detention models are sometimes contradictory (making it difficult to make a decision). Officers may have different decision-making styles (72). For example, some officers adhered to official guidelines while others based their decisions on experience and ‘common sense’. Official guidelines were themselves critiqued as vague (though some people liked the flexibility this provided) (73). Inspection officers’ elaboration on detention decisions depended on who they were talking to. The length of detention was often not given because of uncertainty but also because the facility did not want to be held accountable to promises (94). The real reason for detaining someone versus what was written in the official document did not always match (94). This makes decision accuracy and analysis difficult. Deciding to detain was
sometimes a rational process, but there also exists an arbitrary element involved in the decision making by officers (115). Immigration officers were often defensive about criticism over detention and they were “often caught in a double bind- being criticized for letting too many people in, and for locking too many up” (115). A minority of officers were highly critical of internal practices (115). The authors suggest that a better relationship between the purpose of detention and the criteria for justification should be established. By doing so a more structured approach to decision making could occur (118). They also suggest practices for better officer-asylum seeker relations, including consistent communication to applicants about the reason for their detention. This report is important because the researchers directly interviewed state actors who make the decision to detain and discovered that this was not an objective process.


Since 9/11 the US government has justified its increasing authority over citizens and non-citizens alike. Traditionally people charged with criminal or immigration charges have been detained (understandably) but now people seeking asylum as held as well. Intercepted at ports of entry, asylum seekers are immediately directed toward detention. The war on terror is used to justify immigration control (rather than its purported mission of crime stopping). International human rights are violated when people are punished for seeking asylum. Sometimes asylum seekers receive worse treatment than criminals, including denial of parole, strip searches, and physical/verbal abuse. Asylum seekers also have the burden of providing future evidence of persecution in their home country. The double role of “judge and jailor” from DHS in determining the validity of asylum seekers is problematic (124). Finally, the indefinite detention of asylum seekers, especially in regards to security concerns due to their nationality is a violation of international law.

Less than 2% of shipping containers are subject to in-depth inspection. Inspections need to happen quickly because of just-in-time deliveries. This increases security risks at the same time. A “virtual border” is a “multi-layered defense addressing container security from the initial loading of the container to its movement through the entire international transportation network” (in other words U.S. control from the foreign point of origin). The authors conclude that a secondary inspection with higher precision would improve accuracy.