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Front Cover and Back Cover images: Juan Obando *Tropical Nazi*, 2009 Screen print on French paper.

Tropical Nazi is a piece consisting of two parts: A series of phantasmagoric prints appearing in the streets of Bogotá, Colombia, and an action performed in Grand Central Station, NYC (USA,) during a Colombian country branding event. The resulting images are graphic mutations combining the tropical iconography used by the Colombian country brand "Colombia Is Passion" and Nazi symbols like the *Parteiadler* and the *Totenkopf*.

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Pride and Humility



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Editor's Introduction: Pride, Humility, and Yield

Shawn R. Tucker
Elon University

In everyday usage, pride and humility seem like auto-antonyms. An auto-antonym, as you might expect, is a word that can have two opposite meanings. Yield is such a word. If I make an investment or do a math equation, the product will be the yield. But yield can mean the opposite of produce or make, as when I concede or yield to oncoming traffic. In a similar manner pride can be a positive sense of accomplishment or esteem, but it can also be associated with arrogance and various forms of chauvinism and elitism. Humility can be linked with positive attributes like being teachable or open to others, but its other side is servility and a lack of proper self-worth. The essays and interview that make up this issue take different approaches that reflect pride and humility's complexity.

The first two essays address most directly the above-described complexity. Jessica Tracy and Aaron Weidman provide a comprehensive review of current social science research about what they describe as generally healthy "authentic pride" and its problematic counter of "hubristic pride." They further develop this contrast in their insightful examination of Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*. The second essay, Brett Scharffs' work on "Relational Humility," touches on the defective and excessive states of both pride and humility, but then goes on to posit a basis for a reliable understanding of humility founded upon human inter-relatedness. One element that emerges from this initial pairing is how those who use social science and literary methods and those who use legal, religious, and historical methods can develop similar yet interestingly contrasting examinations of pride and humility.

The next two essays engage positive aspects of humility. Elizabeth Urban explores the historical construction of Abu Bakra as an early Islamic example of humility. Abu Bakra's humility is dedication to truth, a willingness to suffer for that truth, and a rejection of hypocrisy, corruption, and elitism. What complements this essay nicely is the work of Sherrie Barr, Megan Dailey,

Patricia Gordon, and Kaity Sinke. As an insightful reflection on their collaborative dance work and connected learning, their piece shows what can come of a humility typified by vulnerability, openness, and courage.

Where these essays examine humility, pride's damning potential and how humility can be learned are evidence in the subsequent essays by Rhonda McDaniel and Elan Pavlinich. Pavlinich examines how the emergence of Satan's individualization from God's prevailing order as depicted in *Genesis B* enacts and makes possible rebelliousness and demonic pride. McDaniel uses another work of medieval poetry, *Pearl*, to describe how one might overcome a similar, though more possessive type of pride as part of a process of embracing a truer sense of one's place and worth. Both of these essays examine works that engage their Christian contexts, demonstrating how satanic pride begins and/or how it might be overcome.

The concluding works, essays by Bruce Louden and Brett Berliner as well as an interview with Juan Obando, spotlight various proud assertions while simultaneously critiquing such assertions. Louden's explores how the writers of *Genesis* co-opted Greek myths. Such a co-opting can be seen to assert the Hebrew god's superiority over the Greek gods, and the entire essay examines and critiques such assertions. Berliner's essay explores the cultural and artistic context of some of the rejuvenation fads in post-World War I Europe. This exploration shows the extravagance of such proud assertions and their ultimate vacuousness. In Obando's interview, what comes to the fore is how his art critiques authoritative institutional assertions, playing on the tension between art made for and from the community against that which is contained in and promoted by the museum and other powerful organizations.

Part of the value of such a collection is how it shows the breadth of scholarly work focusing on pride and humility. Methodologies employed include those of the social sciences, history, literary studies, art, dance, theology, and legal studies. Another valuable outcome of this collection is how it raises new questions. Do critiques of institutional assertions demonstrate pride, a sort of rejection of the established order, or do such critiques echo with the humility and speaking truth to power of someone like Abu Bakra? Does faith in any institution, religious, political or otherwise, provide a useful basis for self-worth and self-understanding, as experienced by the jeweler in *Pearl*, or is such a basis as illusory as the rejuvenating powers of monkey glands? Can one establish a sense of humility via human interconnectedness, or are all human connections hopelessly imperiled by assertions of superiority, either through power or prestige? Finally, is there a way to consistently live and learn in a connected manner, in a sort of lived *pas de deux* with others, or is such an experience merely transitory if not illusory? The diligence and thoughtfulness of the people who have contributed to this issue provide compelling insights and raise questions that make important contributions to the understanding of what it is that pride and humility yield, or what pride and humility produce and concede.

Saleem, Shiva, and Status: Authentic and Hubristic Pride Personified in *Midnight's Children*

Aaron C. Weidman
Jessica L. Tracy
University of British Columbia

The emotion of pride has received complex and often opposing evaluations from scholars throughout history. On one hand, religious and philosophical thinkers have long decried the dangers of excessive pride, a view most famously put forth in the Biblical Proverb: "Pride goes before destruction, a haughty spirit before a fall."[1] This negative view of pride was widespread among early Christian thinkers; both Augustine and Aquinas saw the emotion as the most fundamental of all sins.[2] Similarly, the sixth century Pope Gregory variously described pride as "the queen of sin," "the beginning of all sin," and even "the root of all evil."[3] To Dante, of course, it was the deadliest of the Seven Deadly Sins, beating out more innocuous transgressions such as envy and wrath.[4] This intense disdain for pride is not limited to the Judeo-Christian tradition; in Buddhism pride is one of the 'ten fetters' that shackles an individual to *samsara,* an endless cycle of suffering.[5] Likewise, Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu wrote in the *Tao Te Ching* (circa sixth century BCE) that, "those who glorify themselves have no merit, those who are proud of themselves do not last."[6]

Yet, despite this overwhelmingly negative characterization of pride in some of history's most canonical texts, a deeper analysis of the ancient philosophical literature reveals a different, more laudatory view. Aristotle admired the "proud man," and viewed pride as "the crown of the virtues" (a stark contrast to Gregory's "queen of sin" metaphor).[7] Aristotle saw virtue in claiming what one deserved, and, like Nietzsche, despised individuals too humble to recognize their own worth, calling them "little-souled."[8] However, even these rare thinkers who advocated for the acceptability and even importance of pride chided those who displayed undue or excessive pride (*hyperephanos*, or over-appearing). These authors made a distinction between a

virtuous pride (*megalopsuchia*, or proper pride), aligned with one's merits, and the claiming of pride beyond one's merits, which they considered to be vanity, and which they viewed as more akin to the sinful pride decried by those quoted above. The distinction between proper pride and excessive pride appears repeatedly from many sources, and seems to capture an essential bifurcation between two distinct kinds of pride. Even the Dalai Lama echoes Aristotle's denunciation of both excessive and deficient pride, stating that "excess—both in terms of exaggeration and devaluation—are equally destructive."[9]

Modern psychological conceptions of pride have a considerably briefer history than these religious and philosophical views, beginning only with Darwin, who was the first to suggest that pride might be a fundamental human emotion.[10] In more recent psychological formulations,[11] pride is considered a "self-conscious" emotion, meaning that its experience requires self-evaluation, and thus the capacity for self-awareness (the executive, subjective "I" self, that does the evaluating) and self-representations (the "me," or objective, evaluated self).[12] Following this formulation, a growing body of psychological research on pride has emerged in recent years; findings from these studies suggest that pride is important to everyday psychological and social functioning, and may have served essential evolutionary functions throughout human history.[13] In addition, psychologists have uncovered two distinct facets of pride, which correspond to the two prides described by religious and philosophical scholars. In the newer empirical work, these are labeled *authentic pride*, which is conceptualized as a genuine sense of pride in one's accomplishments and achievements, and *hubristic pride,* which is considered to be a shallower, self-centered, and egotistical pride that is less tied to specific accomplishments and more linked to a grandiose sense of self."[14]

In this article, we review the extant psychological theory and research on the everyday experience and likely evolutionary functions of pride, draw on the characters of Saleem and Shiva from Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* to provide a more vivid portrait of these psychological findings, and discuss how perspectives on the novel offered by literary scholars may shed new light on psychologists' understanding of pride. In the first section, we will discuss research demonstrating that there are two distinct facets of pride—authentic and hubristic—and use Saleem to illustrate this account. Integrating the research with Rushdie's novel, Saleem can be said to experience hubristic pride early in life, due to his famous birth, but to later experience authentic pride as result of his accomplishments as leader of the Midnight's Children Conference (MCC). Furthermore, literary analyses of the novel point to the possibility of a slightly more benign view of the outward manifestation of hubristic pride than has been traditionally held by psychologists, and provide new insights into the ways in which pride-prone individuals narrate their lives, as well as the potential for socio-cultural forces to engender feelings of pride among a national population. In the second section, we will review empirical evidence providing strong support for the claim that pride has a distinct nonverbal

expression, which is displayed and recognized by individuals across ages and cultures, and which reliably and automatically conveys the high social status of those who show it. We will then discuss Shiva's posturing—a tactic used to intimidate Saleem—to help illuminate these findings. In the third section, we will review research suggesting that authentic and hubristic pride promote social status by facilitating two distinct status-attainment strategies, and we will discuss how Saleem and Shiva employ these two distinct strategies to attain status as leaders of the MCC. We will further draw on the work of literary scholars to speculate on the potential emotional costs of chronically experiencing pride in the pursuit of status, as well as the potential relation between masculinity, hubristic pride, and dominance-based status.

Authentic and Hubristic Pride: A Tale of Two Facets

Psychological scientists, like the philosophers noted above, have argued that there is more than one kind of pride.[15] This claim is generally based on the observation that pride is linked to markedly divergent psychological outcomes, ranging from achievement and altruism to relationship conflict and aggression.[16] Several researchers have addressed the apparently dual-faceted nature of pride by postulating distinct "authentic" and "hubristic" components of the emotion.[17] Indeed, findings from several lines of research support this two-facet account.[18] First, when asked to think about and list words relevant to pride, research participants consistently generate two very different categories of concepts, which empirically form two separate clusters of semantic meaning. The first cluster (authentic pride) includes words such as "accomplished" and "confident," and fits with the pro-social, achievement-oriented conceptualization of pride. The second cluster (hubristic pride) includes words such as "arrogant" and "conceited," and fits with a more self-aggrandizing conceptualization.

Second, when asked to rate their subjective feelings during an actual pride experience, participants' ratings consistently form two relatively independent dimensions, which closely parallel these two semantic clusters. Third, when asked to rate their general dispositional tendency to feel each of a set of pride-related emotional states, participants' ratings again form the same two dimensions. Importantly, the finding that the two pride dimensions are largely independent means that any single pride experience—or any person's dispositional tendency to experience pride—may involve feelings of authentic or hubristic pride, or a combination of both; in other words, experiencing high levels of authentic pride does not mean that one will necessarily also experience high levels of hubristic pride, or low levels of hubristic pride.

How might we understand the distinction between these two kinds of pride? Studies examining the relation between pride and personality have shown that the two pride facets have highly divergent personality correlates, meaning that people who tend, on average, to experience authentic pride have a different personality from people who tend, on average, to experience

hubristic pride.[19] This finding may help resolve the longstanding question of whether pride is psychologically healthy and virtuous or narcissistic and, as previously-noted writers argued, sinful. Contradictory conceptions may exist because one facet is associated with a socially desirable personality profile and pro-social behaviors, whereas the other is associated with a more socially undesirable profile and antisocial behaviors. In particular, individuals prone to experiencing authentic pride tend to also show high levels of adaptive traits such as extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and genuine self-esteem. These individuals also tend to experience high quality and secure interpersonal relationships, to engage in lower levels of aggressive and antisocial behaviors, and to experience fewer mental health problems such as anxiety and depression.[20]

In contrast, individuals prone to experiencing hubristic pride show a personality profile characterized by narcissism and a highly defensive, fragile self-esteem, as well as underlying insecurities and shame.[21] These individuals also experience lower levels of social support (meaning they do not feel that they have close friends they can turn to in times of need) and higher levels of anxiety in their interpersonal relationships, and they tend to engage in aggressive and manipulative interpersonal behaviors.[22] Yet, individuals prone to hubristic pride cannot be said to be simply depressed or anti-social; they are self-promoting achievement seekers who set unrealistically high goals for fame and success, and tend to interpret any positive event as indicative of their own greatness.[23]

Other research has shown that the developmental trajectories of authentic and hubristic pride—that is, the ways in which the tendency to experience these emotions shifts across the lifespan—closely mirror the trajectories of the personality traits to which each pride dimension is related.[24] Hubristic pride levels, much like those of narcissism, tend to peak in early adolescence, and to decline sharply as individuals move into adult social roles.[25] In contrast, authentic pride steadily increases from early adolescence through old age, a trend that is closely mirrored by socially desirable traits such as agreeableness, conscientiousness, and self-esteem.[26] These findings suggest that the development of pride follows a principle of maturation similar to many personality traits. Younger individuals show a more immature emotional balance (i.e., a preponderance of the more dysfunctional hubristic pride), whereas as individuals age, they come to have a more mature emotional balance (i.e., a preponderance of the more adaptive and socially desirable authentic pride).

The two facets of pride have also been found to be caused by distinct cognitive antecedents. Indeed, emotion researchers have shown that specific emotions are uniquely elicited and distinguished from each other not on the basis of distinct events, but rather by the ways in which those events are interpreted, or appraised; the same event can elicit two very different emotions, depending on how it is appraised. Pride, in particular, is elicited when individuals appraise a positive event as relevant to their identity (i.e.,

their most important self-representations) and their goals for their identity (i.e., their ideal self-representations), and as internally caused—that is, due to the self.[27]

Authentic and hubristic pride are further distinguished by subsequent attributions; authentic pride seems to result from attributions to causes that are internal but unstable (i.e., will not change over time), specific (i.e., unique to a given situation), and controllable, such as effort (e.g., "I won because I practiced"), whereas hubristic pride results from attributions to causes that are internal but stable (i.e., will not change over time), global (i.e., present across all situations), and uncontrollable, such as ability (e.g., "I won because I'm great"). One study supporting these links found that individuals who were told to attribute a hypothetical success experience (i.e., a positive, identity-relevant and identity-goal congruent event) to their hard work (unstable, specific attribution) expected to feel authentic pride in response, whereas those told to attribute the same success to their stable, global ability expected to experience relatively higher levels of hubristic pride. Another study found that individuals who tend to make internal but unstable and controllable attributions for a wide range of events also tend to be dispositionally prone to authentic pride, whereas those who tend to make internal but stable and uncontrollable attributions for a range of events tend to be more prone to hubristic pride.[28] Thus, authentic pride is more closely linked to attributions to effort, hard work, and specific accomplishments, whereas hubristic pride is more closely linked to attributions to talents, abilities, and global positive traits.

Saleem's Hubristic Pride Early in Life

Early in Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*, Saleem illustrates the characteristic features of hubristic pride. Saleem was born at midnight on August 15, 1947—the exact moment of India's independence from Great Britain—and as a result his birth is portrayed as historically significant. Saleem views the trajectory of his own life as emblematic of the fate of his country. At first, Saleem's historic birth, combined with his innate ability to read minds, leads him to display some of the characteristic features of hubristic pride, most notably an inflated sense of self-importance. Saleem notes that, prior to his birth, "history had finally...brought itself to the point at which it was almost ready for me to make my entrance."[29] The grandiosity expressed in Saleem's thinking that the world had to prepare itself to appreciate his birth nicely exemplifies the grandiose thinking that is a core part of hubristic pride.

More broadly, Saleem's far-fetched rationale for attributing prominence to himself, and his corresponding inflated sense of self-importance, indicates that he is someone who experiences high levels of hubristic pride. Saleem adopts an inflated sense of self based largely upon his appraisal of *who he is* rather than anything in particular he has done; "newspapers celebrate [him]"[30] from the day he is born, so by his mere existence he feels that he has attained greatness in the eyes of others. The fact that Saleem's hubristic pride arises from

something completely beyond his control—his date of birth—is consistent with evidence suggesting that hubristic pride is most likely to occur when individuals attribute their successes (or positive qualities) to uncontrollable, stable, and global aspects of themselves.

Toward Novel Understandings of Hubristic Pride

Saleem's character clearly mirrors psychological conceptions of hubristic pride in many ways. Most notably, psychologists view hubristic pride as arising from a grandiose sense of self-importance that is not grounded in reality, such that hubristic pride involves feelings of arrogance, pompousness, and snobbishness based on somewhat incorrectly perceived abilities and accomplishments.[31] Saleem fits this portrayal in that his sense of greatness, especially early in the novel, is not based in any actual accomplishments or notable deeds. Rather, Saleem merely internalizes the overly positive feedback he receives from others, indicating that he is destined for greatness. For example, Saleem's father proclaims that he will experience "great things…great deeds, a great life;"[32] the Prime Minister of India writes a letter to Saleem upon his birth proclaiming that "we shall be watching over your life with the closest attention…";[33] and Saleem's parents hang *The Boyhood of Raleigh* on his wall as a child, a painting symbolizing the spirit of British Imperialism and conquest. As a result, Saleem comes to rely on the persistent positive affirmation of others to maintain his grandiose self-esteem, in a manner very similar to that of the classic narcissist, or individual with highly contingent self-esteem, based on psychological accounts."[34]

Yet, in contrast to the psychological conceptualization of hubristic pride and narcissism, Saleem is portrayed throughout the novel as, to some extent, a victim of his circumstances. Indeed, as critic Niel ten Kortenaar has argued, Saleem appears to arrive at his grandiose sense of greatness and feelings of hubristic pride in a passive manner, as a result of the constant exposure, throughout his early life, to the various icons that constantly reaffirmed his greatness.[35] Saleem is never portrayed as actively seeking to enhance his self-image, and in fact routinely questions the legitimacy of his supposed greatness.[36] In contrast, psychological research on hubristic pride and narcissism suggests that individuals who demonstrate these traits actively enhance their self-image by regularly over-generalizing small successes and viewing them as indicative of broader abilities, aggressing and lashing out against any others who challenge their perceived superiority, and engaging in constant grandiose self-presentation.[37] Saleem's character thus points to a slight variation on this traditional psychological conceptualization: an individual high in hubristic pride may be aware of the illegitimacy of others' constant positive feedback, and thus retain a certain cynicism with respect to that grandiosity, such that he or she does not go to great lengths to maintain his or her overly grandiose self-representations through exploitative or exhibitionistic interpersonal tactics.

A second area in which Saleem's character and resultant literary analyses may help psychologists push the boundaries of their knowledge about hubristic pride is that of personal narratives. Not surprisingly, given the antecedents and consequences known to accompany hubristic pride, Saleem comes across as highly enamored with emphasizing the links between his own life events and important historical developments when narrating the novel, in part to create the feeling that his own fate and the fate of newly-independent India are inextricably intertwined. Literary critics have noted that "Saleem's narrative [is] an artificial construct rather than an inevitable and factual rendering of his life," arguing that Saleem constructs his narrative with the goal of tantalizing the emotional needs of the reader and creating a sensationalized feeling of suspense."[38] Saleem's obsession with tempting the emotional appetite of his audience is apparent in the way he crafts links between his own development and India's history to fascinate his caretaker, Padma, who has been described by critics as "the haven that an artist needs in order to be an artist."[39]

Saleem's tendency to construct a suspenseful and sensationalist narrative around his own greatness suggests a potential link between hubristic pride and narrative styles. Psychologists have long believed that a key part of an individual's personality (i.e., the consistent ways in which people think, feel, and behave) may be understood in the ways in which he or she describes important life events and key characters who have influenced his or her development.[40] In this view, persons are seen as authors of their own life stories, and an emerging body of research suggests that unique features of individual's autobiographies (e.g., sense of coherence, perceived ability to chance negative circumstances, presence of redemptive themes) have consequences for mental health and well-being.[41] Yet no research to date has examined the links between hubristic pride and narrative styles. A fascinating future line of inquiry would be to examine whether individuals prone to hubristic pride—as we have argued characterizes Saleem—narrate their lives in a similarly fictional, grandiose fashion, which may include exaggerating the broader historical or social importance of mundane events, revealing daily events as if they were suspenseful mysteries, or making a strong effort to incite the fascination of their audience members.

Saleem's Maturation and Development of Authentic Pride

We have thus far demonstrated how Saleem shows a range of tendencies associated with hubristic pride early in life. As Saleem matures,[42] however, the shallow grandiosity that characterized his early sense of self appears to shift into a more genuine sense of self-worth. This shift is accompanied by more frequent experiences of authentic pride. A turning point occurs when Saleem contemplates the extreme expectations his family members hold for him: "I simply did not know how [to be great]. Where did greatness come from? How did you get some?"[43] Saleem's stated desire to acquire greatness reflects a

transition from crediting uncontrollable, stable, and global dispositions for his prominence to valuing controllable, unstable, specific behaviors (e.g., effort, work) which can promote genuine accomplishments. This shift is made clear by a comparison between Saleem's early-life feelings that his greatness emanated quite simply from who he is, and his later life understanding that greatness must be earned, and should originate from some specific source, act, or achievement.

Concurrent with his maturing self-understanding, Saleem begins to base his sense of self-worth on an actual achievement: his active use of telepathy. Saleem cultivates his inborn ability to read minds, evidenced by his frequent mention of learning to hone his telepathic skills,[44] and his hours of practice listening to passersby on the Bombay streets. Although Saleem's mindreading ability is innate (and thus uncontrollable and stable), he does not take telepathy for granted; he understands that he must work at it, and as a result shifts toward attributing his successes in this domain to unstable and controllable behaviors. These appraisals likely allow Saleem to experience authentic pride from his successes, instead of only hubristic pride. Saleem strives further to turn his mind into an open forum in which all of the Midnight's Children (those children born at the moment of India's independence) can converse about the path of their nation. He views his quest for telepathic mastery as a wide-ranging and formidable achievement: "...the feeling had come upon me that I was somehow creating a world, that the thoughts I jumped inside were *mine*...that I was somehow *making them happen*."[45] Saleem's language further captures his shift from hubristic to authentic pride. Later in life, he uses phrases such as "*I was creating a world*" and "*I was making [thoughts] happen*" to describe his mind-reading, which demonstrate his active agency as well as his sense of self-efficacy in pursuit of greatness. In contrast, earlier in life, Saleem talked of his prominence with phrases such as "*I simply do not know how to be great*," which illustrate passivity and a lack of sense that he has the ability to pursue his goals.

Saleem's maturation also illustrates the previously researched developmental parallel between pride's two facets and self-esteem. Early in life, despite outwardly proclaiming his importance, Saleem seems to have a fragile and defensive self-esteem, the kind of self-esteem that characterizes individuals prone to hubristic pride. Saleem bristles at the notion that some may not fully acknowledge his importance, and expresses frustration at journalists who "trivialize" his birth, claiming that they "[have] no idea of the importance of the event they were covering."[46] Whereas Saleem may outwardly express his prominence, and expects others to appreciate his greatness, these comments suggest that his grandiose self is contingent on continual reinforcement from others, and that he has a defensive need for others' appreciation and support.

As Saleem cultivates his telepathic skill and emerges as a leader of the MCC, however, he begins to experience a more genuine self-esteem. Saleem views his telepathy as his ultimate "triumph,"[47] suggesting he sees it as an earned achievement, and enthusiastically proclaims his self-worth (and worth

to others) in turning his mind into an open forum "in which [the children] could all talk to one another."[48] This shift from hubristic to authentic pride, coupled with the decreasing fragility of Saleem's self-esteem, mirrors the general developmental shift found in studies based on large, nationally representative samples of adults across ages. Saleem's development can thus be seen as an example of the progression from grandiose child to mature young adult experienced by a broad range of individuals whose personality development across the life span reflects a psychologically adaptive trajectory.

Toward Novel Understandings of Authentic Pride

Although, as we have discussed, Saleem's character nicely illustrates authentic pride at an individual level, a consideration of the novel's historical context leads to intriguing speculations regarding the potential for cultural forces to shape the development and manifestation of authentic pride. Critics have suggested that Saleem's agentic pursuit of greatness represents the emerging possibilities for young Indian men in a society that became increasingly upwardly mobile around the time of its independence from British colonial rule. In particular, following the emergence of elite educational opportunities for young men such as Saleem, "it [was] no longer the case...that professions and status are inherited;" rather, Saleem and his cohort were able to envision working toward a career path that held no particular connection to the social demographic into which they were born.[49] In contrast, one might expect social mobility and concomitant agentic pursuit of a career to be more curtailed in previous eras characterized by a more strict caste system.

Given that psychologists have documented a link between authentic pride and effortful achievement,[50] and given our previous discussion of how authentic pride helps drive Saleem's agentic pursuit of greatness as the novel progresses, we might hypothesize that the cultural forces conspiring to create opportunities for upward social mobility in turn engender chronic feelings of authentic pride among those individuals pursuing upward social mobility. In societies in which most individuals have the opportunity to self-determine their career paths, people on average might be expected to engage in greater levels of achievement behavior, which would in turn lead to an increase in the average level of authentic pride experienced by a nation's citizens. This previously unexamined hypothesis might be tested by comparing levels of authentic pride among democratic nations which present upward social mobility opportunities (e.g., the United States) and nations which still embrace some form of a caste system (e.g., Nigeria), or by tracking levels of authentic pride in a population that undergoes a shift away from a caste-based social system. The results of such investigations would provide a fascinating advance in the field of cultural psychology, which has embraced the study of differences and similarities between individuals from both industrialized and non-industrialized nations.[51]

The Pride Nonverbal Expression

Within the psychological literature on emotions, there has long been an emphasis on identifying distinct, recognizable nonverbal expressions associated with each emotion.[52] This emphasis can be traced to Darwin's use of nonverbal emotion expressions to make the claim (based, at that time, largely on anecdotal observations) that not only did people all over the world express emotions with the same nonverbal displays, but that these displays also corresponded to behaviors shown by non-human animals, suggesting a phylogenetic continuity. Building on this theoretical speculation, Paul Ekman, Carroll Izard, and their colleagues famously laid the foundation for the scientific study of affect by demonstrating that at least six distinct emotion expressions (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) are reliably recognized by individuals from a broad range of populations, suggesting that emotion expressions—and thus, emotions—may be universal.

Despite this foundation, it was not until the past decade that studies began to empirically address this issue for pride.[53] These studies, using a range of methods, have now accumulated to suggest that pride is associated with a reliably recognized nonverbal expression which may be universal and even innate. The prototypical pride expression includes the body (i.e., expanded posture, head tilted slightly back, arms akimbo with hands on hips or raised above the head with hands in fists) as well as the face (i.e., small smile)[54], and is reliably recognized and distinguished from other positive emotions (e.g., happiness, excitement) by individuals from the U.S., Italy, and Burkina Faso and Fiji. It is important to note that individuals from Burkina Faso and Fiji were members of highly isolated, traditional small-scale societies, who had almost no exposure to the Western world.[55] Pride-recognition rates, among educated Western samples, are typically around 80-90% which is comparable to recognition rates found for the more established emotions; and, like those emotions, pride can be recognized automatically from a single snapshot image.[56]

Importantly, the recognizable pride expression is also spontaneously displayed in pride-eliciting situations (i.e., success) by children as young as 3-years-old, high-school students who have performed well on a class exam, and adult Olympic athletes from a wide range of cultures, including athletes who are congenitally blind.[57] Together, these findings suggest that the pride expression may be a human universal. It is unlikely that recognition would be so robust, or would generalize to individuals who could not have learned it through cross-cultural transmission (i.e., films, television, magazines), if it were not a species-constant phenomenon. Furthermore, the finding that individuals from a diverse range of cultures—including blind individuals who have never seen others show the pride expression—spontaneously display pride in response to success suggests that the reason for the expression's ubiquitous recognition is that it is universally displayed.

One question that arises, however, in the face of evidence for two distinct pride facets is whether each facet is associated with a distinct nonverbal expression. Several studies have addressed this issue by asking participants to identify different versions of the pride expression (e.g., versions with arms raised above the head, vs. with arms akimbo and hands on hips) using either authentic or hubristic pride labels. All recognizable variants (i.e., expressions reliably identified as "pride") were equally likely to be identified as authentic or hubristic, suggesting that the same expression conveys both facets.[58] Yet, anecdotal evidence would suggest otherwise; observers seem to believe that they know which facet of pride a given proud individual is experiencing. One explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that everyday judgments of authentic and hubristic pride are made on the basis of expressions combined with contextual information about the situation or the person, providing some index of whether the pride is merited (e.g., did the individual have a success?) and what kinds of attributions were made for the causal event. Recent research supports this expectation; several studies found that observers could reach agreement about whether a given pride expression conveyed authentic or hubristic pride if the expression was presented alongside relevant contextual information about the expresser.[59]

Building on the strong evidence pointing to the universality of the pride expression, researchers have also examined the expression's evolutionary significance by testing the hypothesis that the expression may function to inform observers (i.e., other social group members) of the proud individual's achievement, and thereby communicate that he or she deserves higher status. Early evidence supporting this account came from studies that found that individuals who are believed to be experiencing pride are assumed by others to be high status, suggesting an intuitive association between perceptions of pride and status.[60] More directly supporting this link, another study found that individuals manipulated to experience pride prior to engaging in a group task were perceived by others in the group and by outside observers as behaving in a more "dominant" manner, suggesting that something about the pride experience promoted interpersonal behaviors that increased the perceived status of the proud individual.[61]

In research most directly supporting the assumption that pride displays communicate high status, a series of studies found that when confronted with individuals displaying pride, observers respond by automatically perceiving the displayers as high status, and this tendency is so powerful that it holds even when pride displayers are known—via other contextual cues—to possess low status.[62] This effect of pride displays on automatic status perceptions was also found to generalize to a highly divergent population: a traditional small-scale society on Yasawa Island, in Fiji, where individuals hold a set of cultural practices and norms that largely suppress displays of status.[63] The finding that, despite these cultural rules, participants showed a strong automatic association between pride displays and high-status concepts indicates that status signaling may be a universal function of the pride display.

Shiva's Puff of Pride: A Status Signal

Pride's nonverbal expression, and its status signaling function, are both illustrated in Shiva's encounters with Saleem. When Shiva first meets Saleem, he boldly asserts his higher status in an effort to intimidate Saleem and begin his quest to take control of the MCC. Along with verbally asserting his intention to become the gang boss, Shiva displays a nonverbal "puff of pride," which is aimed to intimidate Saleem.[64] The metaphor of a puff clearly depicts the expanded chest and broadened posture that are reliably associated with the prototypical, universally recognized pride display.

Shiva's display of pride upon meeting Saleem is effective: it serves to communicate Shiva's status. In response to Shiva's display, Saleem, despite his current role presiding over the MCC, becomes defensive; he urges Shiva to reconsider his decision to take the MCC by force, and states his intention to actively stop Shiva from doing so. In other words, Saleem responds to Shiva's status-seeking behavior by defending his own high status position.[65] Saleem's response suggests that Shiva's puff is perceived as powerful; the puff occurs immediately after Shiva begins to describe his prowess running a street gang, and thus likely helps to communicate to Saleem that Shiva possesses the physical brawn necessary to attain the status he seeks. In addition, the manner in which Saleem perceives Shiva's puff of pride illustrates the automaticity with which pride conveys status. Rushdie notes Saleem's observation of the puff in parentheses inserted in the middle of one of Shiva's grandiose statements,[66] and the parenthetical comment does not stop or interrupt Shiva's rant, suggesting that the observation is made quickly and is not closely or consciously attended to. That is, by placing this observation within the narrative's stream-of-consciousness, Rushdie may be suggesting that Saleem perceived the pride expression without any conscious effort, consistent with empirical studies suggesting that pride displays are recognized and perceived as high status without any need for conscious deliberation.[67] In sum, Shiva's puff of pride, the way it is used by Shiva to convey high status, and the way it is automatically perceived by Saleem, is consistent with empirical research on the pride expression.

Two Prides, Two Routes to Status

We have thus far reviewed evidence suggesting that pride consists of two distinct facets—authentic and hubristic—which are associated with divergent subjective experiences and personality profiles, and are elicited by distinct attributions for one's success. We have also reviewed evidence suggesting that the nonverbal expression of pride is a cross-cultural, and likely universal behavioral response to success, which signals high status, and thus may have evolved to promote social status. In this section, we will discuss emerging research linking these two bodies of work on pride together by suggesting that

the experience of each of the two facets of pride promotes the attainment of social status in distinct ways.

In their comprehensive review of the ethnographic literature on status attainment in small-scale societies, anthropologists Joseph Henrich and Francisco Gil-White argued that humans throughout evolutionary history have used two distinct strategies to attain social status.[68] They labeled these strategies *dominance* and *prestige,* defining dominance as status attained through force, threat, and intimidation and prestige as status attained through the display of knowledge, valuable skills, and earned respect. Dominant individuals incite fear in subordinates by controlling or withholding resources, and subordinates submit by complying with demands or providing deference. Prestigious individuals, in contrast, acquire power by virtue of their competence, expertise, and genuine care for others, thereby encouraging and permitting followers to copy them. A recent empirical study examining hierarchy formation in small groups of unacquainted individuals found evidence to support this account; this work demonstrated that individuals who were viewed as using a dominance strategy *and* those who were viewed as using a prestige strategy were both likely to attain high status and influence over others.[69] These findings suggest that both dominance and prestige are likely to have been adaptive in evolutionary history, as both facilitate the attainment of social rank, which in turn provides a number of fitness-promoting benefits (e.g., increased access to shared resources, mates, etc).[70]

How does this model of status relate to our account of pride? A recent set of studies demonstrated that each distinct pride dimension is uniquely associated with only one of the distinct status-attainment strategies.[71] First, in a study assessing dispositional levels of authentic and hubristic pride, and self-perceived dominance and prestige, individuals prone to authentic pride were found to rate themselves as highly prestigious, whereas those prone to hubristic pride were found to rate themselves as more dominant. In a second study this pattern was replicated using peer ratings of status; varsity athletes rated the extent to which their teammates used each status-attainment strategy to climb their team's social hierarchy. Individuals who rated themselves as high in authentic pride were viewed by teammates as prestigious (but not dominant), whereas those who rated themselves high in hubristic pride were viewed by teammates as dominant (but not prestigious).

These findings suggest that both facets of pride may facilitate status attainment, but through distinct mechanisms. Authentic pride likely promotes prestige by motivating and reinforcing achievements and other indicators of competence. Authentic pride provides individuals with the feelings of genuine self-confidence that allow them to comfortably demonstrate both social attractiveness and generosity, and to acknowledge the importance of others in their successes, rather than taking sole credit themselves.[72] In order to retain subordinates' respect, prestigious individuals must avoid succumbing to the feelings of power and superiority which would promote perceptions of dominance, and authentic pride—through its association with pro-social

personality traits such as agreeableness—may allow these individuals to recognize and appreciate their achievements while still maintaining a sense of humility. Consistent with this account, a series of studies found that when individuals are experimentally manipulated to experience authentic pride, they respond by demonstrating greater empathy toward those who are different from them.[73] In contrast, hubristic pride may promote dominance by engendering a grandiose sense of self-importance, which allows individuals to focus on their own selfish needs, while feeling little empathy or genuine care for followers or rivals who get in the way. Indeed, individuals experimentally manipulated to experience hubristic pride were found to respond by demonstrating less empathy toward those who are different from them, and even demonstrating prejudice against those individuals.[74] Hubristic pride is also associated with a proclivity toward physical intimidation and aggression, behaviors which could further promote dominance by motivating individuals to forcefully take power rather than earn it.[75]

Saleem and Shiva: Two Pride-Driven Routes to Status

Saleem's life provides a clear illustration of the ways in which authentic pride might promote prestige-based status. As was discussed above, Saleem comes to experience authentic pride in response to the hard work he puts into honing his telepathic skills and in using them to form the MCC, and he views these endeavors as providing a great service to his followers.[76] Becoming the leader of the MCC earns Saleem high status, and he gains further prestige by maintaining closeness to his followers and refusing to situate himself on a pedestal of power or to allow his followers to call him chief.[77] When urged by the other children to take a more formidable leadership role, Saleem modestly remarks that they should "just think of me as a...big brother, maybe."[78] As a result, Saleem gains the respect and admiration of the MCC by engaging in a kind of leadership that fosters their well-being and maintains close leader-follower relationships. These are behaviors that are indicative of a prestigious leader, and are made possible by the regular experience of authentic pride.

In contrast, Shiva embodies the link between hubristic pride and dominance-based status. Shiva is Saleem's alter-ego—the two were accidentally switched at birth—and possesses a physical brawn and tenacity equal to Saleem's intellectual stature. Shiva exhibits a grandiose self-image, viewing himself as a "natural leader,"[79] and runs street gangs in a tough manner, often remarking that, "nobody messes with me."[80] Shiva employs aggressive and intimidating tactics—including his aforementioned puff of pride—when attempting to wrest control of the MCC from Saleem, vehemently asserting that Saleem would be foolish to try to prevent him from becoming the "gang boss:" "I'm going to have to take this thing over...you just try to stop me."[81] In pursuing power, Shiva seems preoccupied with his own selfish desires, rather than by any genuine concern for his followers, which is a behavioral pattern characteristic of hubristic pride and dominance. The story of Shiva exemplifies

how hubristic pride can lead to the attainment of dominance-based status, through physical intimidation, grandiosity, and evincing disdain toward one's followers, and also how this form of status attainment and pride differ quite dramatically from prestige and authentic pride.

Toward Novel Understandings of Pride and Status

Although, in *Midnight's Children,* authentic and hubristic pride play a key role in the attainment of prestige and dominance in a manner largely consistent with psychological theorizing, analyses of the pains both Saleem and Shiva suffer to attain and maintain high status suggests an intriguing possibility regarding the psychological costs of pursuing pride. First, regarding Saleem, although he eventually experiences authentic pride in his accomplishments as leader of the MCC, he also experiences tremendous anxiety and insecurity during his initial pursuit of greatness: "I became afraid that everything was wrong—that my much trumpeted existence might turn out to be utterly useless, void, and without a shred of purpose."[82] Indeed, critics have argued that the same signs from adults around him that plant the seed of greatness in Saleem's mind "inculcate in [him] a fear of failure" and "conspire to deny [him] that greatness."[83] As a result, Saleem develops a great deal of anxiety and doubt about his ability to live up to others' expectations and to attain high status.

Saleem also demonstrates a constant preoccupation with, and uncomfortable awareness of, the possibility that he may lose the abilities associated with his pride and high status, and these insecurities exert a tremendous physical and psychological toll on him. In a moment of stark contrast to the young boy about whom adults forecast greatness, the adult Saleem summarizes his yet-to-be-told narrative by detailing the consequences of his quest to attain and maintain greatness: "please believe that I am falling apart...I mean quite simply that I have begun to crack all over like an old jug...In short, I am literally disintegrating, slowly for the moment, although there are signs of acceleration."[84] Indeed, critics have argued that Saleem's biggest fear comes from the threat of losing his special powers as he ages, arguing that his life can be seen as a progression "from dynamic growth to castration and impotence, premature aging, and death; from a deep sense of connectedness with the pulse of India to alienation, betrayal, and insignificance."[85] Other critics have noted that Saleem's attempts to combat his preoccupation with not losing his powers can be viewed as a tumultuous inner battle which ultimately leaves him feeling defeated and lacking a coherent sense of life's meaning.[86] As the novel nears its conclusion, a distraught Saleem discloses that "I am tearing myself apart...none of it makes sense anymore."[87]

Saleem's plight suggests that pursuit of status and associated chronic experience of pride could, in certain cases, be part of a turbulent emotional life that includes doubt and insecurity when excessive ambitions are thwarted. One interesting question is how authentic and hubristic pride might each contribute

to anxiety or self-doubt, in distinct ways. Psychologists have argued that hubristic pride—and certain kinds of narcissism—are associated with conscious and unconscious feelings of low self-worth and shame, and a chronically insecure self-concept.[88] These findings are clearly paralleled by the self-doubt experienced by Saleem. However, authentic pride has not been found, in psychological research, to be underscored by similar negative self-views; in contrast, people who tend to experience authentic pride tend to have excellent mental health and report positive self-views.[89] It is thus somewhat surprising that Saleem demonstrates considerable self-doubt and insecurity, despite appearing to experience high levels of authentic pride, as he works toward acquiring prestige-based status as leader of the MCC.

One possible explanation for this discrepancy between the psychological scientific literature and the novel is that, at least in the case of Saleem, high levels of authentic pride resulting from effortful pursuit of status and achievement could have left Saleem feeling drained, depleted, and wary of losing those achievements. This possibility can be seen in Saleem's reference to "tearing himself apart," and is consistent with the finding that individuals high in authentic pride are prone to constantly strive toward achievements;[90] such striving could result in the experience of unpleasant emotions when goals are not reached. A reading of the novel and the psychological literature together lead us to suspect that such self-doubt and anxiety associated with achievement failure might manifest more strongly among individuals who initially demonstrated high levels of hubristic pride and associated grandiosity—as seen in Saleem's early life—than among individuals whose pursuit of status revolved entirely around their hard work and achievements. For the former, high status may be an expected and necessary part of life, making it all the more essential that it is continuously maintained. For the latter, working one's way up the status hierarchy might be more expected, allowing these individuals to appreciate and embrace the effort required to attain and maintain high status. Research seeking to answer these questions would prove a fascinating advance in psychologists' understanding of pride.

A final way in which *Midnight's Children* might help generate new understandings of pride is by casting light on the potentially gendered nature of hubristic pride and dominance-based status. The persona Shiva enacts and the behaviors with which he gains dominance-based leadership are highly masculine. Shiva's defining physical characteristic is a strong pair of knees (in contrast to Saleem, who most notably bears an over-sized nose), and Shiva's image revolves around various masculine tropes such as possessing many lovers, fathering many children, and running street gangs. Furthermore, Shiva uses various forms of physical intimidation, such as his puff of pride, to attempt to wrest away control of the MCC from Saleem. Given the ways in which Shiva pursues dominance-based status, critics have argued that *Midnight's Children* sends an implicit message that "those who succeed in the unforgiving world of adults accentuate a brutish masculinity, promiscuous, exploitative, and violent."[91] In contrast, Saleem, who does not pursue

dominance-based status, has been viewed as a character most comfortable in the safety of female companions, including his nurturing caregiver Padma.[92] Psychologists have previously uncovered small gender differences in hubristic pride, such that men tend to experience more of it than do women,[93] yet studies examining status attainment in small, same-sex groups have suggested that dominance-based status is attained through similar processes across genders, and is equally effective in generating social influence in both male and female groups.[94] The hyper-masculinity displayed in Shiva's character is consistent with the previously demonstrated gender differences in hubristic pride, but suggests a more stark contrast in the ways in which men and women prone to hubristic pride attain status than has previously been observed.

Conclusion: Toward a Dialogue Between Humanists and Social Scientists

In this article we have reviewed psychological research on the everyday manifestation, apparent universality, and status-promoting function of pride. Drawing on the character of Saleem, from Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*, we discussed theory and research on the psychological structure of pride, and evidence for two distinct pride facets, authentic and hubristic, each of which is related to distinct psychological characteristics and processes. Authentic pride underlies achievements and genuine self-esteem, is elicited when individuals attribute their success to their unstable, controllable efforts, and is associated with pro-social, socially adaptive personality traits. Hubristic pride, in contrast, underlies grandiosity, snobbishness, and a defensive, narcissistic self-esteem, is elicited when individuals attribute their successes to their stable, uncontrollable abilities, and is associated with an anti-social and even dysfunctional personality profile.

Second, we used Shiva's puff of pride to illustrate how the nonverbal pride expression works in everyday life to communicate one's pride to others, and to signal high status. Individuals who have had no exposure to Western cultural norms nonetheless recognize the pride expression, and congenitally blind individuals who have never seen others show pride still show the display in response to success. Furthermore, individuals across cultures automatically associate pride with high status, suggesting that the pride expression is a cross-cultural status signal.

Finally, we used Saleem and Shiva to illustrate how authentic and hubristic pride can promote status through the attainment of prestige and dominance, respectively. Authentic pride promotes prestige-based status by facilitating both agentic and pro-social tactics such as motivating achievements and fostering compassion for one's subordinates and followers. In contrast, hubristic pride promotes dominance-based status by facilitating agentic and anti-social tactics such as narrowing one's focus to selfish ends and engaging in physical intimidation and coercion toward subordinates and followers.

In sum, we have sought to review recent empirical findings on a fundamental human emotion, and to illustrate the utility of drawing on psychological science to help understand literary characters. In the case of Rushdie's *Midnight's Children*, psychological research on pride provides several novel insights. For example, we can understand the developmental transition seen in Saleem from an arrogant, self-centered child to a mature, pro-social leader as reflecting a shift in his emotional balance from hubristic to authentic pride. In addition, we can view Shiva's posturing toward Saleem as a manifestation of a psychologically ancient, universal mechanism—the pride display—by which humans gain social status. We might also distinguish the tactics Saleem and Shiva use to influence the MCC as reflecting two distinct, adaptive status-attaining strategies, which are each motivated and facilitated by a distinct facet of pride.

In addition to using *Midnight's Children* to illustrate the psychological literature on pride, we have drawn on previous literary analyses of the novel to develop new insights into the psychological causes and consequences of pride. First, although hubristic pride has generally been seen as leading to a pernicious interpersonal style in which an individual seeks to maintain his or her self-image by derogating and aggressing against others, Saleem's experience raises the possibility that certain individuals may more benignly experience hubristic pride, such that they question the legitimacy of their presumed greatness and shy away from self-promotion. Second, the way in which Saleem narrates his life story suggests that individuals prone to experiencing hubristic pride may craft sensational, exaggerated narratives aimed at creating an aura of importance around their lives. Third, analyses of the social climate in mid-twentieth century India, and its liberating effect on the social mobility prospects of young men such as Saleem, raise the previously unexamined possibility that national-level forces may collectively influence the degree to which a nations' citizens experience authentic pride. Fourth, Saleem's willingness to disclose his feelings of doubt and insecurity regarding his attainment and maintenance of greatness and status shed light on the heretofore unexamined emotional costs of frequently experiencing pride as a means toward attaining social status. Finally, the way in which Shiva enacts dominance-based status suggests a potential link between hubristic pride, dominance, and masculinity. Regardless of which of these or other avenues psychologists may choose to pursue, there is little doubt that a researcher wishing to further his or her understanding of pride might gain novel insights by closely examining *Midnight's Children*.

In conclusion, we have attempted to model an exchange between psychologists and humanists that may enhance both parties' understanding of their subject matter. To be sure, scientific, research-based interpretations of literature, as well as literary reinterpretations of psychological science, may provide only a marginal advance in each field's scholarship; a simple search for *Midnight's Children* in the JSTOR database yields nearly 800 hits, and the two most formative papers in pride research have been cited a combined 167 times

in less than ten years since publication.[95] Nonetheless, we believe that psychological research (particularly research on personality, emotions, and social interactions) represents a fruitful and largely untapped source from which literary criticism might draw numerous new insights; pride-prone characters, in particular, abound in texts throughout literary history, ranging from Achilles and Ajax in the *Iliad* to Willy Loman in *Death of a Salesman*.[96] The strategy employed here might be successfully extended to these and other texts, potentially enhancing our understanding of both literary works and psychological science. Similarly, literature and literary criticism, given its typical interest in delving into the minute details of characters' lives, likely contains many pearls of research wisdom for the aspiring personality or social psychologist Indeed, the prominent social psychologist Richard Nisbett, in a parody meant to shed light on several creativity-hindering tendencies of psychologists, once wrote that "I am quite pleased that [the typical] reading program...has steered [the young psychologist] away from philosophy and literature by intimations of 'hot air,' 'speculation,' 'fantasy, waste of time,' and so forth. This is much to be commended because great philosophy and great literature are an unparalleled source of ideas in psychology."[97]

Notes

[1] Proverbs 16:18 (NIV)
[2] James J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: A New Biography*. New York: Ecco, 2005, and Stephen J. Pope, *The Ethics of Aquinas*. Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, 2002.
[3] Matthew Baasten, *Pride According to Pope Gregory the Great: A Study of the Moralia*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1986.
[4] Dante Alighieri. *The Divine Comedy*, trans. John Ciardi. New York: New American Library, 2003.
[5] Akira Hirakawa, *History of Indian Buddhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.
[6] Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching: 25th Anniversary Edition*, trans. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English. New York: Vintage, 1997.
[7] Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. William David Ross. New York: Oxford UP, 1925.
[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 2000.
[9] Dalai Lama XIV and Howard C. Cutler, *The Art of Happiness: A Handbook for Living*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1998.
[10] Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*. New York: Appleton & Co, 1872.
[11] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "Putting the Self into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model," *Psychological Inquiry* 15 (2004): 103-125.
[12] See William James, "The Consciousness of Self," in *The Principles of Psychology*, ed. William James (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1890), 291-401, for a more complete discussion of the subjective and objective self.

[13] Jessica L. Tracy, Azim F. Shariff, and Joey T. Cheng, "A Naturalist's View of Pride," *Emotion Review* 2 (2010): 163-177.
[14] Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "The Psychological Structure of Pride: A Tale of Two Facets," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92 (2007): 506-525.
[15] Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt," in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 623–636.; and June P. Tangney, Patricia F. Wagner, and Richard Gramzow, *The Test of Self-Conscious Affect*. Fairfax, VA: George Mason UP, 1989.
[16] See Otto F. Kernberg, *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism* (New York: Aronson, 1975).; Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions."; Carolyn C. Moft and Fredrick Rhodewalt, "Unraveling the Paradoxes of Narcissism: A Dynamic Self-Regulatory Processing Model," *Psychological Inquiry* 12 (2001): 177–196.; and Ian McGregor et al., "Defensive Pride and Consensus: Strength in Imaginary Numbers," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89 (2005): 978–996.
[17] We have adopted the terms "authentic" and "hubristic" to emphasize that the first facet (authentic pride) is based on actual accomplishments and is likely accompanied by genuine feelings of self-worth. This label also connotes the full range of academic, social, moral, and interpersonal accomplishments that may be important elicitors (in previous work, we referred to this facet of pride with the narrower descriptor of "achievement-oriented" pride). However, the label "hubristic pride" should not be taken to imply that this facet is not an authentic emotional experience. Rather, from our theoretical perspective at least, the *elicitors* of hubristic pride are more loosely tied to actual accomplishments, and involve a self-evaluative process that reflects a less authentic sense of self (e.g., distorted and self-aggrandized self-views), but the subjective experience is likely to be as genuine as that of any other emotion. For related discussions, see Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions."; Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow, *Test of Self-Conscious Affect*.; Tracy and Robins, "Putting Self into Self-Conscious Emotions."; and Tracy and Robins, "Structure of Pride."
[18] Tracy and Robins, "Structure of Pride."
[19] Ibid.; and Jessica L. Tracy et al., "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: The Affective Core of Self-Esteem and Narcissism," *Self and Identity* 8 (2009): 196-213.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Several scholars have built on psychoanalytic accounts of narcissism to argue that individuals who show such defensiveness while outwardly self-aggrandizing suffer from low implicit self-esteem and psychological vulnerability. For discussions, see Christian H. Jordan et al., "Secure and defensive high self-esteem," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85 (2003): 969-978.; Kernberg, *Borderline Conditions*.; Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press, 1971; and Jessica L. Tracy et al., "The Affective Core of Narcissism: Inflated by Pride, Deflated by Shame," in *Handbook of Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder*, ed. W. Keith Campbell and Joshua D. Miller (New York: Wiley, 2011): 330-343.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Charles S. Carver., Sungchoon Sinclair, and Sheri L. Johnson, "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: Differential Relations to Aspects of Goal Regulation, Affect, and Self-Control," *Journal of Research in Personality 44* (2010): 698-703.

[24] Ulrich Orth, Richard W. Robins, and Christopher J. Soto, "Tracking the Trajectory of Shame, Guilt, and Pride Across the Lifespan," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 99 (2010): 1061-1071.
[25] Joshua D. Foster, W. Keith Campbell, and Jean M Twenge, "Individual Differences in Narcissism: Inflated Self-Views Across the Life Span and Around the World," *Journal of Research in Personality* 37 (2003): 469-486.; and Brent W. Roberts, Grant Edmonds, and Emily Grijalva, "It's Developmental Me, Not Generation Me: Developmental Changes are More Important than Generational Changes in Narcissism," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 5 (2010): 97-102.
[26] Richard W. Robins et al., "Global Self-Esteem Across the Life Span," *Psychology and Aging* 17 (2002): 423-434.; and Brent W. Roberts, Kate E. Walton, and Wolfgang Viechtbauer, "Patterns of Mean-Level Change in Personality Traits Across the Life Course: A Meta-Analysis of Longitudinal Studies," *Psychological Bulletin* 132 (2006): 1-25.
[27] Tracy and Robins, "Putting Self into Self-Conscious Emotions."; for related discussions, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Craig A. Smith, "Shades of Joy: Patterns of Appraisal Differentiating Pleasant Emotions," *Cognition and Emotion* 2 (1988): 301–331.; Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions."; Ira J. Roseman, "Appraisal Determinants of Discrete Emotions, *Cognition and Emotion* 5 (1991): 161–200.; and Bernard Weiner, "An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion," *Psychological Review* 92 (1985): 548–573.
[28] Tracy and Robins, "Structure of Pride."
[29] Salman Rushdie, *Midnight's Children* (London: Picador Books, 1982), 90.
[30] Ibid., 122.
[31] Carver, Sinclair, and Johnson, "Authentic and Hubristic Pride."; Tracy and Robins, "Structure of Pride."; and Tracy et al., "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: Affective Core of Self-Esteem and Narcissism."
[32] Rushdie, *Midnight's Children*, 152.
[33] Ibid., 122.
[34] Michael H. Kernis, "Toward a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem," *Psychological Inquiry* 14 (2003): 1-26.; Morf and Rhodewalt, "Paradoxes of Narcissism."; and Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, "Death of a (Narcissistic) Salesman: An Integrative Model of Fragile Self-Esteem," *Psychological Inquiry* 14 (2003): 57-62.
[35] Neil ten Kortenaar, *Self, Nation, and Text in Salman Rushdie's Midnight's Children* (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 2004), 65-66.
[36] Rushdie, *Midnight's Children*, 156.
[37] Carver, Sinclair, and Johnson, "Authentic and Hubristic Pride."; Morf and Rhodewalt, "Paradoxes of Narcissism."; Robert Raskin and Howard Terry, "A Principal Components Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and Further Evidence of its Construct Validity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54 (1988): 890-902.; and Tracy et al., "Authentic and Hubristic Pride: Affective Core of Self-Esteem and Narcissism."
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Relational Humility

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Introduction

Of all virtues, none needs a public relations consultant more than humility. The loser's virtue of wimps and doormats, humility is a sop we throw to life's losers: Blessed are the poor in spirit, blah, blah, blah, declares the conquering horde.

But hang on. For Christians, not only is being humble a categorical imperative, for everyone humility is the key to understanding the human condition.[2] Many virtues can stand on their own two feet. As Aristotle, the godfather of virtue ethics, defined it, moral virtues, which he distinguished from intellectual virtues, lie in a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency.[3] For example, courage lies in a mean between an excessive state (rashness) and a defective state (cowardice or timidity). Much the same can be said of other virtues recognized by Aristotle, including temperance, which lies midway between prolificacy and insensibility; generosity, which lies in a mean between prodigality or wastefulness and meanness or stinginess. Magnanimity, which Aristotle describes as "greatness of soul" lies in a mean state between excessive vanity and a defect of parsimoniousness or "smallness of soul." With regard to honor and dishonor, Aristotle says, "the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of empty vanity, and the deficiency is undue humility."[4]

Thus we see, humility is not viewed by Aristotle as a virtue of free men. It is a defective state with respect to the virtue of honor or self-respect. Indeed, Aristotle views it as a trait of character of inferior classes such as slaves, tradesmen, women, and children.[5] For Aristotle humility is a mark of inferiority and subservience; it is the congenital cousin of humiliation.

The closest Aristotle comes to appreciating humility is in recognizing the virtue of friendship as lying between two types of excess (obsequiousness on

the one hand and flattery on the other) and a defective state of being quarrelsome or surly. On a related note, Aristotle conceptualizes truthfulness as a virtue lying between boastfulness, or pretense and exaggeration (which we might view as a kind of pride) and a defective state of self-deprecation. Friendship has an element of equality and truthfulness a component of honesty, ideas that are structurally related to humility. But when we think of humility, equality and truth are not the concepts that seem most closely linked, although I will argue that these ideas actually get us closer than we might think to the essence of humility.

But while it is easy to see how other moral virtues lie in a mean between excessive and defective states, this is not so obvious in the case of humility. Perhaps this is why Aristotle, along with the ancient Greeks in general, did not even think of humility as a virtue worthy of a citizen. For Aristotle, humility was a relational concept, but not a virtue; rather, it was a sad reality of biological and social inferiority.

While we have every reason to reject Aristotle's biological elitism, his account of moral virtues as lying in a mean between extremes of excess and defect has survived more than two millennia of scrutiny and experience.[6] Aristotle was also right that humility can only be understood relationally, but he was wrong in discounting it as a virtue worth cultivating.

Justice, Mercy, Humility: The Components of Practical Wisdom

In the first article I wrote as a law school professor, I argued that humility, along with justice and mercy, is the forgotten key to understanding and exercising practical wisdom, which for Aristotle lies atop the pinnacle of practical virtues.[7] In developing this argument, I took my cue from the Hebrew Prophet Micah and his account of a divine lawsuit between God and the Children of Israel.

Micah, chapter six, begins with the prophet Micah, issuing a summons to the children of Israel:

> 1. Hear ye now what the Lord saith; Arise, contend thou before the mountains, and let the hills hear thy voice.

In verse two, Micah identifies the mountains and foundations of the earth as the jury:

> 2. Hear ye, O mountains, the Lord's controversy, and ye strong foundations of the earth; for the Lord hath a controversy with his people, and he will plead with Israel.

Note the double meaning of the word "plead." The Lord will plead his case, as the plaintiff does in any lawsuit, but he will also plead with his people, the Children of Israel, to change their hearts and actions. In verses three through

five, Micah, speaking as the Lord's attorney, states God's claim against the Children of Israel:

> 3. O my people, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? Testify against me.
> 4. For I brought thee up out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed thee out of the house of servants; and I sent before thee Moses, Aaron, and Miriam.
> 5. O my people, remember now what Balak king of Moab consulted, and what Balaam the son of Beor answered him from Shittim unto Gigal; that ye may know the righteousness of the Lord.

Micah begins with an indictment of Israel's forgetfulness, reminding the Children of Israel of their deliverance from bondage in Egypt. Micah's audience would have been acutely aware of the miraculous assistance identified in verse four—the plagues, the Passover, the pillars of fire and cloud, the parting of the Red Sea, the manna and quail, the water from the rock—that God provided the Children of Israel in their exodus from Egypt.

The events alluded to in the following verse may not be as familiar to us, but they would have resonated strongly with Micah's listeners as well. Verse five refers to events recorded in Numbers 22-24, where Balak, the king of the Moabites, promised honors and riches to Balaam, a diviner from Northern Syria, if Balaam would curse Israel. Instead, upon explicit instructions from God and after a dramatic manifestation from an angel, Balaam blessed Israel three times and predicted that Israel would destroy Moab. The phrase "from Shittim to Gilgal" refers to the critical period when the Israelites entered the promised land.

The prophet Micah has presented a powerful case for the plaintiff. Micah's invocation of the Lord's miraculous assistance to Israel in liberating them from bondage, leading them to the Promised Land, and preserving their freedom places them squarely on the defensive. In the following two verses, the defendants respond:

> 6. Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old?
> 7. Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?

In verse six, Israel demands to know just what it is that God wants. Does the Lord wish them to bow low before him? Does he require burnt offerings? In verse seven, one detects an even sharper edge of self-justification, even sarcasm, on the part of the defendants. Would the Lord be satisfied with

"thousands of rams" or with "ten thousands of rivers of oil?" The defendants' tone of self-justification finally "rises to a hysterical and ghastly crescendo," when they demand, "Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?"[8]

From a Christian perspective, this last question is bitterly ironic, given the doctrine of the Atonement, which maintains that God the Father did send his Only Begotten Son, Jesus Christ, to take upon himself the sins— not of God, but—of the world.[9]

Given the defensive, self-justificatory, and strident tone of the defendants' response, we might expect God to answer with a voice of anger. Instead, through a rhetorical question, God issues a beautiful, tender, and poignant injunction. Micah states simply and majestically:

> 8. He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doeth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?

What does God require? With elegant clarity, God summons his people to be just, merciful, and humble. More precisely, he employs a series of action verbs, imploring them to *do, love, and walk* with justice, mercy and humility.

In that early article, I argued that like justice and mercy, humility, too, should be understood as a virtue that is susceptive to both excess and defective states. When humility is underdone, the defective state—pride, arrogance or vanity—is easy enough to recognize. We are used to thinking of pride as standing in opposition to humility. The defective state, however, is harder to recognize. What might it mean to have too much humility? I suggest that an attitude of inferiority, subservience, and servility is the defective state of humility. When humility is overdone, the result is an attitude of insecurity, worthlessness, or subjugation.

According to Aristotle, moral virtue is not simply a midway point between undesirable extremes, it is also a steady state of habit and character. This steady equilibrium of character that distinguishes moral virtue can be illustrated by imagining a heavy object suspended from the end of a rope, such as a wrecking ball. When the object is in motion, it swings from side to side, without stopping at the nadir. It also carries considerable destructive force. When the object is at rest, it is very difficult to move and its destructive capacity is under control. Similarly, humility is a steady state of character that is not easily moved, whereas when one is out of balance with respect to humility, one can easily swing destructively between excessive and defective extremes. As we know, those with overt superiority complexes are often masking deep feelings of inferiority. And those who outwardly exude deference and submissiveness are often simmering cauldrons of resentment and grievance.

We could easily make the mistake of not realizing that one can have too much as well as too little of the feelings or attitudes underlying humility. While pride (too little humility) is often understood to lie in opposition to humility, it

is less common to recognize that feelings of inferiority, worthlessness, subservience, or subordination (too much humility) also lie in opposition to humility. Indeed, one might even mistakenly think that humility requires one to be accepting of subjugation and subordination. But humility does not demand timidity, self-effacement, passiveness, or quietness, although it does urge circumspection, patience, respectfulness, and considered attention to others. Humility is manifest when we treat other things—and especially other people—as if they really matter. Humility does not imply weakness, although one who is humble will be mindful of the nature and hazards of his personal weaknesses.

The defective state. Pride, the defective state with respect to humility, creates barriers between human beings, barriers based upon differences such as race, education, wealth, social status, or position. Pride demands the establishment and maintenance of vertical relationships, with oneself or one's group above, or in some way superior to, others. Pride creates enmity, hatred, or hostility towards others.

The excessive state. At the other end of the spectrum from humility lies an excessive state, characterized by attitudes or feelings of inferiority, subjugation, or subordination. Being humble does not mean being a doormat. We may mistakenly view victims of subjugation as exemplars of humility, and in so doing we distort the meaning of humility. Such victims can be seriously misled by general exhortations to be humble or by praise of their humility. Such admonitions might be misinterpreted as an instruction to regard themselves as even more inferior or subservient than they already do, when in fact—and this is important—what humility may require is that they move toward the middle of the spectrum by asserting themselves, standing up for their rights, and fighting against the subjugation or subordination to which they are subject.

The mean state. Humility does not denote weakness, but rather a proper understanding of the sources of one's strength. In the religious context, it is acknowledging one's relationship with and dependence upon God. In the context of relationships between people, it is acknowledging that one is a member of a family, a community, a nation, and the human race. These interrelationships form a primary source of one's strength and also constitute the source of our obligations to each other. Power wielded with humility becomes service; power wielded with pride becomes dominion. Pride is easy. Humility is difficult. It is not exaggeration to say that it takes a considerable amount of courage to be humble. It is unlikely that you will encounter someone who is humble and considers herself to be a "self-made" person, because humility will compel her to acknowledge the sustenance and assistance she has received from others. Humility will not countenance ingratitude or self-aggrandizement, but neither does it require self-mortification or denunciation. Humility enables one to be submissive to legitimate authority, but it does not require subservience to illegitimate authority.

Humility also denotes an attitude of open-mindedness and curiosity, a willingness to learn, reassess, and change. One who is humble can be

persuaded that his conclusions are wrong, that his perspectives are limited and should be broadened, and that his settled opinions merit reconsideration. One who is humble will possess a quiet confidence that is capable of learning and reassessment, because he is not defensive or insecure. What is more, one who is humble will seek the insights and viewpoints of others, because he will not have an unwarranted confidence in the power of his own intellect or the rightness of his every conclusion. One who is humble will have the capacity to be surprised by an argument or insight that causes him to rethink long-held opinions or favorite theories. Humility does not imply soft-headedness or intellectual weakness, although the learned and mentally acute are particularly susceptible to being prideful.

In that article, I argued that justice and mercy, which are recognized as the central virtues related to practical wisdom, often conflict with each other, and that humility helps us synthesize or mediate the competing demands of justice and mercy.

Walk Humbly with God

Fifteen years later, I remain convinced that humility is a virtue that is susceptible to both excess and defect, and that it plays an important role in mediating, reconciling and harmonizing the competing claims of justice and mercy. But in a deeper sense, I have come to believe that I completely overlooked—or perhaps only mentioned in passing—the most important characteristic of humility, its relational character. A clue to understanding this can be found in the same passage from Micah six that I discussed at length; indeed, it is contained in the climax of the divine lawsuit between God and his People, verse eight:

> He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.

God instructs his children not just to walk with humility, but to "walk humbly *with thy God*."

Humility is not an abstract concept; it is found in our walk with God—*walking* invoking the idea of movement forward; *with*, implying the idea of being side-by-side, *our God* being our maker and father. Humility is found in our walk with God our father.

Thus, I have come to believe that the key to understanding, and more importantly valuing and cultivating, humility lies in what must be regarded as the central doctrine of Abrahamic religion (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam): the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of humankind. The idea is to my mind the most powerful and important concept in revealed religion, and it can be found in the first chapter of Genesis.

In the creation story in Genesis, chapter one, verse 26, God says, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness."[10] And the following verse says, "So God created man in his *own* image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them."

The concept that human beings are created in the image of God is of course susceptible to many different conceptions. I suggest that the more literally we take the idea of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, the more likely we are to strike the right chord with respect to the idea of humility.

Fathers are in a vertical relationship with their children, and even as we grow and progress, in an important sense we never surpass our fathers; we remain in a parent-child relationship with them, where we owe them certain duties. Nevertheless, there is a deep equality between fathers and children, because children have within them the capacity to grow and develop into the same sort of being as the father is. This is not to say that children ever surpass or take the place of their parents. This is all the more so in our relationship with God; to aspire to replace God is blasphemy and dangerous (as Icarus learned), but to aspire to become more like God is the essence of filial piety, and another categorical imperative of Biblical religion.[11]

Brothers are fundamentally equal as well—not in the superficial sense of being identical, but in the deep moral sense of moral worth. Thus Dylan Thomas is not making a witty aside, but stating a profound truth when he prefaces his collected poems with the observation, "These poems, with all their crudities, doubts and confusions are written for the love of man and in praise of God. And I'd be a damn fool if they weren't."[12] When we come to appreciate the relationship between God and man, and between human beings, then it transforms the meaning of everything we do, including writing poems, and we'd be damn fools if it didn't.

The Brotherhood of Mankind: "I Like Pigs."

Winston Churchill, bombastic and rude as he was, may have come closer than anyone in identifying the *sine qua non* of humility with his frequent, and varied, expression of his fondness for pigs. "I like pigs," Churchill would say. "A cat will think himself your superior and look down upon you. A dog will think himself your inferior and look up at you. But a pig will look you in the eye and treat you as an equal."[13] Churchill was so fond of this idea that he often sketched a picture of a pig when signing his name, even in important diplomatic correspondence. Churchill may not leap to mind as exhibit A when we think of humility, but he captured its essence with this homely example.

The brotherhood of man is an often cited and seldom followed principle. But the very heart of humility lies in viewing the other neither as a superior or an inferior, but as an equal.

Gordon B. Hinckley, former President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, often recounted a story he heard from a former Israeli prime minister, which is a variation of a story that appears in the Talmud:

> [This man] had seen much of conflict and trouble in his time. He told a very interesting story of a Jewish rabbi who was conversing with two of his friends. The rabbi asked one of them, "How do you know when the night is over and a new day has begun?"
>
> His friend replied, "When you look into the east and can distinguish a sheep from a goat, then you know the night is over and the day has begun."
>
> The second was asked the same question. He replied, "When you look into the distance and can distinguish an olive tree from a fig tree, then you know morning has come."
>
> They then asked the rabbi how he could tell when the night is over and the day has begun. He thought for a time and then said, "When you look into the east and see the face of a woman and can say, 'She is my sister,' and when you look into the east and see the face of a man and can say, 'He is my brother,' then you know the light of a new day has come."
>
> [This story] speaks of the true meaning of brotherhood.[14]

The distinctive feature of humility is that it is a relational virtue. Humility can only be experienced in the context of relationships. The essence of humility in human relationships is understanding the irreducible inherent equality of human beings. Knowing that I am no more worthwhile than you and you are no more worthwhile than me is the heart of humility. But this is only half of the equation. The essence of humility in divine relationships is understanding the fatherhood of God, and our essence as his children created in his image.

Created in God's Image: The Israeli Enemy Combatant Case

Consider a case decided by the Israeli Supreme Court in 2005, sitting as the High Court of Justice.[15] The case involved the Israeli government's policy of preventative strikes aimed at killing members of terrorist organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, even when they were not actively or immediately engaged in terrorist activities. The petitioners argued that this preemptive strike policy against enemy combatant's violated international law, Israeli law, and basic principles of morality and human rights. The petitioner argued that the targets of these strikes had to be treated as ordinary criminals, and must be dealt with by the ordinary mechanisms of criminal law, including arrest and trial.

President (Emeritus) Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the absolutism of the petitioner's claim. In a thoughtful article reflecting upon

this case, Oxford Philosopher Jeremy Waldron notes that Barak's opinion contained the following statement:

> Needless to say, unlawful combatants are not beyond the law. They are not "outlaws." God created them as well in his image; their human dignity as well is to be honored; they as well enjoy and are entitled to protection . . . by customary international law.

As Waldron notes, the reference to the idea that all men are created in the image of God found in Genesis 1:26-27 is clear enough. The question, urged by Waldron is, what on earth is this doing in the judicial opinion of a secular court? After all, in a concurring judgment, Vice President Eliezer Rivlin made the same point in exclusively secular terms. Said Rivlin, "The duty to honor the lives of innocent civilians is thus the point of departure . . . but it is not the endpoint. It cannot negate the human dignity of the unlawful combatants themselves. . . . Human dignity is a principle which applies to every person, even during combat and conflict."

Why does Barak appeal to the religious idea that all men are created in the image of God, when the secular idea of human dignity, invoked by Rivlin, was readily available?

The answer is not immediately apparent. The opinion's author, Aaron Barak, lost his parents in World War II and came to Israel as a teenager, where he was a brilliant student, a brilliant professor, and eventually a brilliant judge. But he is not himself a believer; he is a Jew, but a secular Jew, deeply mistrusted by religious conservatives within his own country. Throughout his career, he has been viewed as a liberal who pushed the envelope in protecting individual and human rights. As a judge he was protected by a bodyguard, not so much due to threats from Palestinians who live in Israel, but due to threats from conservative Jews. Yet, we have every reason to believe Barak knew exactly what he was doing.

In professor Waldron's judgment, Barak's reference is

> intended to pull us up short. It is intended to remind us that although we are dealing with an outsider and an evil person, an enemy of the state of Israel and the Jewish people, a threat to our lives and those of our loved ones, one who will kill and maim scores of innocent people if he gets the opportunity—although we are talking about someone who may be justly liable through his actions and intentions to deadly force—we are nevertheless not just talking about a wild beast, or an outsider to our species, or something that may be manipulated or battered or exploited as a mere tool for our own purposes (the purpose of saving the lives of members of our community). The unlawful combatant may be a threat and

> an outsider and an evil and dangerous man, but he is also *man-created-in-the-image-of-God* and the status associated with that characterization imposes radical limits on what may be done with him and radical constraints on how lightly we may treat the question of what may be done with him.

Judge Clifford Wallace, emeritus Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who knows Justice Barak personally, agrees, and believes there is something else important going on as well. Although the petitioners in the case lost, Wallace notes, Barak is communicating a powerful message to one of the primary audiences, specifically religious Jews who are deeply conservative. He uses their scripture to reinforce the boundaries that exist in the treatment of enemy combatants, and while he does not grant the petitioners the broad protection they were seeking, he sends a cautionary message to the government and its conservative supporters: We are watching, and we expect you to be faithful to your own professed beliefs. To conservative Jews, Justice Barak says, in effect, I expect you to be mindful of and constrained by your own deepest commitments, including the bedrock belief that all men are created in the image of God.

Waldron speculates, correctly I think, that an American court would not cite scripture the way Justice Barak does in the enemy combatant case, although as he notes, there was a time in American history when judges did speak in these terms, "a time when Justice McLean could say (in his dissent) of the petitioner in Dred Scot v. Sanford that '[h]e bears the impress of his Maker, . . . and he is destined to an endless existence.'" Waldron observes,

> Israeli courts are not afflicted with the Rawlsian doctrines of public reasons that our philosophers put about, which are intended to limit the citation of religious considerations in public life, and which indeed take the federal courts as an exemplar of this sort of restraint.

At various times in American history, the concept enshrined in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence, that all men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, has been very influential. According to Oxford historian Richard Carwardine's masterful biography of Abraham Lincoln, this idea dwelled at the heart of Abraham Lincoln's political thinking.[16] According to Carwardine,

> The Declaration of Independence, in which he rooted his arguments during the 1850s, was for Lincoln more than a time-bound expression of political grievance. It was a near-sanctified statement of universal principles, and one that squared with essential elements of his personal faith: a belief

> in a God who had created all men equal and whose relations with humankind were based on the principles of justice.

As Lincoln said in a speech in Lewistown, Illinois, the Founders have declared that "nothing stamped with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on, and degraded, and imbruted by its fellows."

Conclusion

Thus, I have come to believe that the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God is the essence of humility—brotherhood, understood in its old-fashioned ungendered incarnation, and fatherhood understood as bodily incarnate, in the person of our Father in Heaven, the Perfect Man. Humility is cultivated in our peaceable walk with God, as we strive for justice and seek to become merciful. It is found in understanding that all are children of God, created in His image, each of equal and eternal moral worth. For his part, the God who invites humility is not a distant unapproachable unknowable abstract entity, but a father, the person we are designed to grow and become like unto, not to become equal or replace, but to become His heirs, joint-heirs with Christ.[17]

Notes

[1] Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law and Associate Director of the International Center for Law and Religion Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.S.B.A., M.A., Georgetown University, B.Phil, Oxford University, J.D., Yale Law School. Thanks to Shawn Tucker for his invitation to contribute to this special edition on pride and humility. Thanks also to my research assistant Blake Richards for his help with footnotes and editing.

[2] The first half of this claim is scriptural, the second half the gravamen of this article. For example, Matthew 18:4 reads, "Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven." All biblical quotations are to the King James Version, which I use here for its historical significance and magnificence of language. In a similar vein, Matthew 23:12 says, "And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted." (see also Luke 14:11; 18:14).

[3] Quotations from Aristotle are from *A New Aristotle Reader*, (J.L. Ackrill, ed., Oxford, 1987). For example, in Book II, Chapter 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, "Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it." 1106b35-1107a2.

[4] 1107b22-25.

[5] See, e.g., W.D. Ross, *Aristotle* 202-208 (1923) See also 8 Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 11-12 (Gerhard Friedrich ed. & Geoffrey W. Bromiley trns. Wm. B. Erdmans Publ'g Co 1972). Elsewhere, in contrasting the inexperience of youth with the experience of age, Aristotle spoke somewhat more sympathetically about humility:

> And youth trust others readily because they have not yet often been cheated; and they are optimistic . . . for they have as of yet met with few disappointments. And they live their lives for the most part in hope; for hope looks to the future and memory to the past, and for youth the future is great, the past brief… And they are great-souled, for they have not yet been humbled by life or learned its necessary limitations.

Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character* 197 (1989)(citing Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 1389a16-31) (Sherman concludes that for youth, Aristotle views the experience of disappointment or failure as necessary to "knock them out of their naïve trust of others and over-confidence in their abilities").

[6] Anthony Kronman, *The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession*. (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts 1993), 42.

[7] Brett G Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 127 (1998), 32. Much of the following section is adapted from that article.

[8] Id. at 150, quoting Leslie C. Allen, the Books of Joel, Obadiah, Jonah and Micah 370 (1976).

[9] See John 3:16, which appears to me to be the favorite Bible verse held up in the end zone at football games.

[10] Genesis 1:26 (KJV).

[11] Terrel and Fiona Givins, *The God Who Weeps* (Ensign Peak 2012), 109-110. See Also Deuteronomy 18:13 ("Thou shalt be perfect with the Lord thy God.") and Matthew 5:48 ("Be ye therefor perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.").

[12] Dylan Thomas, *The Collected Poems of Dylan* (James Laughlin 1953), note xiv.

[13] [13]Winston Churchill Biography, National Churchill Museum available at: http://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/winston-churchill-biography.html accessed 1/12/2013.

[14] Gordon B. Hinckley, from an address given at Brigham Young University on October 31, 2006.

[15] The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment v. The Government of Israel and Others [2005] HCJ 769/02 (Isr.). My discussion of the Israeli enemy combatant case is based upon Jeremy Waldron, The War on Terror and the Image of God, remarks at the Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion Conference "From Silver to Gold: The Next 25 Years of Law and Religion" (October 24-26, 2007). A revised version of this article is included in *Christianity and Human Rights: An Introduction* (John Witte, Jr., and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010), and is excerpted in W. Cole Durham and Brett G. Scharffs, *Law and Religion: National, International and Comparative Perspectives* (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), at 556-562.

[16] Richard Carwardine, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power* (Alfred A Knopf 2006), 40.

[17] This is a reference to Romans 8:16-17, which says, "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God: And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together."

Humble in Word and Body: Abu Bakra as an Early Islamic Exemplar

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Introduction

In common parlance, the word "humility" often evokes an image of deference, passivity, submissiveness, and contentment with one's meager lot in life. Humility is considered synonymous with meekness, and the humble person accepts abuse and punishment with eyes lowered and voice silenced. However, in this article I reveal how the early Arabic-Islamic historical tradition presents a different conception of humility as a more active and socially transformative value. Humility here is a powerful force that resists injustice in the name of a higher truth and for the good of the entire community. Specifically, the ninth-century Arabic historian Baladhuri (d. 892) depicts an early Muslim, companion of the Prophet Muhammad, and freed slave named Abu Bakra as someone who "walks upon the earth in humility." Baladhuri applies this description—which is a Quranic phrase—to Abu Bakra even though he also depicts Abu Bakra as crying out against oppression, standing up in the name of his values, and generally not being a pusillanimous person. Rather, Abu Bakra's humility is embodied in his willingness to be physically beaten by more powerful actors, it is symbolized by his lowly status as a non-Arab freedman (*mawla*), and it serves to protect his pious reputation from any accusations of partisanship or bad faith. Reading Baladhuri's depiction of Abu Bakra, we thus encounter a definition of humility that is strikingly different from a contemporary description, and we also view how this conception arises in the context of a particular historical moment and in the service of a particular ideological project.

Meet the Historian: Baladhuri

Baladhuri was an eminent ninth-century scholar who worked in Baghdad, the political and intellectual capital of the Abbasid caliphate. His two most famous works are an account of the Islamic conquests entitled *The Conquests of the Lands*, and a huge biographical work called *The Genealogies of the Notables. The Genealogies of the Notables,* which is the primary focus of this article, has been described as a "genealogical work that contains much historical material,"[1] or it can also be considered a historical work that is arranged by tribal genealogy instead of strict chronology. It contains a wealth of information on early Islamic figures and events, and it is a crucial source of early Islamic history. Moreover, Baladhuri is representative of ninth-century historical writing in the Islamic world more generally.[2] First, he is a compiler and synthesizer of older traditions; he generally does not write in his own voice, but transmits reports from a variety of written and oral sources and shapes them into a coherent narrative. Second, his works are comprehensive; they do not focus on one locality or historical period, but aim to convey as much information as possible about a given topic. Finally, his works are some of the earliest extant historical materials written in Arabic. The events of the seventh and eighth century have only reached us, for the most part, through the writings of ninth-century scholars such as Baladhuri. With a few exceptions, the modern scholar of early Islam must rely on these later narratives to reconstruct the earliest stages in Islamic history.

Baladhuri and his contemporaries are thus responsible for constructing the basic contours of early Islamic history that still persist today. These authors had their own ideological viewpoints, and their presentation of the first two centuries of Islamic history must not be taken at face value. The historian of the first two centuries of Islam must carefully sift through these literary sources, analyzing chains of oral transmission and searching for anomalous accounts that reflect glimmers of historical fact. However, the aim of this paper is not to uncover the "reality" of the earliest period of Islamic history, but to show how Baladhuri was shaping it in his ninth-century writings. To provide some orientation for the following analysis, I will briefly present an outline of early Islamic history, as provided by Baladhuri and his contemporaries. The following account is necessarily simplified, for there is much scholarly debate about the details of early Islamic history and there is still much work to be done in analyzing the various historical narratives. This overview will nevertheless serve to accurately frame Baladhuri's portrayal of Abu Bakra.

In the early seventh century CE, a new world order erupted from the Arabian peninsula, propelled by the preaching of the Prophet Muhammad and carried out by the Arabian tribes now united under the banner of Islam. When Muhammad emigrated to Medina with his faithful followers in 622 CE, he founded a new polity headed not by the old Arabian tribal elite, but by himself as the Prophet of God. Within a few decades after the Prophet Muhammad's

death, the political hegemony of Islam had spread rapidly in all directions under the leadership of the Rightly Guided Caliphs of the Sunni tradition.[3] Various internal disputes soon began to flare up among these early Muslims, which eventually exploded into a civil war. This civil war began when the third Rightly Guided caliph, Uthman (r. 644-56), was murdered by malcontents. Some parties called for the fourth caliph, Ali (r. 656-61), to punish Uthman's murderers. When Ali refused, these parties renounced their allegiance to Ali and mustered support for their quest to avenge Uthman. One of these parties that resisted Ali was led by the Syrian governor Muawiya, who was Uthman's cousin and a leading member of the Umayyad family. Through a series of events that need not be detailed here, Muawiya was victorious and Ali was murdered by rebels who had defected from his own camp. Although Muawiya's ascent brought the traumatic hostilities of the civil war to an end, it also signaled the end of the Rightly Guided caliphate and the rise of the much-maligned Umayyad dynasty (661-749).

This civil war caused many ideological problems for early Muslims, as they strove to determine who had been right and who (if anyone) had been wrong in the dispute. The main problem was that most of the participants in this civil war had been Companions of the Prophet, who were responsible for transmitting prophetic traditions and whose reliability as transmitters might be endangered if they had exhibited iniquitous behavior during the civil war. The Sunni consensus that emerged in the ninth and tenth centuries was that all Companions, including those directly involved in the civil war, were above reproach. Historians from this time period thus took pains to explain away, smooth over, or even altogether avoid the difficulties of the first civil war.

As for the Umayyad dynasty that emerged after the civil war, it has not generally been viewed in a positive light. Only a few pro-Umayyad histories have survived, and most accounts of Umayyad history were written by authors (such as Baladhuri) who had major ideological problems with the dynasty.[4] One of these problems was the role of Arabian tribalism and "noble" Arabian lineage in structuring Umayyad politics. According to the unfavorable mainstream historical accounts, the Umayyads rewarded Arabian nobles with the highest political positions, while mawlas—freed slaves, foreign converts, and other non-Arab people who became clients of Arab patrons—clung to the lower rungs of the social ladder. Mawlas were expected to be obedient to their Arab patrons, were ridiculed for their lowly genealogies, and were forced to pay humiliating taxes that were supposed to be reserved for non-Muslims.[5] Baladhuri and his contemporaries largely remembered the Umayyad period as a time of rampant "Arabism" and un-Islamic inequality. By the time the Abbasid revolution swept away the Umayyad state in 749 CE, tribal politics had largely been replaced by more stable, centralized, and explicitly Islamic institutions. The Abbasid era is heralded as a "Golden Age" of Islamic civilization, an era when distinctions between Arab and non-Arab were erased under the banner of Islamic egalitarianism.

Baladhuri bolsters certain aspects of this historical framework in his portrayal of Abu Bakra's humility. First, I suggest that Baladhuri was engaged in the wider ninth-century project of elaborating the excellence of the Companions of the Prophet and preserving their integrity as transmitters of prophetic tradition.[6] That is, Baladhuri invokes Abu Bakra's humility to protect him from any accusation of wrongdoing or partisanship, and to locate him neatly within this irreproachable category of the Companions. Secondly, Baladhuri criticizes Umayyad Arabism by presenting Abu Bakra's mawla status as a marker of religious virtue rather than a handicap. He transforms the lowliness of the mawla into pious humility, and by doing so he implicitly exposes the hubris of the Umayyads: the Umayyads denigrated the mawlas out of their own arrogant disregard for Islamic values. Moreover, by presenting Abu Bakra's humility not as meek but assertive, Baladhuri shows how the humble mawlas could actually transform society through their embodiment of religious values. The humility of mawlas such as Abu Bakra encouraged the growth of social, political, and religious structures that were based on piety rather than inherited status. It is against this background of ideological maligning of the Umayyads, protection of the Companions, and construction of shared community-oriented values that we can best understand Baladhuri's invocation of humility. With this understanding of Baladhuri's agenda as our foundation, we are finally prepared to meet out protagonist, Abu Bakra.

Meet the Protagonist: Abu Bakra

Because of the aforementioned difficulties of the early Arabic-Islamic sources, it is quite difficult to ascertain much about the actual life of Abu Bakra.[7] What matters for our purposes is rather how his image has been constructed and remembered by later historians such as Baladhuri. According to these historians, Abu Bakra was born sometime in the early seventh century CE in the Arabian town of Taif, just east of Mecca. His mother was a female slave and prostitute named Sumayya; Sumayya was also the mother of Abu Bakra's nefarious half-brother, Ziyad ibn Abihi, whom we will meet again later. The identity of Abu Bakra's father is uncertain: it was either Harith, a well-to-do Arabian tribesman and Sumayya's master, or else it was Masruh, an Abyssinian slave belonging to Harith. When Sumayya was pregnant, Harith seems to have been fully prepared to accept her child as his own and thus to raise him as a freeborn son. But when Abu Bakra emerged with dark skin, Harith declared that the father must have been Masruh, and Abu Bakra was raised as a slave.[8]

In the year 630 CE, Muhammad and his army of Muslims took control of Mecca and then besieged Abu Bakra's nearby hometown of Taif. During the siege of Taif, the Muslim army announced that any slave who fled his master and joined the cause of Islam would be freed. At this point, Abu Bakra and a handful of other slaves escaped to the Muslim camp; Abu Bakra reportedly rappelled down from Taif's high citadel wall on a pulley, which is how he earned his

famous name (Abu Bakra means "father of the pulley").[9] Abu Bakra was then manumitted in the name of Islam and became the freedman (mawla) of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Being someone's mawla was a form of kinship, a bond forged between a master and his manumitted slave that not only lasted during the freedman's life but was also passed down to his descendants. As we shall see, Abu Bakra's identity as a mawla of the Prophet is a major aspect of his historical memory and it forms the conceptual background of his humble persona.

Several years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakra moved to the town of Basra, Iraq, with his extended family. Here transpired two important events in his life that would occupy the attention of the later historians. First, he became embroiled in a legal dispute that destroyed his relationship between himself and his half-brother Ziyad. In this dispute, which will be analyzed in more detail below, Ziyad caused Abu Bakra to be found guilty of the serious offence of *qadhf* (slander or false accusation of adultery). Second, Abu Bakra refused to take sides in the first civil war of Islamic history, and he is particularly famous for abstaining from the Battle of the Camel near Basra.[10] He seems to have been wary of political power in any form, particularly during the Umayyad period. He retired to his large estate in Basra, and his children became some of the wealthiest and most prominent citizens of that city. He died in the year 652.

"Those Who Walk upon the Earth in Humility"

Baladhuri is the only early Islamic historian who describes Abu Bakra as one of "those who walk upon the earth in humility."[11] To understand my argument about what Abu Bakra's humility means for Baladhuri, we must first unpack this Quranic verse. Baladhuri only quotes half of this verse, which in its entirety reads: "The servants of the Merciful One are those who walk upon the earth in humility, and when ignorant fools address them, they say 'peace.'" While Balahdhuri does not quote the part about speaking "peace," it is likely that he expected his audience to recognize the verse and to fill in the rest for themselves, which is a common stylistic technique. In any case, we find that the humility expressed in this verse is not passive but active. It is not solely an internal attitude or self-assessment strategy,[12] but rather a value that entails both comportment (walking upon the earth) and speech (saying "peace").

It is also worth noting that the meaning of this verse is somewhat obscure, and the exegetes who tackled it found some of its basic elements puzzling. First is the unusual word used for "humility" (*hawn*). Elsewhere the Quran contains more familiar words for humility (such as *tawadu'* and *khushu'*), and the exegetes' first task was to gloss this term *hawn* as humility, gentleness, and self-restraint. Second, they strove to understand exactly what it means to say "peace" to foolish people. The general consensus is that it means to utter words that are right, appropriate, and truthful, words that protect the speaker from sin.[13]

I suggest that Baladhuri applied Quran 25:63 to Abu Bakra because of its expression of humility enacted in word and speech, combined with its semantic obscurity. By invoking this verse, Baladhuri is perhaps subtly acknowledging that Abu Bakra's particular version of humility is slightly ambiguous or unusual. Bold speech and action might not have created an automatic association with the word humility even in Baladhuri's day, but it is nevertheless supported by the words of this difficult Quranic verse. This verse thus provided a brilliant way for Baladhuri to fit Abu Bakra's behavior into an authoritative Quranic expression of what humility can mean: an active humility that spurs Bakra to say and do what is right, regardless of the consequences.

Speaking Up and Getting Beaten Up

While many Arabic-Islamic historians discuss Abu Bakra, Baladhuri devotes a striking amount of attention to him and explains Abu Bakra's actions in a unique way. In particular, I show how Baladhuri presents two problematic events in Abu Bakra's life as an embodiment of his active humility. In recounting both of these events, Baladhuri highlights Abu Bakra's fearless speech or action that results in a physical beating, followed by words explaining that the *intention* of those actions was not to cause trouble but to stand up for the truth. Additionally, both events are based on the unstated but crucial premise that Abu Bakra is a mawla. After analyzing these two events, I will contrast Baladhuri's narrative with a later historical account to reveal the distinctiveness of Baladhuri's project and to give a concrete example of how Abu Bakra's humility might be otherwise construed. In this later account, Abu Bakra is still a humble mawla, an assertive speaker, and victim of physical violence. However, his humility is presented not as a personal sacrifice in the name of a higher truth, but as evidence of his proto-Sufi disregard for worldly existence.

Abu Bakra vs. Ziyad

Baladhuri declares that Abu Bakra was one of "those who walks upon the earth in humility" directly before reporting an embarrassing episode in Abu Bakra's life: the slander (*qadhf*) episode.[14] This episode took place in Basra, during the reign of the second Sunni Rightly-Guided Caliph, Umar (r. 634-44 CE). One day, Abu Bakra and three of his half-brothers—including Ziyad—noticed the Basran governor, Mughira, acting suspiciously. They followed Mughira to the house of a woman who was not his wife, and from a nearby rooftop they witnessed him committing adultery with the woman. Abu Bakra urged his half-brothers to go to Medina to report Mughira's behavior to the famously strict caliph Umar. In Umar's presence, Abu Bakra and two of the brothers repeated their accusation against Mughira. However, Ziyad rescinded his witness against Mughira, claiming that he saw only some vaguely inappropriate behavior and could not identify the perpetrators with any certainty. The other two brothers then recanted their statements as well. Abu

Bakra alone stood by his witness, was found guilty of slander, and was beaten eighty lashes. Many historians (including Baladhuri) mitigate Abu Bakra's culpability here by transmitting the account from his own point of view. That is, in their accounts Abu Bakra actually witnesses the act of adultery, and he receives verbal confirmation from his three fellows that they also witnessed the event and could identify the perpetrators. Baladhuri is the only early historian who also cites the Quran to exculpate Abu Bakra, and he further softens the blow by ending his account with the words: "He was a righteous, pious man."[15]

Additionally, Baladhuri preserves a version of this slander incident not mentioned by other historians, and which I argue is key for his particular understanding of Abu Bakra's humility. Here, caliph Umar moves to beat an unrepentant Abu Bakra a second time, at which point Abu Bakra yells: "I will not repent from the Truth![16] This truth-orientation underlies Baladhuri's conception of Abu Bakra's humility. The truth (*ḥaqq*) does not merely mean verbal veracity, but a grander sense of rightness and justice; it is one of the names of God. Thus, Abu Bakra is not merely saying, "I cannot tell a lie," but rather that he will not renounce God or Islamic values for the sake of his own bodily wellbeing. To rescind his witness against Mughira and protect himself from further beating would not merely be inaccurate, it would be wrong, detrimental to Islam, and a bad example to set for his fellow Muslims. For Baladhuri, humility is thus not merely an internal assessment of self-worth before a divine standard, but an outward orientation toward that standard.[17] In some sense, this definition of humility prefigures the definition voiced by the modern author, Iris Murdoch: "Humility is not a peculiar habit of self-effacement, rather like having an inaudible voice; it is selfless respect for reality and one of the most difficult and central of all virtues."[18]

In addition to this external truth-orientation, Baladhuri's depiction of Abu Bakra's humility also hinges on his identity as a mawla, or freedman of non-Arab origins. I do not suggest that Baladhuri believes Abu Bakra should be humble *because* he is a mawla, but rather that he transforms Abu Bakra's lowly social status into a positive religious virtue. To witness what Baladhuri does with Abu Bakra's mawla identity, we must first see how that identity is presented and particularly how it is used to contrast Abu Bakra from his notorious half-brother Ziyad.

The uncertainty of Abu Bakra's paternity and the lowliness of his social origins lie at the heart of his persona in many historical works. Abu Bakra could have plausibly claimed that the Arabian tribesman Harith was his father; indeed, according to classical Islamic law, Harith *should* have been considered his father because he was the legal owner of Abu Bakra's mother.[19] Claiming Arabian tribal origins would have improved Abu Bakra's social standing, increased his network of kinsmen and supporters, and widened his marriage options. Yet, Abu Bakra refused to adopt a noble lineage, and most ninth-century authors such as Baladhuri present Abu Bakra unequivocally as an

Abyssinian slave and, upon his manumission, a mawla of the Prophet Muhammad.

In contrast to Abu Bakra's lowly mawla status stands his notorious half-brother, Ziyad. Ziyad and Abu Bakra have similar backgrounds; both were raised as slaves in the household of the Arabian nobleman, Harith. Ziyad's mother and Abu Bakra's mother were the same woman, a slave named Sumayya. Ziyad's biological father was probably a Byzantine slave belonging to Harith, named Ubayd. Unlike Abu Bakra, however, Ziyad disavowed his biological father and adopted an "Arab" identity for political gain. The first Umayyad caliph, Muawiya, had been trying to convince the talented Ziyad to work for the Umayyad state (he even resorted to holding Ziyad's sons hostage, though Abu Bakra negotiated their release). Once Ziyad finally acquiesced, Muawiya cemented their partnership by declaring that his own father, Abu Sufyan—arguably the most powerful Arabian tribal chief of his day—had visited the tent of Sumayya during his travels, and that the result of this visit was Ziyad.[20] Overnight, Ziyad dropped his mawla status and became an Arabian tribesman and half-brother of the caliph. Because of his dubious adoption, Ziyad is widely known by the derogatory name Ziyad ibn Abihi, which means "Ziyad, the son of his father (whoever *he* is)." Almost all sources condemn Ziyad for perpetrating this travesty of an adoption, and they use the incident as evidence that the Umayyads cared more for mundane power and Arabian lineage than religious righteousness. It is in contrast to his brother's image of immorality and suspicious adoption that Abu Bakra stands as a beacon of mawla humility.

The historical development of one particular *hadith* (prophetic saying) presents the clearest evidence that Abu Bakra's lowly lineage was wielded as an ideological tool in eighth- and ninth-century criticisms of Ziyad and Umayyad Arabism.[21] This hadith exists in several variations, and its most basic form reads: "Whoever claims a false father, knowing that he is not his father, will have Heaven forbidden to him." A few versions of this hadith are not associated with Abu Bakra at all; however, in the mid-Umayyad period, a handful of Basran scholars began to cite Abu Bakra as one of the original transmitters of this hadith. In its most fanciful but symbolic form, this hadith is even presented as a conversation between Ziyad and Abu Bakra. Ziyad says to Abu Bakra: "Don't you see that the Commander of the Faithful [Muawiya] wants [to adopt me]? I was born on the bed of Ubayd [the Byzantine slave] and so I attribute my paternity to him, for I know that the Prophet said 'whoever claims a false father, let him occupy his seat in Hell.'" But the following year came, and the adoption went ahead anyway.[22] Ziyad incriminates himself by claiming to have heard the prophetic hadith with his own ears, and Abu Bakra simply listens as Ziyad reveals his hypocrisy. Although Abu Bakra's mawla status is never explicitly mentioned in any version of this hadith, the context makes it clear that his effectiveness as an anti-Umayyad symbol hinges on his mawla status and his refusal to fake an Arabian lineage as Ziyad had done.

This dichotomy between Abu Bakra's mawla identity and Ziyad's false lineage underlies all of Baladhuri's reports about these brothers, even those that do not mention genealogy specifically. For instance, Baladhuri transmits one colorful account in which two famous Basran figures—Anas ibn Malik and al-Hasan al-Basri—visit Abu Bakra at home when he is suffering from a bad case of sciatica. During their conversation, Anas insists that Abu Bakra should not be angry with Ziyad for anything concerning this world, for Ziyad has bestowed high positions and wealth upon Abu Bakra's children. To this, Abu Bakra responds: "What has he done for them, other than to ensure that they will enter Hell?" Anas then insists that Abu Bakra should not be angry with Ziyad for anything concerning the next world, for Ziyad "always strives to do what is right" (*innahu la-mujtahid*).[23] To this, Abu Bakra responds: "The Kharijites of Harura also claim that they strive to do what is right—and did they hit the mark or miss it?"[24] The Kharijites of Harura had killed the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph Ali and were the most notorious and radical rebels of early Islamic history. Thus with one flip comeback, Abu Bakra has reduced his half-brother to the same level as a band of dangerous Kharijite fanatics. Nowhere is Ziyad's suspicious adoption or Abu Bakra's mawla status mentioned in this account, but both are implied. First, the reference to Abu Bakra's children is based on the fact that they, too, pretended to be Arabs when they took up positions working for the Umayyads. Second, the presence of Anas ibn Malik and al-Hasan al-Basri, two famously pious mawlas of Basra, indicates that Abu Bakra here also represents the mawla class and their religious virtue. Ultimately, every story about Abu Bakra and Ziyad—including the slander episode analyzed above—is founded upon Abu Bakra's humble origins and Ziyad's immoral adoption.

It is against this background of ideological maligning of the Umayyads and construction of more classically Islamic values that we can better comprehend Baladhuri's construction of Abu Bakra's humility. Abu Bakra reveals that that virtue lies not in what lineage a person adopts, but in what values he or she adopts. Baladhuri presents Abu Bakra here as a paradigmatic virtuous mawla, standing against Ziyad as a paradigmatic power-hungry Umayyad. The Umayyad concern with Arab lineage is presented as a selfish, individualistic, elitist arrogance, while Abu Bakra's refusal to adopt an Arab lineage is presented as a community-oriented, egalitarian, piety-minded humility.[25] This background underlies the moral of the slander episode analyzed above: neither the humble mawla Abu Bakra nor the pious caliph Umar is in the wrong. Abu Bakra is merely speaking the truth, and Umar is merely carrying out the letter of the Islamic law. It is Ziyad who distorts the truth and makes Abu Bakra seem like a liar. By refusing to repent from the truth, Abu Bakra is implicitly refusing to give into Ziyad, and thus refusing to give into the distorted Umayyad value system that Ziyad represents.

Abu Bakra vs. Busr

Baladhuri transmits a second account in which Abu Bakra sacrifices his physical wellbeing in the name of the truth, exposing himself to the wrath of the Umayyad general Busr ibn Abi Artat. In this account, Busr is standing in the mosque of Basra and cursing the former caliph Ali, who was a primary ideological enemy of the Umayyad state. After cursing Ali, Busr invites the congregation to swear by God whether or not his curses are true. At this point, Abu Bakra yells: "By God, we only know you as a liar!"[26] Busr and his cronies beat Abu Bakra almost to the point of death. This reaction against Busr comes dangerously close to expressing a pro-Ali political partisanship, as well as a rash or even prideful attitude. However, Baladhuri is again quick to recast Abu Bakra's words, transmitting a unique explanation that is missing from other historical narratives. When his son asks him why he stood up to Busr, Abu Bakra says: "O son, perhaps you think your father said this thing out of love for Ali? No indeed! A fly crawling around on a corpse is better in my eyes than getting involved with what Ali was involved in [i.e., the first civil war]. But [Busr] asked in the name of God, 'Am I truthful?' and so I told him the truth."[27] Once again, it is truth-orientation that transforms Abu Bakra's bold action into a humble form of self-sacrifice; it is his *intention* that protects him from unseemly partisanship.

This account provides a rich example of how humility can be translated into positive political, social, and community-oriented action. Baladhuri uses the concept of humility to locate fearless speech and overtly political action within a wider network of positive Islamic values. Abu Bakra thus provides a historical example of how to become a political activist without becoming a political partisan. Here Abu Bakra's comportment complements what Khaled Abou El Fadl calls "empowering or enabling traditions" from the legal literature. These traditions encourage actors to speak up in the name of a higher truth, without necessarily sanctioning disorder or revolt. For instance, according to one hadith, the Prophet Muhammad said: "One of the greatest forms of jihad is a word of justice spoken before an unjust ruler."[28] The Prophet also reportedly commanded people "to speak the truth in any context and not to fear any rebuke, [trusting] in God."[29] In Abu Bakra's fearless reaction to Busr, we find a similar idea, this time expressed not in a juristic discourse about the legality of rebellion but in a historical account about speaking truth to Umayyad power.

Not only does Abu Bakra exhibit a political application for humility, but he also provides a model for broader communal action. Baladhuri does not explicitly present this communal application of humility, but I believe it follows from his presentation of humility as a truth-oriented attitude, coupled with Abu Bakra's identity as a mawla. For humility here not only entails an orientation toward a divine standard, but it also entails an orientation toward other men and toward the greater good of the community as a whole.[30] When viewed only in relation to Ziyad or Busr, Abu Bakra's actions might seem rude or even prideful. Yet, by standing up to Ziyad and Busr, Abu Bakra is not putting himself above them or saying he is better than them, but is rather uncovering their arrogance for the

wider community to witness.[31] By challenging these particular individuals, Abu Bakra is revealing his humility before their arrogance, putting his body in danger before their power, and displaying his lowly freedman status before their lofty Arab lineages. By exposing himself to their power, Abu Bakra is exposing his fellow Muslims to values that should matter rather than the corrupt values that did matter in the Umayyad polity. His assertive action might inspire others similarly to work to create an Islamic society that would benefit the entire community of Muslims and not just an elite group. Thus, Abu Bakra's is not just a truth-oriented humility but also a community-oriented humility. It models humility as a potential foundation for a grassroots movement toward collective goodness and elaboration of egalitarian Islamic values.

A Later View for Comparison

Comparing Baladhuri's narrative with that of a twelfth century Syrian scholar, Ibn Asakir (d. 1175), will highlight the distinctiveness of Baladhuri's treatment of Abu Bakra. Ibn Asakir's less overtly political account centers on the funeral proceedings of Abu Bakra's deceased wife. Her brothers claim the right to pray over her body, but Abu Bakra protests, claiming that as her husband he should have the honor of praying over her. These protestations anger his brothers-in-law, who later ambush Abu Bakra, knock him out, and wrap him in a funeral shroud. Upon seeing their unconscious father wrapped in a shroud, Abu Bakra's children think he is dead and begin to wail. Abu Bakra awakens to their wailing and says: "Do not cry. By the One who holds my soul in His hand, there is no soul that I would rather see depart this world than my own soul here, not even the soul of this buzzing fly."[32] In Ibn Asakir's account, Abu Bakra is still a humble mawla who asserts himself and is physically beaten as a result, but he is now cast as a *renunciant*. Abu Bakra exposes himself to physical danger not out of a fearless defense of the truth but out of a disregard for the life of this world.

This ascetic or renunciant conception of humility is common in the Islamic tradition. There are a number of Islamic figures who exemplify this type of humility, particularly Jesus son of Mary.[33] The Muslim Jesus exhibits a world-renouncing attitude that involves poverty, silence, and patience.[34] Likewise, a prominent strain of early Islamic thought glorifies detachment from the world, a preference for *din* (religion, spiritual matters) over *dunya* (worldly life). Early Islamic history contains a number of renunciants known for their ascetic humility, such as Abu Dharr Ghifari (d. 652-53), Talq ibn Habib (d. 718), and Hasan al-Basri (d. 728). By emphasizing Abu Bakra's disregard for the world, his dismissal of his soul as more lowly than a fly's soul, his dispassion even in the face of his crying children, and his symbolic garb of a funeral shroud, Ibn Asakir portrays Abu Bakra within this ascetic framework of humility.

Moreover, by Ibn Asakir's day, Sufi spirituality was being widely practiced and elaborated throughout the Islamic world. For instance, the great scholar

Ghazali (d. 1111), whose seminal writings helped reconcile Sufi spirituality with orthodox Sunnism, discussed humility in several of his works. In one passage, Ghazali describes the Prophet Muhammad as a humble man who rode a donkey, ate while sitting on the ground, helped with the household chores, and adopted a simple outward appearance that left him indistinguishable from his slaves.[35] The later Sufi spiritual tradition further elaborated humility as a moral virtue and basis for ethical comportment, particularly within the communal life of the Sufi brotherhood.[36] Indeed, one of Ibn Asakir's teachers was the foundational Sufi thinker Abu Najib Suhrawardi, originator of the Suhrawardi Sufi brotherhood. Thus, in contradistinction to Baladhuri's account, Ibn Asakir's depiction of Abu Bakra's humility is situated firmly within the Sufi tradition.[37]

Finally, it is worth noting that Ibn Asakir's account raises a classic paradox of humility, namely that well-executed humility can become a source of spiritual pride. Ibn Asakir presents this paradox when speaking of Abu Bakra's identity as a mawla. Baladhuri had been content to simply describe Abu Bakra as a mawla of the Prophet, but in Ibn Asakir's account Abu Bakra describes himself as an embodiment of the Quranic ideal of mawla-ness. When Abu Bakra hears some of his fellow Companions making fun of his unknown paternity, Abu Bakra retorts: "I am one of those whose father is not known, and I am one of your brothers in religion and a mawla of the Prophet," which is a paraphrase of Quran 33:5.[38] Here, Abu Bakra's very lowliness seems to have turned into a source of spiritual pride, a glorification of his connection to the Prophet. Moreover, his response seems to have stemmed from nothing more than a wounded ego. Indeed, this account highlights that the line between humility and pride is quite thin, and that what may be considered humble from one perspective might be considered prideful from another.

In the Islamic tradition, this paradox arises paradigmatically with the figure of Iblis (Satan). In the Quran, God commands the angels to bow down in prostration before Adam. They all do so, save Iblis. Iblis "refused and grew arrogant," and in return was cast out of heaven, to tempt mankind until the Day of Judgment."[39] When God asks Iblis why he refused to bow to Adam, Iblis replies: "I am better than he. You have created me from fire, while him you have created from clay."[40] In the mainstream Muslim view, Iblis is the evil enemy of God; arrogance is Satan's sin, the demonic trait *par excellence*. However, in some Sufi traditions, Satan's arrogance is viewed differently. What seemed like arrogance was actually an extreme form of humility and self-sacrifice: Iblis would only humble his fiery body to God himself, bowing to no created being but only to the Creator. From this perspective, Iblis becomes a "model of monotheistic devotion," who willingly sacrifices his soul for God and will ultimately be redeemed.[41] Iblis thus beautifully encapsulates the paradox of pride and humility: the very same words and actions might be understood as prideful or humble, depending on the perceived intention of the actor.

Rather than attempting to resolve this classic paradox, this article has instead focused on how the early Arabic-Islamic historian Baladhuri resolved it.

Baladhuri avoids the humility-as-pride paradox by focusing on Abu Bakra's intentionality and by constructing a concept of humility that makes room for bold action. In a somewhat similar fashion to the later Sufi redemption of Iblis, Baladhuri takes Abu Bakr's seemingly arrogant or disruptive actions, and shows that the underlying context (mawla identity) and intention (orientation toward the truth and the Sunni community) reveal the true humility of these actions. Rather than engaging in a Sufi project of spiritual reorientation, however, Baladhuri is engaged in an early Islamic historical project of preserving Abu Bakra's status as a Companion of the Prophet and as a beacon of piety in a sea of Umayyad injustice.

Broadening the discussion

In this article, I have analyzed how Baladhuri's depiction of Abu Bakra sheds light on the concept of humility as well as the process of constructing and invoking humility. Abu Bakra's humility is fearless and active, as he stands up for the truth and withstands violence for the good of the community. Furthermore, Baladhuri's presentation of Abu Bakra's humility served a particular ideological purpose. Baladhuri was writing at a time when Sunni values such as political non-partisanship and the righteousness of the Companions of the Prophet were being articulated. I suggest that Baladhuri highlighted Abu Bakra's humility to contribute to this wider scholarly project and to protect a pious Companion from any accusations of impropriety or partisanship. Moreover, Baladhuri transformed Abu Bakra's lowly mawla status into the religious virtue of humility, depicting him as a model of piety whose behavior could be emulated by all members of the Islamic community, regardless of their social background. Ultimately, Baladhuri's inventive location of Abu Bakra within the Quranic description of "those who walk the earth in humility" cements Abu Bakra's status as a paragon of humble action in the early Islamic tradition.

The discussion presented in this article is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to open the door to other avenues of analysis and broader comparative projects. For specialists in early Islamic history, there remains much to discover about how individual historians such as Baladhuri conceptualized Islamic values and constructed idealized images of the Companions. For political and social scientists, Abu Bakra's example may have implications for theories of nonviolent resistance, community action, or social dynamics. For scholars of religious studies, Abu Bakra might provide new insights into the role humility can play in interreligious dialogue. [42] His form of humility might also inspire comparisons across traditions, for instance with the Buddhist concept of fierce compassion.[43] For scholars of Arabic literature, parallels may be explored in stories such as Khalil Jibran's "The Ambitious Violet," a mystical allegory in which pride and humility are turned on their heads. Ultimately, Abu Bakra helps us appreciate that studying humility in different contexts can be a rich humanistic project, and I hope his unusual form of humility proves as

stimulating for scholars today as it was for Baladhuri more than a millennium ago.

Notes

[1] Chase Robinson, *Islamic Historiography* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 35.

[2] On the trends of Islamic-Arabic historical writings in the ninth century, see Robinson, *Islamic Historiography,* 30-38.

[3] The identity of the Rightly Guided Caliphs was a matter of debate for the first few centuries of Islamic history, and it was only finally elaborated in the ninth century. See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Religion and Politics Under the Early 'Abbasids: The Emrgence of the Proto-Sunni Elite* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 49-63, 169-77.

[4] For an introduction to the historical memory of the Umayyads in Islamic history, see Gerald Hawting, *The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661-750*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2000), 11-18.

[5] The historians remembered one Umayyad caliph, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (Umar II), in a good light and declared him the fifth "Rightly Guided caliph." His reputation for righteousness is based in large part upon his repealing of these unjust taxes against the mawlas.

[6] On works extolling the excellence of the Companions, and the political ideologies latent in these works, see particularly Asma Afsaruddin, *Excellence and Precedence: Medieval Islamic Discourse on Legitimate Leadership*. Leiden: Brill, 2002. See also M. Muriyani, "Saḥāba," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition.

[7] For instance, I argue elsewhere that Abu Bakra was not actually a mawla of the Prophet at all (though he was a freed slave), and that his image as a pious mawla of the Prophet was constructed in Basra sometime in the mid-8th century CE. E. Urban, "The Identity Crisis of Abu Bakra" in *The Lineaments of Islam: Studies in Honor of Fred McGraw Donner,* ed. Paul M. Cobb (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012), 121–50.

[8] Most historical and biographical sources present Abu Bakra either as the son of the slave Masruh or of completely unknown paternity. A few hadith specialists, however, treat Abu Bakra as the son of Harith for legal reasons. See for example Bukhari, *Al-Tarikh al-Kabir* (Hyderabad: Matbaʿat Jamʿiyyat Da'irat al-Maʿarif al-ʿUthmaniyya, 1941–1958), 4.2: 112–13; Ibn Hanbal, *Kitab al-Asami wa-al-Kuna (*ed. ʿAbd Allah Hibn Yusuf al-Judayʿ. Kuwait: Maktabat Dar al-Aqsa, 1985), 30; and Muslim, *Kitab al-Kuna wa-al-Asma*, (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1984), 16.

[9] His given name is Nufayʿ, but he is most commonly known by his nickname Abu Bakra, which serves as an emblem of his freedom from slavery and his conversion to Islam.

[10] He notoriously explained his withdrawal from this dispute by quoting the hadith: "Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity." (One of the main combatants in the Battle of the Camel was the Prophet's widow, Aisha). For his association with this hadith, see Fatima Mernissi, *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation Of Women's Rights In Islam* (trans. Mary Jo Lakeland. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1991)*,* 49–60. In addition to his non-association with the Battle of the Camel, he is known for his political neutrality more generally. For instance, Abu Bakra reportedly met a man named Ahnaf on the road and asked, "Where are you going?" Ahnaf replied, "To go support Ali." Abu Bakra warned him: "Turn back, for I have heard the Messenger of God saying, 'When two Muslims meet

each other with their swords, both the murderer and the murdered will enter hell.' I said, 'O Messenger of God! That is fine for the murderer, but what about the murdered?' The Messenger of God said, 'He surely intended to kill his companion.'" Bukhari, *Sahih (*ed. Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Gujranwala: Taleem-ul-Quran Trust, 1971–), 1:30; see a similar account in Malik ibn Habib, *Kitab al-Ta'rij (La Historia)* (ed. Jorge Aguadé. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Arabe, 1991), 114.

[11] Quran 25:63.

[12] In critical analyses of the concept, humility is often treated as an attitude about the self in comparison to others or to a higher standard. There is debate about whether humility entails an *accurate* self-assessment, or an *underestimating* self-assessment. See for example Cooper, *Measure of Things*: *Humanism, Humility, and Mystery* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 161-67; Jamie Schillinger, "Intellectual humility and interreligious dialogue between Christians and Muslims," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 23, no. 3 (July 2012), 364.

[13] See for instance Mujahid ibn Jabr, *Tafsir Mujahid*; Muqatil ibn Sulayman, *Tafsir Muqatil ibn Sulayman*; Tabari, *Jam' al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an* (accessed at altafsir.com in March, 2013)

[14] Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 1:582

[15] Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 1:583.

[16] Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, 1:583.

[17] That is, humility is "vital" in the sense that it impacts one's life and conduct, as opposed to being merely an intellectual exercise. See Cooper, *Measure of Things,* 10, 144.

[18] Iris Murdoch, *Existentials and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature* (ed. P. Conradi. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997), 338. See also Cooper, *Measure of Things*, 154.

[19] This law had not yet come into existence at the time of Abu Bakra's birth. It is generally known as the *al-walad lil-firash* ("the child belongs to the bed") dictum; it says that whenever a child is born to a woman in a legally sanctioned sexual relationship—i.e., marriage or slavery—the child is treated as an offspring of that relationship. A formal charge of fornication may be brought against the woman and the child disavowed in that way, but barring evidence of fornication, the child must be acknowledged as legitimate (even if he looks suspiciously like the milkman.) See Uri Rubin, "'*Al-walad li-l-firāsh*': on the Islamic campaign against '*zinā*.'" *Studia Islamica* 78 (1993): 5–26. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between legitimate paternity in marriage and slavery, and the rights and obligations owed by a man to his wife or *umm walad* (slave who has borne him a child), see Kecia Ali, *Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010.

[20] This kind of genealogical manipulation is forbidden by the Quran, but in practice it persists even to this day. See for instance Zoltan Szombathy, *The Roots of Arabic Genealogy: A study in historical anthropology*. (PiliscsAbu Bakraa: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003); and Edouard Conte, "Agnatic Illusions: The Element of Choice in Arab Kinship," in *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, edited by Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawod. London: Saqi, 2001.

[21] It is hard to determine exactly who was responsible for using Abu Bakra as an ideological tool in this way, but there seems to be some connection to Basran scholars such as Abu Uthman al-Nahdi (d. 715) Asim al-Ahwal (d. ca. 759) and Khalid al-

Hadhdha (d. 760). I perform a detailed analysis of this hadith and its chains of oral transmission in E. Urban, "The Identity Crisis of Abu Bakra."

[22] Ibn Asakir, *Tarikh Madinat Dimashq (*ed. Umar ibn Gharamah al-Amrawi. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1995–2000), 19:174.

[23] I have translated the Arabic word *mujtahid* in a slightly tortuous manner, hoping to convey both the idea of "striving" and the idea of "exercising independent judgment."

[24] Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf,* 1:592.

[25] Stephen Judd has shown that Baladhuri views the late Umayyads as morally bankrupt. Judd, "Narratives and Character development: al-ṭabarī and al-Balādhuri on late Umayyad history" in *Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal: Insights into classical Arabic literature and Islam*, ed. Sebastian Günther (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 209-226.

[26] Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf,* 1:492. See also al-Tabari, *Tarikh al-Rusul wa-al-Muluk*, ed. M.J. De Goeje (Leiden: Brill, 1964–1965), ser. 2, vol. 1, p. 12.

[27] Al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf,* 1:584.

[28] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 123 (tradition found in Tirmidhi's *Jami*). I have slightly tweaked Abou El Fadl's translation of the Arabic.

[29] Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence*, 123 (tradition found in Ibn Maja's *Sunan*).

[30] This idea that an orientation toward a divine standard also entails an orientation toward other humans is highlighted in some Sufi works, which present humility as a foundational value of Sufi ethics. See Paul Heck, "Mysticism as Morality: The Case of Sufism," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 34, no. 2 (Jun., 2006): 253-286. However, in the Sufi case, this other-oriented humility usually entails gentleness and non-reactivity in the face of offence. It is also an ethical stance that values the Sufi brotherhood over the individual will, thereby contributing to the stability of Sufi institutional structures. In this way it seems similar to humility in the Christian monastic tradition, in which the novice adopts an attitude of complete deference to his superior's spiritual authority. I suggest here that Abu Bakra's humility shows a more politically active, potentially revolutionary form of community-minded humility.

[31] In his later definition of humility, the seminal thinker Ghazali insists that no Muslim can rightly think himself better than any other Muslim, lest this result in the denial of truth. See Schillinger, "Intellectual humility," 371. I suggest that Baladhuri is conveying the same message, albeit through Abu Bakra's fearless example rather than through theological or moral discourse.

[32] Ibn Asakir, *Tarikh Madinat Dimashq,* 62:218 (see also a similar story on page 215).

[33] See Tarif Khalidi, *The Muslim Jesus: Sayings and Stories in Islamic Literature.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003.

[34] Tarif Khalidi, *Muslim Jesus*, 34, 59, 71.

[35] Schillinger, "Intellectual humility," 370.

[36] See Heck, "Mysticism as Morality," 270-72.

[37] I do not mean to suggest that Sufi conceptions of humility are always conventional, familiar, or simplistic. There is undoubtedly a rich Sufi discourse about humility and its diverse applications in society; however, I merely mean to suggest that Ibn Asakir's ascetic view of humility might seem more familiar than Baladhuri's presentation of a politically active humility.

[38] Ibn Asakir, *Tarikh Madinat Dimashq*, 62:213–14.

[39] Quran 2:34; 38:72-75.

[40] Quran 38:76.
[41] Peter Awn, *Satan's Tragedy and Redemption: Iblis in Sufi Psychology* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1997), 178.
[42] For a critical analysis of humility's usefulness as a tool for interreligious dialogue, see Schillinger, "Intellectual humility," and the sources cited therein.
[43] More broadly (though not with the exact term "fierce compassion"), there is much recent scholarship on how to enact Buddhist values actively in the world (see for instance Sallie B. King, ed. *Socially Engaged Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009). And the Tibetan Buddhist contains wrathful deities, such as Red Tara who has a fierce or violent aspect even though she is the embodiment of compassion. These wrathful deities break down any sense of duality between loving compassion and fierce strength (see also Rob Linrothe, *Ruthless Compassion: Wrathful Deities in Early Indo-Tibetan Esoteric Buddhist Art*. London: Serindia Publications, 1999).

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Connected Knowing—Connected Dancing

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All knowledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known.[1]

Introduction

This is a story of discoveries. It is a story of exploring and meaning making by four people invested in the physical and expressive art form of dance. Our story became a journey of intertwining narratives, one about dance-making[2] and the other a humanistic inquiry. Individually and collectively we re-discovered our passion for dancing while uncovering diverse approaches to learning. Ways of moving, thinking and feeling were stretched and pulled apart only to be re-assembled from different points of view. As the journey unfolded, each individual's personal story became illuminated through an increasing awareness of community.

Connected knowing[3] became a vibrant vehicle for our narratives. Often within such a framework, the process of learning can be heightened. Experiential explorations are valued; learning is encouraged through multiple perspectives. Connected knowing focuses on the personal and shared experience rather than authoritative declarations of knowledge. Authority "rests not on power or status but on commonality of experience."[4] In this way, a community of learners comes into play as relationships with those seeking to understand the shared experience are forged. A sense of intimacy and trust emerges.

Connected knowing became a means for us to explore spoken and moving stories while also artistically crafting these stories. We found ourselves continuously re-mediating our relationship to dance-making and to each other.

Unfolding narratives regularly overlaid, interrupted and re-defined each other. It is our hope that the following reflective narratives illuminate the ways in which engaged learning heightened our dance-making, in movement, thought, and meaning. We hope that in articulating our stories we can further uncover and re-mediate the hidden dimensions, insights and contradictions, within our experience.

Sherrie's Story: Moving Between and Betwixt

Movement is … a most productive and challenging means of thinking about and reflecting upon the world.[5]

I had multiple roles throughout this journey of intertwining narratives. Many of these roles reflected my responsibilities as faculty artistic director of a university repertory concert. For instance, I chose the two guest choreographers and auditioned the dancers. I conceived of the theme for the concert: exploring notions of home. Each choreographer established a discrete choreographic intent that stemmed from re-defining notions of home. Choreographic explorations engaged physical, cognitive and affective modalities. At times, choreographers highlighted thoughts of home from the past, incorporating memories of dancers and others involved in the dance-making, to intermingle with that of the present. Other times, the sense of now was the most relevant. As a result of such a process, each of the three dances in this concert was distinct. It is also important to note that the three choreographers—two guest artists and myself—embraced dance-making as a collaborative process. This collaborative involvement ranged from student-dancers contributing to movement invention, re-mediating choreographic intent to the overall shaping of the dance. Such a dance-making process readily aligns itself with the tenets of connected knowing. As the frameworks of collaborative dance-making and connected knowing increasingly interfaced, additional doorways opened for us to engage in learning about dancing, and perhaps most importantly, ourselves.

Trust is critical to the experiential processes of dance-making and connected knowing. Within each of these two processes, learners-dancers take risks with their thinking-dancing as they explore possibilities. Both encourage participants to be open to all possibilities while being confident to make decisions. In our journey, we—as students and teacher, dancers and choreographer—needed to trust each other and the collaborative dance-making model in order to build a safe learning-rehearsal environment. To do so, we often found ourselves shifting between the role of teacher, student, spectator and mover. Yet within the context of each role, we experienced an increasing awareness of the body being more than an object to be examined from afar. Our bodies could be trusted as a rich source of knowledge embedded with life experiences.[6]

The stories shared by Megan, Kaity and Tricia, the three student-dancers involved in this humanistic inquiry, provide a glimpse into how each experienced their journey of discoveries.[7] Their stories are distinct, just as the dances celebrating ideas of home came to be distinct. Yet as much as each student-dancer shaped her learning in a unique manner, the dancers also learned as a community. To underscore this reality, the commentary following each narrative is offered as a further reflection to frame the intertwining narratives, and, of course, to continue our journey of engaged learning and dancing.

Megan's Story: Embracing the Unknown

A free spirit can exist only in a freed body.[8]

The keyword of process cropped up again and again. For me, this idea of learning through understanding became the integral part of connecting to the movement. It also enabled me to be an effective collaborator in creating the dance. By focusing on the process rather than the end product of the dance I was also led into a world where nothing is clear-cut. At first I was overwhelmed with the ambiguity of not having a prescribed assignment. The notion of right versus wrong has been hard-wired in my brain from early childhood, and has been continually reinforced through a traditional education. I was taken aback by the unlimited possibilities that this new approach to learning and understanding facilitated. I since have found that this new way of experiencing the learning process facilitates openness, creativity and connections; three elements I have found particularly helpful, in dance classes and my other university courses.

Embracing this learning process of collaboration, with the choreographer and with the other dancers, meant that each movement had a rich history behind it. For instance, to generate movement for my solo in *The Thirteenth Step*, I needed to choose a few objects off a list of things I literally carried in and out of my house on a daily basis. The objects could be mundane or of very personal significance. Once I chose my objects, I was given loose guidelines to create movement personifying them. The creation, however, was just the beginning. For I then had to explore my movement through different outlets. The final step was when my expanded movement material was placed with someone else's work. My movement, initially a solo created around my objects, now physically transformed into a duet with Tricia. The new challenge was to find a way to connect these two solos into a cohesive duet. Curiously, this stage of the dance–making seemed easier to me as I already knew the intricacies of my solo inside and out. I was ready to dedicate myself to finding connections with Tricia. It was also helpful that the choreographer, to aid us in finding these connections, put certain guidelines in place. For example, Tricia and I were told that each of the four walls was a wall in our home and each was a different color; we then had to use these colors to inform and modify

our movement. These enhanced layers of movement invention were slowly built. Each layer helped facilitate the connections I made throughout the dance. That is, connections from memories to the present moment and then from myself to others both inside and outside of the dance.

Going through this learning process compelled me to look back and reflect on how I was accustomed to learning and exploring movement. Previously I often found myself copying the movements of the teacher, or another student. I then viewed this copied movement in evaluative measures, judging not only myself but also others around me. This forced the movement to have a feeling of being foreign to both me, the performer, and to the audience. I was dancing outside of my body, as a separate entity, and therefore not allowing connections to the movement to form. Judgment creates this separation between the knower, the object and me, and in this case, the movement. It was only after finding the connection between my body and the movement that I realized what dance educator Sherry Shapiro discusses as a shift from disembodied knowing to embodied knowing. She writes:

> [the] intent of the learning experience moves from one of learning movement vocabulary for the sake of creating dance to gaining an understanding of the self, others, and the larger world for the possibility of change.[9]

Commentary

Shapiro's words are especially poignant when, as Megan discusses, the choreographic collaboration calls for the dancers to generate movement. As dancers mine ideas through the physicality of their bodies in motion, choreographic intent emerges within and through their bodies. Students find their individual dancing voice, going beyond familiar and comfortable vocabulary boundaries. They begin to trust themselves. Megan claims a growing sense of trust in herself as a learner-dancer when recognizing the different sensibilities of embodiment. She became engaged in learning by connecting to Tricia, in movement and thought. Through such engagement a unique understanding of learning about dancing and the dancing itself unfolds.

The tenets of connected knowing are certainly not new. Its principles are embedded in educational frameworks aligned with critical feminist pedagogy and democratic learning.[10] Sharing and exploring are accepted inroads to uncovering knowledge and enhanced understanding. All parties are equal as a multiplicity of ideas is celebrated; a community evolves because individuals are dedicated to a commonly shared passion. As Megan enthusiastically states, "However time consuming and vigorous this process of collaboratively creating the dance became, the end payoff was truly astonishing. By exploring this new way of learning we had built a community around the commonality of the movement."

Kaity's Story: Trusting Relationships

The body is personal. At the same time, it has a tremendous capacity to connect with others.[11]

When I think back on my performance of *In Their Skin*, I find myself continually returning to how I came to learn and eventually understand this dance. Discovering all that was embedded within the movement was a vigorous process of learning. I first wanted, and believed I needed to understand the technical components of the movement. Similar to Megan's story, learning the technique was my main objective, for that was what was familiar to me. Yet although not initially searching for meaning in the movement, I discovered the movement motifs within this dance brought out certain emotions in me. However if I wanted to embody what the dance was about, I needed to go beyond my own personal emotional responses to the movement and probe the physical expression within the action. To do so, I had some important questions to consider. Why is the movement being created? What am I as a mover attempting to represent or embody? What emotions am I evoking through the physicality of the movement? How can I differentiate simply moving through space from moving with intentionality?

To find some answers, many stories were shared with the choreographer and my fellow three dancers. I heard stories involving disconnected relationships between mothers, siblings and abusive partners; I also heard stories about the past and the present. Yet I remained unclear how I could immerse myself into the true meaning of these stories and this dance. How would I be able to physically connect to the movement; what did this way of thinking about home emotionally bring out of me? I gradually envisioned myself telling not only my story, but also the back-story of *In Their Skin* through my dancing. As much as I knew I had to find my own connection, no matter how personal, or even uncomfortable, I had to be careful. As I can be emotional, it was too easy to simply "paste on," as Megan would say, my perception of the correct emotions to the dance and negate the expressive emotions embedded within the movement vocabulary. For if nothing else, I needed to remember that the dance was created with a choreographic intent; I also wanted to keep in mind all the stories of triumphs and struggles that we had shared.

I began to remember the many different relationships I have had with the influential people of my life. I also began to rely on the other dancers, particularly Clare, my partner. Because Clare and I had an existing strong friendship, we could easily fall back, metaphorically and literally, on each other. This realization was a critical turning point for me. Being able to physically rely on my partner for support gave me ways to reach new expressive levels in the dance. If our performance was to be believable, our friendship had to become the backbone for the trust that was needed to physically develop in our interactions with one another. In retrospect, that physical trust allowed me to

experience an emotional sense of vulnerability in my dancing. Although vulnerability can be scary and emotionally draining, this vulnerability opened a door to bring my own story to the dance. I began to enter into spatial and expressive relationships with the others as well which, in turn, helped me embody the movement.

Only after months of rehearsing, I ultimately came to fully comprehend the vocabulary of this dance. This was a dance that required my physical, mental and emotional understanding of its underlying intent. I found each of these connections when relating my own experiences to the dance as a whole. I needed to trust that the physical, mental and emotional were intricately linked. Finding the value of my personal experiences in the context of the larger whole was critical to this. When I started to fold my own experiences into the choreographic intent, I physically and emotionally connected with the dance itself. I knew 'it' was happening because I felt myself dancing differently, with a new awareness.

Commentary

Connected knowing is very much a learning frame focusing on relationships. Personal experience and learning through empathy are inherent to a connected knowing orientation. Kaity's story reveals these attributes and more. Whether revolving around the dance's movement vocabulary, structure, or overarching intent, she intentionally sought out other points of view while weaving her own passion into her search to understand. Her emotional empathy and trust of others, especially her partner Clare, enabled her to value her own expressiveness about and within the dance. As Kaity observed:

> I could move freely, expressing my emotion within the movement, with a sense of safety knowing my dancing was being supported by those around me. Like the safety of being home, where people can be themselves and welcomed with open arms.

The development of trust that emerged between the dancers of *In Their Skin* and the choreographer was central to Kaity's discovery. The trust was not about, as Kaity remarked, "coming to a definitive conclusion, but rather to better understand each other." Megan and Tricia also found such trust. For Megan, it was the "shared small truths"[12] that dancers reveal in a dance's quiet moments. Within those movement moments of *The Thirteenth Step*, Megan discovered the trust to enter into, as she so beautifully stated, "a community around the commonality of the movement." For Tricia, it was honestly seeing and being aware of others, "even if I don't dance with them."

Tricia's Story: Engaged in Connected Knowing

> *When the object speaks, when the body dances, perhaps it is not a watching but a listening which is required. Or if it is a watching, it is a watching with an eye that glides under the surface of skin and rests there, listening without expectation.*[13]

Connected knowing was a difficult concept for me to grasp at first. I did not understand whether I was aiming to achieve something, or simply opening my eyes to what was happening in a new way. I asked myself questions reflecting on my association to the choreographic process, my relations to the movement, and my awareness of the other dancers. With so many different ways and places to feel connected, I felt overwhelmed by the dance-making process and our research. However, as developmental psychologist Blythe Clinchy describes, "… thinking cannot be divorced from feeling," and how, "[f]ully developed connected knowing … means to truly experience the other as a subject."[14] These words, noting a difference between the words *understand* and *experience*, led me to realize that while I often understand what I am dancing, I may not always be experiencing what I am dancing.

These thoughts helped me evolve in the dance *2x5 by 3* where I performed both group and solo movement phrases. The group movement phrases were not only performed with other dancers but often with the same movement. When performing with others, I used my relationships to other dancers as a means to learn. I observed their movement and where they were in relation to me and would alter my movement in relation to theirs. However, in my solo movement phrases, the movement was unique to me; there was no obvious relation to another dancer. Without other dancers to observe and directly relate with, I was challenged, almost feeling uneasy, to approach the movement from a new direction. At first, I was just going through the motions, repeating the same thing over and over again in each rehearsal, dancing in my own bubble, and not noticing anything around me. I understood what I was doing and how I was doing it, but I was not really relating or identifying with my surroundings. Then during one rehearsal, the choreographer offered a few suggestions for how to alter the solo sequences. Her suggestions were interesting because they were not telling me how to physically change the movement or how she wanted the movement to look. Rather, her suggestions focused on changing how I thought about the movement, encouraging me to probe how dance was more than mere actions and steps within it. Her suggestions were actually in the form of questions. Are you feeling the ground more as fresh cut grass or hot pavement? How does that change the movement execution? When the movement draws you backward, are you being pushed or pulled in that direction?

When asked such questions, I had to experiment and make choices. The questions also created a sense of collaboration between the choreographer, the movement, and me. Both the choreographer and I were able to use our experiences to help each other learn more about the dance and ourselves. As I

rehearsed and performed this solo phrase, I soon found that I was no longer trying to repeat the movement as a memorized event; rather I allowed the movement to change with time and thought. In particular, I began thinking about structures in relationship to moving. When the base and support of a movement shifted, the structure could easily fall apart, or adjust, and return to equilibrium. The circular patterns I drew in space came to represent the structures of home, relationships, and belonging. While I danced, my body was constantly shifting, yet balanced and stable at the same time. As I explored, I found physical ways and mental processes that made more sense to me and helped me understand the movements and then to explore those movements in new ways. This could be as much about changing the dynamics, the number of rotations, or how large I draw the circle. I also gave myself permission to explore these possibilities in relation to what the dance was about for me. Investing in the intent made me question, and eventually act upon, why I did something a specific way. Was it just out of habit, or was it because it meant something to me in that particular moment?

The difference between replicating and simply doing the movement versus experiencing and immersing myself into the dance is what helped me evolve with dancing my solo phrase. The choreographer's suggestions prompted me to change how I approached the movement. Instead of viewing the phrase as one chunk I became aware of the little details and specificities that were entwined in the movement. Through my explorations I realized that my mental choices were creating a difference in how I actually executed the movement. I also began to find that the movement's specificities were doing much more than just helping me carry out the movements differently. There really was a difference between just going through the motion and actually being invested in the dance. By immersing myself mentally and physically, I became mindful of how the details of my movement compared or contrasted to other dancers and other movement. I was able to explore and better understand the specificities of their movement execution and their relationship to my thoughts and choices, and the choreography. For example, when looking at the other dancers, I noticed that other phrases also had a circular sense, even though the movement was being executed differently or had a different focus. This helped me gain a deeper understanding about the cohesiveness any dance should have; the realization also helped me determine what I should be focusing on in this particular dance, as my solo phrase was one part of a larger community.

As I came to understand the different parts of the dance, I was truly able to better relate to any and all the movement and dancers, whether or not I did the movement or danced with a person. By understanding all the movement in the dance, I could then find ways to highlight aspects of my movement to better express the dance as a whole. I found that while my particular movement phrases might not have been physically similar to others, I still had a relation to the other dancers. It was up to me to make the choice of how I wanted the audience to read the space between us. I also had the choice to notice other dancers and what they were doing or to ignore them. I know that

my decisions made a big difference in how I danced. I would like to think that my choices also impacted how the audience perceived the dance.

Commentary

Contributing to the dance-making process is not easy for student-dancers accustomed to a model based on choreographer as authority and dancer as instrument. The binary readily fosters an environment in which students await declarations of right and wrong.[15] It also speaks to the differences between separate knowing and connected knowing. Tricia reminds us of this when offering the following by Blythe Clinchy:

> In separate knowing one regards the object as an instance of a category (a type of person, say, or a genre) and measures it against objective standards. In connected knowing, the focus is on the object in itself, in all its particularity of detail.[16]

In reflecting upon her experiences, past and present, Tricia allowed herself to consider the spectrum of choreographic models. She did not want to judge the extremes of either. Rather, Tricia delved into different inroads to find movement and, in turn, contribute to the making of the dance. As a result, she also uncovered a new sense of ownership in her dancing. When dancer and choreographer become invested in dance-making as co-owners, as what happened with Tricia, embodied dancing becomes possible. And as Tricia experienced, connected knowing can support such embodiment. She explains:

> Connected knowing helped me find different inroads toward connections and relationships. Although the swarms of questions and multiple aspects of connection are what overwhelmed me from the start, those questions are what helped me explore and become engaged in connected knowing.

Communities of Learning

> *[W]e can see otherness within ourselves, and we can begin to build community that is both located within ourselves, and we can begin to build community that is both located in specific conditions and yet open to difference.*[17]

Connected knowing and collaborative dance-making invite us to be thoughtful in our speaking and listening, to be as purposeful in our moving as our witnessing. Underlying both processes, in practice and in theory, is the notion of community. Initially the students entered into a community for the opportunity to perform; performing was their passion. Individually each became active in the give and take inherent to collaborative dance-making.

Collectively all contributed to building a community in which trust and intimacy were so critical.

Communities of practice[18] contain many of the same characteristics as connected knowing and collaborative dance-making. Each embraces a perspective where all participants are equal and all are invited to learn from everyone. Participating in this community of practice opened an array of doorways to experience different understandings of home. In so doing, many questions, often personal, surfaced. What makes a home; does home need to be a physical place; is home a feeling, a locale or my family; is home safe? We shared stories and memories, dancing together to physically capture our reflections.

We also held creative movement workshops with participants from a local community rehabilitation organization. We initially went to this center to incorporate how others defined home for *The Thirteenth Step*, the dance in which all four of us participated in the dance-making. Yet we came away re-defining our own sense of home. As students, rehabilitation participants and with me as workshop facilitator, we re-discovered the relevance of touch to feelings of safety and trust associated with home. Physical contact, initially perceived as disarming, became more frequent and soon gave rise to simple tasks of weight sharing. Bonds developed, at times verbal but most often physical. Tricia spoke of the "significance that can come with human touch. It made me realize it was not just as an empty action, but actually made me feel more comfortable and connected to the other person." Megan too found the experience of touch quite powerful, as it "was the only way we could communicate with the participants. Finding this new way to communicate with their bodies transformed participants … all of us." Kaity noted, "Observing the way a person moves truly is a way of looking into his or her soul. It uncovers pieces of who they are as a unique individual."

The creative movement workshops required us to continually consider anew the question, "what is home?" as we listened, observed and moved with the participants' experiences of home. Although at times uncertain of what home is, we were grateful for what at times felt like a bombardment of ideas. Yet as we uncovered relationships between a body's movement and lived experiences, we came to realize embodied dancing. In turn, the possibilities for a unique way of learning and knowing were also recognized.

Concluding Thoughts

> *Our stories are masks through which we can be seen, and with every telling we stop the flood and swirl of thought so someone can catch a glimpse of us and maybe catch us if they can.*[19]
>
> **Megan**

Confronting challenges by embracing them and being engaged in each step of the process changed the way I view learning movement, and learning in

general. In collaborative learning there is no right answer, no single solution, and every route is explored and accepted in different ways. Finding new ways to tackle problems and to see new possibilities allowed me to learn in ways I never have before. The endless possibilities became revitalizing rather than overwhelming. Embracing the confusion is what eventually allowed me to continue learning. Yet to say that I changed permanently and no longer think in judging ways as I used to would be untrue. I view my endeavors in connected knowing as the beginning of a long journey, in which my boundaries will continue to be expanded.

Kaity

Although I was delving into unexplored ways of learning, I discovered more about the power of movement and the influence of trust in each rehearsal. Ultimately through my moments of discomfort I became engaged in connected knowing. This collaborative learning led me to feeling secure with others and myself. It is fascinating to realize that while learning *In Their Skin,* I was constantly searching for the same sense of security that I had discovered while moving with the rehabilitation center participants. Moving as a community at those creative workshops influenced me in how I approached learning the dance. I became open to possibilities; I was able to develop a sense of trust and vulnerability in my dancing similar to the trust that I had previously uncovered. Connected knowing enabled me to understand that there are no limitations to accomplish feelings of being comfortable in one's own skin.

Tricia

Connected knowing has become a process that helps me stay aware and continue progressing, developing and learning. It helps me recognize new methods for developing and creating connections and relationships. I find that one of the most interesting aspects of connected knowing is the idea that every dance and every rehearsal is unique. With my emotions, my thoughts, and my experiences changing throughout time, the possibilities are overwhelming and intimidating. Yet this changing is what allows us to further explore our surroundings and ourselves. Connected knowing opens up the possibilities and helps me find what it means to continuously experience and engage myself in my learning.

Sherrie

Asking these student-dancers to come to a place of co-creators was surely not their expectation when auditioning for this concert. They had to suspend, at least temporarily, their ideas of how to learn and what was dance. The stories of Megan, Kaity and Tricia reveal the transformative learning that can

take place in the context of a rehearsal. They explored possibilities and came to a place of greater knowing. Their collective experiences expanded individuals' understanding of home. The more they valued their physicality as a tool for learning, the more their bodies became a personal site of knowledge connecting to others. They matured as learners, dancers and people. Connected knowing invites learners to embrace a procedure of learning that forges relationships with others and within oneself. It is within this context that the mindfulness of connected dancing begins.

Notes

[1]Belenky, M., B. Clinchy, N. Goldberger, and J. Tarule. *Women's Ways of Knowing* (New York: BasicBooks, 1986), 137.

[2]We use the term dance-making in an encompassing manner in order to highlight all who are engaged in contributing to the realization of the dance. This ranges from the initial stages of the process to the final stages of production. See Butterworth, J., and L. Wildschut, eds. 2009. *Contemporary Choreography – A Critical Reader*. London: Routledge, 2009; Alexander, E. *Footnotes: six choreographers inscribe the page.* New York: G & B Arts International, 1998.

[3]See Belenky, M., et al ,*Women's Ways of Knowing;* Clinchy, B. 1996. "Connected and separate knowing: Towards a marriage of two minds." In *Knowledge, Difference, and Power*, ed. N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. Clinchy, and M. Belenky. (New York: BasicBooks), 205-247.; Meek, E. L. 2007/2008. Cultivated connected knowing in the classroom. *Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical*, 34(1):40-48; Stinson, S. W. "Seeking a feminist pedagogy for children's dance." In *Dance, Power and Difference*, ed. S. Shapiro. (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1998.) 23-48.

[4]Belenky, M., *Women's Ways of Knowing.*

[5]Sally Gardner and Elizabeth Dempster quoted in Barbour, K. *Dancing Across the Page*. (Chicago: Intellect, 2011), 30.

[6]Shapiro, S. "Toward transformative teachers: Critical and feminist perspectives in dance education." In *Dance, Power and Difference*, ed. S. Shapiro. (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1998), 7-22.

[7]These stories are the words of Megan, Kaity and Tricia. Notions of community and collaboration were very much part of this writing; editing in individual stories was done for clarity of the specific story as well as cohesiveness within the full essay.

[8]Isadora Duncan quoted in Vigier, R. *Gestures of Genius: Women, Dance and the Body*. (Stratford: The Mercury Press, 1994), 33.

[9]Shapiro, S. Toward transformative teachers: Critical and feminist perspectives in dance education. In *Dance, Power and Difference*, 15.

[10]See Barbour, K. *Dancing across the Page*.

[11]Bresler, L. "Dancing the curriculum: Exploring the body and movement in elementary schools." In *Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds – Towards Embodied Teaching and Learning*, ed. L. Bresler, (Doedrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 128.

[12]Patricia Sparks quoted in Belenky, M., *Women's Ways of Knowing,* 116.

[13]Dempster, E. "Women writing the body: Let's watch a little how she dances." In *Bodies of the Text*, ed. E. W. Goellner and Jacqueline Shea Murphy, (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1995). 36.

[14]Clinchy, B. "Connected and separate knowing: Towards a marriage of two minds" 227.
[15]Butterworth, J. "Teaching choreography in higher education: A process continuum model." *Research in Dance Education*, 5(1) (2004):45-67.
[16]Clinchy, B. "Connected and separate knowing," 225-226.
[17]Kuppers, P. 2007. Community arts practices: Improvising being together. In *The Community Performance Reader*, ed. P. Kuppers and G. Robertson, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 41.
[18]Wenger, E. June "Communities of practice," 2006: http://www.ewenger.com/theory. Accessed July 24, 2012.
[19]Madeleine Grumet quoted in Stinson, S. and K. Anijar. "Interpretive inquiry in dance education." *Impulse* 1(1) (1993):52-64.

"Maysterful mod and hyghe pryde . . . arn heterly hated here": Losing Pride and Finding Oneself in *Pearl*

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Across its manifold disciplines the humanities present a means of learning to know ourselves and others as human in all the splendor, darkness, and practicality of what being human entails. Works of literature in particular provide insight into human thoughts, attitudes, desires, and more. Thus a number of philosophers claim that "the best psychological analyses are to be found in literary sources rather than professional journals."[1] While psychology as a discrete discipline of academic study may have begun with Freud, the Delphic Oracle's famous injunction to "Know thyself!" has prompted centuries of thoughtful reflection upon the workings of the human mind and soul as a means of self-knowledge. From the late third century C.E. and throughout the Middle Ages in Western society the concept of the seven deadly sins or vices grew into a framework within which to understand and speak about the psychology of destructive attitudes and immoral or sinful behaviors. This psychological framework was conceived of in a monastic environment and applied to the interior desires or thoughts that might lead monastic men and women astray from lives of happiness and fulfillment in religious devotion. In his overview of previous scholarship on the seven deadly sins, however, Richard Newhauser notes that

> The most recent research on this topic . . . has allowed these seven concepts to emerge from a narrowly theological inquiry and to be seen, individually and as a series, in the same light as other historically defined objects of study. In this way, current research does not define categories of sins merely as theological entities, but rather as differentiated articulations of what can be called discrete forms of an interrupted actualization of socially accepted forms of desire.[2]

Among the most recent authors to use the deadly sins (or vices) as a framework for the analysis of desire is ethical philosopher Gabriele Taylor, whose book *Deadly Vices* explores the deadly sins in the context of virtue-ethics. Taylor's analysis shows a remarkable similarity to late medieval Western European conceptions of the deadly sins and of pride in particular. Thus it lends itself to use as a framework in which to read the depictions of pride and humility in the fourteenth-century Middle English work, *Pearl*.

Written by an anonymous but brilliant contemporary to Chaucer known to literary scholars simply as the *Pearl*-poet or the *Gawain*-poet (since he is believed also to have written *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*), *Pearl* is "the most intricate poem in Middle English."[3] This beautifully crafted, complex dream-vision explores the grief of a man who has lost his young child to death and the comfort that the now-glorified young girl gives to him through her instruction. The poem has been examined from many perspectives, but rarely has much attention been given to the evidence for the deadly sin of pride in the speaker. The speaker in *Pearl* is a jeweler, and yet the jeweler's informed view as a craftsman has gone largely unremarked. This view is central, however, to an exploration of the speaker's pride and the Pearl-maiden's attempts at a cure. Observations from virtue ethics applied to the jeweler in parallel with medieval commentary on the vice of pride reveal the self-destructive nature of sinful pride. They also illuminate how the jeweler's proud perspective on his relationship to his craft, the maiden, and the prince undergoes a progression and inversion that leads to a breakthrough in self-knowledge and, ultimately, redemption.

The first stanza of *Pearl* introduces the jeweler. He is accustomed to assaying and judging gems, and he has a sophisticated appreciation of how to show a gem to its best advantage.[4] He claims ownership of a beautiful pearl and indicates its perfection by setting it as a solitaire, apart from all other gems so that its perfection can be emphatically displayed. The jeweler's pride in his pearl reflects his "feeling of self-applause, of esteem for oneself as, for example, the owner of a beautiful house, or as the parent of successful children."[5] The jeweler seems to incorporate the pearl as a part of himself in what psychologists refer to as the "extended self." Belk notes that "the notion of extended self is . . . not only that which is seen as 'me' (the self), but also that which is seen as 'mine.'"[6] The dreamer presents himself as a discerning jeweler, an authority who determines the quality and worth of the gems he sets into jewels. He speaks of his craft as what he does; his work is a part of himself. The pearl is a possession, something that he incorporates into his extended self by claiming it as "mine."[7] The valuation and possession of such perfection lend a sense of superiority—of perfection or even deification—to ownership of the pearl. At first this may seem to be a harmless sort of pride, yet it provides the source for vanity, conceit, and arrogance, three kinds of self-destructive pride discussed by Taylor.[8] Such pride is considered destructive within virtue ethics because it, along with the other deadly vices, is "destructive

of [the] self and prevent[s] its flourishing."[9] While modern psychological perspectives generally see pride as a positive feeling, they also find it necessary to distinguish between positive "proper" pride and "false" or harmful pride. This false pride is described by Stephen E. G. Lea and Paul Webley as "likely to lead to erroneous or apparently irrational decisions."[10] Such erroneous or irrational choices and actions may arise from false conceptions of the self that are based upon possessions. Belk comments that "possessions can . . . symbolically extend self, as when a uniform or trophy allows us to convince ourselves (and perhaps others) that we can be a different person than we would be without them."[11] The poem reveals that such a sense of extended self seems to afflict the narrator, leading him into erroneous assumptions and irrational actions.

The narrator seems unconscious at this time that he has set himself in opposition to the "prynces paye," the prince's pleasure, by claiming the pearl as his own "pryuy perle."[12] He seems not to realize that he is valuing his ownership of the pearl as the mark of a rank he does not hold within the context of fourteenth-century English society; in short, he does not recognize or know himself. The Middle English translation of Lorens D'Orléans' *Somme le Roi* says that, "the sin of pride is very perilous, for it blinds a man so that he does not know himself, nor does he see himself."[13] Writing 600 years later, Solomon Schimmel seems to agree when he observes that "pride is unique among the seven deadly sins in that we are frequently unaware of our arrogance. . . . This is because it is difficult for us to admit that we are of less worth than we imagine ourselves to be."[14] It is this erroneous imagination of oneself in contradiction to real knowledge of self that the jeweler demonstrates though he does not realize it until the end of the poem. The poet subtly points out the jeweler's lack of self-knowledge, his failure to recognize his own arrogance and station in society, by exploiting the tension over social rank, owning, and wearing jewelry that existed in England in the second half of the fourteenth century. Joan Evans records in her *History of Jewellery 1100-1870* that

> [t]he wearing of jewels had become, indeed, a definite mark of rank, and as such was restricted by law. In 1363 Edward III of England's Statute *de victu et vestitu* decreed that handicraftsmen and yeomen were not to wear 'ceynture, cotel, fermaille, anel, garter, nouches, rudaignes, cheines, bendes, sealx u autres chose dor ne dargent,' nor their wives and children either; knights were not to wear rings or brooches made of gold or jewelled with precious stones; and only esquires with land or rent of 200 marks a year and merchants and their families with goods and chattels of £500 value were to be permitted to wear apparel reasonably garnished with silver and their wives' apparel for the head garnished with stones.[15]

It is likely that the poet's audience would have grasped the tension created in the opening lines between the jeweler and the prince, especially given Edward III's known passion for pearls.[16] Through his possession of this princely pearl, the jeweler does not actually claim to be a prince, but indirectly asserts his equality with the prince. He does so by asserting his own private ownership of such a perfect pearl as would please a prince. Taylor categorizes this form of pride as *arrogance*:

> Arrogance . . . does not involve comparison: it is "the pride which pretends to an importance it does not possess." As a form of pride it naturally shares certain crucial features with vanity and conceit, but it also has a further characteristic which sets it apart from these and makes it the more deadly: it is wholly self-referential.[17]

The jeweler does not look down upon the prince in order to feel better about himself, nor does he seem to flaunt his pearl in order to win the admiration of those he deems to be beneath him. Rather, he sees himself as unique in being like the prince because he possesses this pearl. He perceives himself as having sole right to it (a point that will be demonstrated below) because, God-like, he alone is able to accurately judge its worth and value its perfections. This makes the jeweler a "moral solipsist" in Taylor's framework wherein such solipsism is "'moral' because [it concerns] the ascription of needs, rights, and values to the agent [the jeweler] and to others respectively."[18] A prince might desire such a pearl, but the jeweler alone possesses it and claims a right to his "pryuy perle."[19] His pride in this possession skews his knowledge and sense of his own place in society. It suppresses his recognition of his place as a tradesman within the social structure of the three estates (those who fight, those who pray, and those who work) and exaggerates his importance as the owner of such a valuable gem. Taylor comments that "both, suppression and exaggeration, give rise to the possibility of misguided self-creation, and so may create a possible niche for the notion of a 'false self.'"[20] This lack of true self-knowledge that arises from pride is destructive because it prevents in the jeweler the true self-knowing that allows for personal growth and beneficial relationships with others, including God. Eileen Sweeney notes that in Scholastic thought "the motive for acquiring all the lesser goods one prefers to God is pride, that through them one 'may have some perfection and excellence.'"[21] The jeweler's false sense of self, arising from possession of the pearl, gives rise to a subtle self-deification and sense of exaggerated importance incommensurate to his actual situation in life. It takes strong medicine in the form of humility to break such a self-deceiving pride. Taylor notes:

> [H]umility limits consciousness of self through an awareness of something outside and above human beings which brings home to them their contingency and lack of absoluteness. . . .

> Humility is always linked with a certain type of feeling, usually called "reverence."[22]

The jeweler must learn this for himself if he is ever to shed his false pride and develop a true sense of self.

The second stanza introduces a word-play which weaves through the rest of the poem and becomes the vehicle by which the poet transfers the jewel imagery from one person to another. In a moment of passionate grief where the pearl was buried the jeweler cries, "O mud, you mar a merry jewel."[23] The jeweler's remembrance of the pleasure his pearl gave him is pathetic and the poet refracts the pathos into myriad colors by punning on the word "iuele." According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*),

> "iuele" comes from the Old French word "joel," from which English also derives "joy". . . . The etymology of the [French] word is still a matter of dispute; some see in it a [derivative] of [Latin] *gaudium* (qua-i **gaudieilum*), whence [French] *joie*, joy; others of [Latin] *jocare* [joke or jest], whence [French] *jouer* to play, or the cognate *jocus*. . . .[24]

The entry for "joy" is even more straightforward: "[Middle English] a. [Old French] *joie*, *joye* joy, jewel . . . ."[25] The *OED* also lists "joyaus" as a plural form of "jewel."[26] The word "jewel" was first attested in Middle English at the very end of the thirteenth century and starts to appear more often in the fourteenth. Since French was still the primary language of the court at the time in which the *Pearl*-poet wrote, the poet's choice of words reflects the influence of French on the Middle English language and the relationships between the two that create the pun would have been apparent to most literate people. Thus, when the poet employs "myry iuele," he both deepens and adds shades of meaning to the pathos of the jeweler's lament by evoking not just the grief at loss of a lovely material object, but also the loss of "my happiness and all my health,"[27] a sense of self that had been based upon possession of the pearl. At the same time, the wordplay on "jewel" and "joy" brings into focus a misprision on the jeweler's part. He believes that the pearl is his ultimate source of happiness and health. His desire for this jewel which cannot provide what he demands, however, reveals a deeper desire for a joy that cannot be marred or lost, that will heal his grief, and define the nature of his true self.

The jeweler spends the first five stanzas of the poem emphasizing the fact that he considered the pearl his own, and that his grief over the loss is inconsolable. The speaker even considers his reaction to the loss of the pearl to be irrational when he remarks that "A miserable grief settled in my heart, / Though reason should have made me rest."[28] The poet reveals a complex understanding of human nature and relationships in these lines as he shows the jeweler equating love with possession. The jeweler would even keep the pearl from the prince if he could, but he is unaware that he is dealing with a Prince

unlike any earthly king, a Prince who cannot be fooled or refused. He acknowledges the comfort that is available to him in Christ, but he does not seek Christ's comfort, wallowing in woe over his lost pearl instead.[29] The comment is made in passing, but it begins to set up what must happen in order for there to be both self-knowledge and redemption for the jeweler at the end of the poem. Because he irrationally refuses Christ's comfort now he does not see that the pearl is not lost, but simply claimed by its rightful owner.

The sixth stanza describes the beginning of the dream: the jeweler finds himself he knows not where, but wherever it is, it is a jeweler's paradise. He describes the rich setting of the place, full of crystal cliffs and silver-leafed trees and pearl gravel that outshine even the sun's bright rays. By emphasizing the link-words "dub" and "adubbement" in this section, the poet underscores the jeweler's appreciation of the craftsmanship which adorned the place so beautifully. So great is the jeweler's appreciation of the color and beauty of the location that even his informed jeweler's lexicon fails him. For all his vivid description of the rich surroundings, the jeweler runs out of words—there simply are not enough superlatives or colors in his vocabulary.[30]

The jeweler's sorrow is assuaged by the awe inspired by his jeweled surroundings and his heart is strained by the strength of joy washing over him.[31] The poet has subtly reversed the pun in this phrase, using joy to suggest the jeweled landscape of "þose floty valez."[32] At the same time, however, the old possessive desire asserts itself in a new way. Instead of just desiring possession of the pearl, the jeweler now wants "to haue ay more and more" of the solace he found in his new surroundings.[33] He is unable to articulate the sense of "wele," wholeness and well-being, that he feels but there is an unspoken sense that the jeweler finds it entirely appropriate that he be in such a place. After all, who else could belong among such jewels other than a jeweler? The poet here describes the jeweler's insatiability. The desire for more and more of the "wele" of the place is actually satisfied by less and less of it. The jeweler comes to expect that Paradise lies just over the hills beyond the river and is now consumed by desire to get there. Taylor observes:

> The insatiability and hence infinity of relevant desires hinges on their self-reflexivity, on the proud's concern for the superiority and self-sufficiency of his position. The proud see themselves as gods, and hence as perfect. Their crucial desires, then, are to have this position confirmed and maintained. . . . If the proud wish for godlike perfection and self-sufficiency then, it seems, their desire would have to be that they be desire*less*. . . . The notion of a desireless self is hardly a comprehensible one. It would seem to be a self which is not engaged with the world at all, and hence a self which has lost that which gives it substantial identity. . . . The proud, it would appear, in wishing to be godlike, desire their spiritual death.[34]

Assuming he has a right to the Paradise beyond the water, the jeweler wanders by the bank in search of a way across the river. He does so alone, with never any thought of seeking help or direction, indeed, never even wondering if anyone might be around to offer such direction. His isolation is complete and he is content that it be so. The English translation of the *Somme le Roi* describes this self-sufficiency as the third branch of pride: arrogance. The text notes that arrogance shows itself first and foremost

> . . . in uniqueness, that is, egotism. For the proud and overweening man, who thinks he knows more or is of greater might or is more praiseworthy than any other, will not do as others do who are better than he, but will be aloof, that is by himself, in his doings.[35]

Not only must he do all things by himself in his own ability, however, he also can only be satisfied by the truly unique. No longer satisfied by the bejeweled beauty he sees around him and the healing it brings, the jeweler yearns for the perfection of Paradise alone, and is dissatisfied by the obstruction of the river that he finds himself unable to cross.[36] At this moment, the jeweler is startled to find that he is not alone. Instead of Paradise, across the river he sees a beautiful child—his own pearl—and all the joy of possession rushes back, but is mixed with uncertainty because of the bizarre context in which they meet. He is so afraid he may lose his pearl again, that he is afraid to speak, to establish contact.[37] His jeweler's eye does not leave him, though. He describes the maiden as he would a gem,[38] but also in terms that imply her part in a larger work. She is in "royal array, / a precious piece (["pyece"]) adorned in pearls."[39] "Pyece" is glossed by E. V. Gordon as "being, person." According to the *OED*, however, "pyece" was also used as early as 1225 to denote "part of or fragment—separate or detached portion."[40] The dual meaning is not clear at this point, because the poet has not yet told us what the maiden, obviously whole in herself, could possibly be a fragment of. Her unusual placement alone at the base of a cliff, however, strikes both the reader and the jeweler as odd.[41]

The jeweler describes the exquisite richness of the maiden's regal clothing—pure white linen generously ornamented with pearls. Upon her head he sees a crown with high pinnacles decorated solely with pearls. The clothing and crown clearly proclaim the maiden's rank in the society to which she belongs. The crown especially fits the description of the "fermaille" crowns which were popular with the nobility at the end of the fourteenth century. According to Evans, the crown that Blanche of England wore for her wedding in 1402

> . . . is formed of twelve brooch-like medallions of delicate tracery, each centred witha jewel . . . . From these greater and lesser pinnacles rise alternately, that seem to have lost their

> traditional fleyr-de-lis form in a loftier and more architectural development of their design.[42]

The brooch-like medallions were called "fermailles." Several fermailles hinged together made a crown. Evans states that the paintings of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries associate such pinnacled crowns with virgins, brides and, occasionally, angels. Blanche's crown, with the single jewel centered in each fermaille, seems austere compared to the description of the crown worn by the Duke of Burgundy's daughter at her wedding: "a circlet garnished with eight 'fermailles,' surmounted by four great and four lesser floriated pinnacles, all jeweled with indescribable richness."[43] Evans states that sometimes the fermailles of a bridal crown were taken apart after the ceremony and distributed as bridal gifts.[44] If *Pearl* were written as late as 1390, as suggested by some scholars, the poet could have been familiar with such crowns. The crown is important in *Pearl* because it indicates the maiden's status as virgin and royal bride and serves as mute testimony that she no longer belongs to the jeweler.

Another possible function of the crown may be to give the poet's audience a frame of reference for his earlier use of "pyece."[45] If the poet is hinting that the maiden is part of a greater whole, the fermaille crown may be the key to understanding the suggestion. In this frame of reference, the maiden would represent one fermaille among 143,999 others later in the poem when she joins with the other maidens who are dressed in the same manner as she is dressed. This usage suggests that the brides of Christ represent a wedding crown when they surround the Lamb later in the poem. The poet again refers to the maiden as "þat precios pyece" at line 229, thus enclosing the detailed description of the maiden and her royal array that runs from lines 193 to 228. The jeweler uses "pyece" only in this descriptive section, never before nor after it despite the many opportunities to use "pyece" in the *þ* alliterations that occur throughout the whole poem. The context strongly suggests that she is a piece complete in herself yet also separated from the greater whole to which she now belongs.

The significance of the maiden's own bridal crown, however, is lost on the jeweler, especially since she humbly removes it when she greets him.[46] His first words show us as much when he refers to the maiden as "my perle."[47] Despite all the visible signs, he does not recognize that another has claimed "his" pearl. As far as the jeweler is concerned, the only two people in the world are he and the maiden—and she belongs to him. He demands to know what fate had sent his jewel, and his joy, away from him to this place. Line 252 leads us into a series of sparkling refractions and reflections on the jewel/joy word-play of the poet. The jeweler claims that since he lost his pearl, he has been a "joylez juelere." Not only has he been obviously joyless, he has also been jewelless. The pun works with double force when we realize that it turns the "juelere" into "one who gives joy"—something he is ill-equipped to do as long as he himself is joyless and remains in his proud isolation.

The maiden is called "That jewel . . . in noble gems."[48] The pun works here as well, for the jeweler thinks of her as his joy as well as his jewel. The maiden replaces her crown in this stanza to emphasize both her authority and the fact that she belongs to a greater Jeweler. She encourages the jeweler to consider her "setting," the ornate coffer in which she abides, and tells him that if he were a "gentyl jueler," he would not mourn and begrudge her high estate. She implies that he is neither noble nor a joy-giver, reminding him of his worldly social station. This reminder points out the discrepancy between who he arrogantly imagines himself to be and who he really is. The pearl-maiden sets about to break the jeweler's "circle of desires," [49] his inability to be satisfied by anything he has attained because he has missed what he most deeply desires and needs: self-knowledge. Such an effort can only come from someone he regards as an equal, but he has yet to see her in this manner, for those prone to the deadly sins or vices "while of course aware that there are other agents in their universe with, apparently, aims of their own, fail to acknowledge these as agents in their own right. For them they exist only in so far as they affect their own lives."[50]

Such an interpretation makes the maiden's use of "jueler gente" in line 265 highly ironic, exposing the prideful way the jeweler thinks of himself. The maiden's assessment of his pride and folly is that if the jeweler is willing to "lose / your joy for sake of a gem that you loved, / it seems to me you are set on an insane purpose."[51] Her comment demonstrates the self-destructive nature of his arrogance and the effect of pride in causing the jeweler to think irrationally about what will fulfill his deepest desire. Significantly, the maiden does not refer to herself here as a jewel, but rather as a gem. The term "jewel" conveys completeness—it is the gem in its complete setting, not just the gem itself. The maiden is saying that the jeweler is risking the loss of complete joy (embodied in the jewel) if he chases only after the gem. This distinction adds force to the maiden's criticism for now, not only is there the implication of jewel within "ioy," but of completeness as well. This stanza also firmly declares that Christ is the sovereign Craftsman, for he has made a lasting pearl out of a dead rose, and everything (including the jeweler) from nothing at all. Since the jeweler accuses such a master craftsman, such a "wyrde" or "providence" of stealing his pearl, he is "no kynde [natural] jueler" in any sense of the word. The jeweler has shown breath-taking presumption (another aspect of arrogance) in judging Christ to have no right to possess that which Christ himself has made; God can only obtain it by theft. By calling attention to the jeweler's lack of "kynd," of natural, rational thought, the maiden points out the falsity of the jeweler's self-conception. "Like the vain, the arrogant substitute illusion for reality," and so the jeweler has asserted his "right" to possession of "his" pearl and accuses Christ of theft in taking her through death into his transcendent kingdom.[52]

Completely missing the point, the jeweler calls the maiden and her rebukes jewels, which by implication bring him joy. He declares that he shall dwell with her in those bright woods and says that if he could cross the river to be with

her he would be a "ioyful jueler" once more. "'Jueler', sayde þat gemme clene, / 'Wy borde ye men? So madde ye be!'"[53] In this instance, the punned meaning of jeweler changes from joy-giver to something more stinging, so we might read these lines as "'Joker,' said that fair gem, 'why do you jest, man? You're insane!'" After pointing out the madness of the jeweler's thoughts, the maiden states that no joyful jeweler can cross that noble river at will. She ceases to be gentle with the jeweler and frankly identifies the vice that blinds him:

> I consider that jeweler of little praise
> Who believes only what his eye sees,
> And much to blame for discourtesy
> Who believes our Lord would tell a lie,
> Who faithfully promised your life to raise,
> Though fortune cause your flesh to die.
> You make his words all awry
> Who believe nothing unless you see it.
> And that is a point of surquidry,
> That each good person badly fits
> To believe no tale true to the test
> Except that which his skill alone may judge.[54]

The jeweler's surquedry, his arrogance in believing that only he himself can determine the truth of the situation, actually prevents him from seeing the truth, especially in relation to the claims of Christ upon the jeweler as well as the maiden. The maiden again employs "jueler" as "joker," only this time with more derogatory connotations. A madman might be excused for his folly, but not the rascal who believes Christ would lie. The joker who twists Christ's words into lies ("Ye setten hys wordez ful westernays") deserves no praise for his cleverness. Such craftsmanship indicates an arrogantly high opinion of one's own craftmastery in setting the words and works of Christ in clever but false mountings. The maiden suggests that the jeweler humble himself by asking Christ's permission before he thinks about crossing the river.

The river thus becomes the unyielding reality that forces the jeweler out of his self-referential perspective. Its impassability forces him to acknowledge a right possessed by someone else, the Lord of the land in which he finds himself, and also impresses upon the jeweler that someone else's evaluation of himself matters. Taylor points out that "Dependence, to a degree, on another's evaluation of oneself will affect one's self-evaluation. It forces the agent to shift [his] point of view and so at least makes possible a better knowledge of [him]self."[55] A small chink seems to open in the jeweler's awareness, for the maiden tries again to point him to a greater good than herself:

> Because of the clamor of woe over lesser losses
> Many a one often foregoes the greater [good]
> . . . . . .

For, bluster or rage, mourn or mutter,
All lies with him to arrange and judge.[56]

The word "dyght," arrange, carries the connotations of ordaining and adorning and so points again to the activity of heaven's Craftmaster. This Craftmaster, like the jeweler, not only creates beauty, but rightfully judges, "demes," its worth.

The jeweler indicates some change of attitude. He admits "I am nothing but earth and without manners" and asks the maiden to pay no attention to his words, but rather to tell him about her life in this blissful place.[57] The maiden accepts his apology and says "Masterful mood and arrogant pride, / I warn you, are hotly hated here."[58] She refers not only to the jeweler's position as a master of his craft, but to the frame of mind which made him imply that Christ was a liar and his insistent possessiveness toward her. In the heavenly realm, the vice of pride is not tolerated. In lines 413-418 the maiden states in no uncertain terms that she belongs to Christ, saying, "But my Lord the Lamb through his deity, / Took me into his marriage, / Crowned me queen in bliss to flourish / . . . I am wholly his."[59] Her words echo the image and symbolism of the bridal crown, but the jeweler still seems to miss the point. He ignores the maiden's claim to be a bride and focuses instead on her claim to be a queen. His "masterful mood" returns as he argues with the maiden again, arrogantly weighing and measuring God and the society of heaven by his own worldly measure, as though he were still judging the value and quality of gems.

There follows the long dialogue in which the maiden defends her statements with the authority of scripture. When she comes to the story of the pearl of great price, she speaks in terms the jeweler readily understands, for she now speaks clearly of the Lamb as a Jeweler: "My Lord the Lamb, who shed his blood, / He place it [the pearl] there as token of peace."[60] The effect of these words upon the jeweler is electric: "O spotless pearl in pearls pure, / . . . Who formed your fair figure? / Who fashioned your garments was very wise. / Your beauty never came from nature; / Pygmalion never painted your face."[61] The master jeweler is overwhelmed by the work of the heavenly Jeweler, who is clearly not an equal but a superior. He realizes that the perfection he sees before him could never have been accomplished by human hands, neither his own nor any other person's hands. This realization results in a moment of self-transcendence. Taylor observes that "Self-transcendence is the basic step necessary for gaining a self-knowledge that is substantial."[62] This "substantial" self-knowledge must be grounded in truth and reality, not fantasy and imagination. The jeweler has begun to lose his "moral solipsism" and recognize that others, particularly one Other, have rights that trump those he considers to be his own.

The maiden answers him immediately:

My matchless Lamb who may remedy all,
. . . . . .

He gave me strength and beauty;
In his blood he washed my garments on the throne,
And crowned [me] clean in virginity,
And adorned me in spotless pearls.[63]

Understanding continues to dawn once the matter is couched in the language of the jeweler's own craft. The maiden follows up on the idea, now referring to the Lamb himself as "my dere juelle, / My ioy."[64] Her words emphasize the beauty, joy and completeness of Christ, pointing the jeweler to the one who now held primacy over him in her own heart, and the one who could fulfill the desires of his heart as well.

After more stanzas of dialogue, the jeweler asks the maiden whether or not she has a home nearby (one can almost imagine him asking where her setting or mount is), for royal Jerusalem is far away. The maiden responds that she is one of a "pakke of joly juele" that live in the great city of Jerusalem—not the city in Judea, but the Heavenly seat of Christ's kingdom.[65] That she is one of a "pakke" indicates that her position is social. Whereas the jeweler set her as a solitaire at the beginning of a poem, the Heavenly Jeweler has set her as one among others. The poet builds layer upon layer of jewels, for not only is the maiden set as a jewel, she is but a "pyece" of a larger work made up of the 144,000 jewels, which are in turn part of the larger work of the Heavenly Jerusalem. The jeweler is overwhelmed by the sight of the jewel that is Jerusalem. He says:

I stood still as a dazed quail
For the wonder of that beautiful vision,
So that I felt neither peace nor pain,
So ravished was I with pure light.
For I dare say with a sure mind,
Had a man experienced that blessing bodily,
Though all clerks had him in treatment,
His life would have been lost under the moon.[66]

He is the witness of a masterpiece beyond even his ability to comprehend and he responds with the kind of reverence that shatters false pride and produces humility. "Reverence itself is a complex phenomenon, implying a sense of wonder as well as of unease and fear, and feelings such as these are clearly countervailing to the arrogantly proud's cultivation of their godlike self-image."[67] The awe that the jeweler feels forces him to see himself as he truly is: frail and imperfect. The result is humility. The jeweler is so dazzled by the glorious sight and by his own new knowledge about himself that he believes if he were in his own body he would die. He sees thousands of crowned maidens, each arrayed like his own pearl, proceeding through the noble city in company with the Lamb. The Lamb is described as "þat gay juelle,"[68] and the reader assumes that he is as spotless and pure as the maidens in his procession.

But the poet dismays both the jeweler and his audience, for the white coat of this noble Lamb has a bloody gaping wound. Rosalind Field comments, "[t]he poet has deliberately held back, indeed he has denied, the description of the Lamb's wound until the climactic point of the Dreamer's vision"[69] Now the jeweler has seen the crown jewel of heaven, the priceless Lamb of God. Field continues, "And yet, at the heart of the vision there is a flat contradiction of the Maiden's earlier statement of the nature of the Lamb: there is the blemish of imperfection and death."[70] The jeweler is anguished by the marring of so perfect a jewel and he seems at a loss to comprehend what he sees. As Rosalind Field remarks,

> Either the Lamb is spotless or the Maiden is wrong: the Maiden, bride of the Lamb, cannot be wrong, and therefore it is the perception which sees a mortal wound as a blemish that is at fault. The mark of death is a cause of joy [a jewel], worn as proudly and joyfully by the Lamb as the maidens each wear the pearl that marks them as his.[71]

While still trying to digest the shock of the crimson jewel in the Lamb's white side, the jeweler spies the maiden, "my lyttel quene."[72] He sees her enjoying to the full her place among the other queens before the Lamb. "Love-longing," the desire to possess as his own, rises up again in the jeweler. He insanely determines that nothing will stop him from crossing the river and placing himself as he thinks fit within the complex jewel of heaven's kingdom.[73] Only when he finds himself flung out of the vision of heaven does he realize again how his proud, masterful action displeased heaven's Prince.

The jeweler's expulsion from heaven back to earth uses a tradition about pearls to illustrate the process of his redemption. In a footnote to her article, Field notes a medieval tradition that pearls would regain their luster if they were buried.[74] This tradition seems to be at work in the last stanzas of *Pearl*. The jeweler's spirit, which is quite spotted and lusterless with his arrogance, is cast out of the vision back into the earth of his body. He must learn humility in order for his soul to come forth again after death with its luster restored, pleasing and fit for use by the Sovereign Jeweler. Only in the last stanza do the maiden's words finally become real to the jeweler, and he ceases to view himself in pride as a solitary, self-sufficient master jeweler. Instead, he understands and accepts that he is not sufficient alone in himself, but a part, a "pyece," of the finely detailed, multifaceted jewel which Christ has wrought. The struggle between the jeweler and his Prince ceases when the jeweler commits his pearl to heaven's Gentyl Jueler and humbly accepts his own place as one of many pearls, made precious for the Sovereign Jeweler's own pleasure.[75] Once the jeweler loses the blinders of false pride, he not only sees the truth about himself, but also about the pearl-maiden and about God. In this newfound humility he understands that in giving "his" pearl up to her rightful Lord, he does not lose her, but gains himself.

Notes

[1] Jonathan J. Sanford, Review of *Deadly Vices* by Gabriele Taylor in *Review of Metaphysics* 61:1 (September 2007): 162–64.
[2] Richard Newhauser, "Introduction: Cultura; Construction and the Vices," in *The Seven Deadly Sins: From Communities to Individuals*, ed. Richard Newhauser (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 6.
[3] Nicholas Watson, "The *Gawain*-Poet as a Vernacular Theologian," in *A Companion to the* Gawain-*Poet*, eds. Derek Brewer and Jonathan Gibson (Cambridge, UK: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 293–313, at 298. Nothing is known of the *Pearl*-poet except what may be gleaned from the four works attributed to him, but the subject matter, narrative stance, and the anti-female tirade given by the character of Sir Gawain in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* have led to a scholarly consensus that the poet is male.
[4] E.V. Gordon, ed., *Pearl* (1953; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 1–8.
[5] Gabriele Taylor, *Deadly Vices* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 70.
[6] Russell W. Belk, "Possessions and the Extended Self," *Journal of Consumer Research* 15:2 (Sep. 1988): 139–68, at 140.
[7] *Pearl*, 24.
[8] Taylor, 71–72.
[9] Ibid., 1.
[10] Stephen E. G. Lea and Paul Webley, "Pride in Economic Psychology," *Journal of Economic Psychology* 18 (1997): 323–40, at 323.
[11] Belk, 145.
[12] *Pearl*, 1, 12.
[13] W. Nelson Francis, ed., *The Book of Vices and Virtues: A Fourteenth Century English Translation of the* Somme le Roi *of Lorens D'Orléans*, EETS 217 (1942; reprint, London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 11.25–27. "þan synne of pride is wel perilous, for it blyndeþ a man þat he ne knoweþ not hymself, ne seeþ not hymself." All translations from Middle English are my own. A parallel passage may be found in *The Mirroure of the Worlde: A Middle English Translation of* Le Miroir do Monde, eds. Robert R. Raymo and Elaine E. Whitaker, Medieval Academy Books 106 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press for the Medieval Academy of America, 2003), 1483–96.
[14] Solomon Schimmel, *The Seven Deadly Sins: Jewish, Christian, and Classical Reflections on Human Nature* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 36.
[15] Joan Evans, *A History of Jewellery 1100-1870* (Boston: Boston Book & Art, 1970), 53–54.
[16] Oscar Cargill and Margaret Schlauch. "*The Pearl* and its Jeweler," *PMLA* 43 (1928): 105-123, at 109.
[17] Taylor, 74.
[18] Ibid., 75.
[19] *Pearl*, 12 and 24.
[20] Taylor, 55.
[21] Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin," in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2002), 159.
[22] Taylor, 148.
[23] *Pearl*, 23. "O moul, þou marre3 a myry iuele."
[24] *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "jewel"
[25] Ibid., s.v. "joy."

[26] Ibid., s.v. "joyous."
[27] Pearl, 16. "my happe and al my hele."
[28] Ibid., 51–52. "A deuely dele in my hert denned, / Þaȝ resoun sette myseluen saȝt.
[29] Ibid., 55–56.
[30] Ibid., 99–100.
[31] Ibid., 123–28.
[32] Ibid., 127.
[33] Ibid., 132.
[34] Taylor, 80–81.
[35] *Book of Vices and Virtues*, 17.10–14. "in syngulertee, þat is onlyhede. For þe proud and þe surquidous man, þat weneþ to kunne more or be of more mi3t or be worþier þan oþere, ne wole not don as oþere doþ þat ben bettere þan he, but wole be soleyn, þat is only, in his doynges."
[36] *Pearl*, 137–44.
[37] Ibid., 186–88.
[38] Ibid., 189–90.
[39] Ibid., 191–92. "araye ryalle, / A precios pyece in perlez pyght."
[40] *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "piece."
[41] *Pearl*, 159-162, 175.
[42] Evans, 69.
[43] Ibid., 69.
[44] Ibid., 70.
[45] *Pearl*, 192.
[46] Ibid., 237.
[47] Ibid., 242.
[48] Ibid., 253. "That juel . . . in gemmez gente."
[49] Taylor, 81
[50] Ibid., 127.
[51] *Pearl*, 265–66. "lose / [his] ioy for a gemme þat [he] watz lef, / Me þynk þe put in a mad porpose,"
[52] Taylor, 74.
[53] *Pearl*, 289–90.
[54] Ibid., 301–12.

> "I halde þat iuler lyttel to prayse
> Þat leue3 wel þat he se3 wyth y3e,
> And much to blame an vncortayse
> Þat leue3 oure Lorde wolde make a ly3e,
> Þat lelly hy3te your lyf to rayse,
> Þa3 fortune dyd your flesch to dy3e.
> 3e setten hys worde3 ful westernays
> Þat leue3 noþynk bot 3e hit sy3e.
> And þat is a poynt o sorquydry3e,
> Þat vche god mon may euel byseme,
> To leue no tale be true to try3e
> Bot þat hys one skyl may dem."

[55] Taylor, 133.
[56] *Pearl*, 339–40, 359–60. "For dyne of doel of lurez lesse

Ofte mony mon forgos þe mo.
. . . . . .
For, marre oþer madde, morne and myþe,
Al lys in hym to dyght and deme."

[57] Ibid., 382.

[58] Ibid., 401–02. "Maysterful mod and hyghe pryde, / I hete þe, arn heterly hated here."

[59] Ibid., 413–15, 418. "Bot my Lorde þe Lombe þurgh hys godhede, / He toke myself to hys maryage, / Corounde me quene in blysse to brede / . . . I am holy hysse."

[60] Ibid., 741–42. "My Lorde þe Lombe, þat schede hys blode, / He pyght hit [the pearl] þere in token of pes."

[61] Ibid., 745–50. "O maskelez perle in perlez pure, . . . Quo formed þe þy fayre fygure? / þat wroght þy wede, he watz ful wys. / þy beauté com neuer of nature; / Pymalyon paynted neuer þy vys."

[62] Taylor, 133.

[63] *Pearl*, 757, 765-768.

"My makelez Lambe þat al may bete,"
. . . . . .
He gef me myght and als bewté;
In hys blode he wesch my wede on dese,
and coronde clene in vergynté,
and pyght me in perlez maskellez,"

[64] Ibid., 795–96.

[65] Ibid., 929.

[66] Ibid., 1085-1092.

I stod as stylle as dased quayle
For ferly of þat frelich fygure,
þat felde I nawþer reste ne trauayle,
So watz I rauyste wyth glymme pure.
For I dar say wyth conciens sure,
Hade bodyly burne abiden þat bone,
þagh alle clerkez hym hade in cure,
His lyf were loste an-vnder mone.

[67] Taylor, 148.

[68] *Pearl*, 1124.

[69] Rosalind Field, "The Heavenly Jerusalem in *Pearl*," *The Modern Language Review*. 81:1 (Jan. 1986): 7-17, at 14.

[70] Ibid., 14.

[71] Ibid., 15.

[72] *Pearl*, 1147.

[73] Ibid., 1152. "Luf-longyng"

[74] Fields, 7.

[75] Ibid., 1207–12.

Satan Surfacing: (Predetermined) Individuality in the Old English *Genesis B*

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Amidst the precious works of Old English poetry, *Junius Manuscript* contains an Anglo-Saxon account of Genesis that includes a unique insert, now known as *Genesis B*. *Genesis B* details the manifestation of Lucifer's pride and the subsequent fall of his band of angels. The details of this poetic account as well as the moral it expresses are distinctly Anglo-Saxon. While the focus of *Genesis B* is on the state and affairs of angels before Creation, the metaphysical implications are to be heeded by humans. As the text traces the cognitive development of Lucifer in relation to the philosophical question of predetermination, *Genesis B* demonstrates that individuality is a corruption of God's will because Lucifer's individuality is identified as defiance of the ontological order. Lucifer's individuality not only threatens God's governance, it also negates the fundamental omniscience of Christian divinity, thus the very nature of God. The narrator of *Genesis B* renders Satan an agent of predetermination in order that the Devil's mythos can be reconciled to Christian ontology. His rebellion, according to the narrator, is required by the very structure he reels against. The narrative details the Devil as an individual exercising free will, but the narrator locates the Devil within an ontological structure that affords Satan only the illusion of autonomy. Satan functions as the human condition within an ontology that does not allow for individuality and the narrator's moral allows the audience to impose upon the text the possibility of individuality within an ontology of predetermination.

Before Creation, God had formed ten types of angels who, "*hie his giongorscipe fyligan wolden"* [would follow his will].[1] Out of these ranks of immortals, who were created to conform to his divine law,

> …one he had created so strong
> so mighty in his thinking; he let him wield so much

> power, highest next to Him in Heaven-Kingdom,
> He had him so brightly created, so charming were his ways in heaven, that came to him from the Lord's company, he was like the light of the stars. [2]

The angelic race is embodied because they were formed through God's *handgeweorc*; they are divided into ten types and positioned hierarchically with Lucifer assuming an elevated status. Not only is he above his angelic kin, but he is *next* to God. Despite their roles of Creator and created, Lucifer is visually equal to God due to his spatial orientation next to Him.

The narrator interjects, moralizing that Lucifer should have loved the Lord and been thankful for the joys he was given, but Lucifer became *ofermod* [over-spirited] and he *sohte hetespræce* [sought *hate*-speech].[3] Lucifer, as a superior in heaven, does not yet have a reason to hate, nor—one might assume—the capacity to understand such a feeling. He only *sought* hate-speech, as if his pride encourages him to reach complex emotion that he is not yet capable of cognitively manifesting. Ranked so highly in heavenly bliss, Lucifer cannot make the emotional leap to loathe an other. His understanding consists only of the wit imparted to him by God. Experientially he is limited by the heavens (i.e. perpetual unchanging goodness). He has limited interiority, thus limited emotive responses. He cannot construct hateful statements; he can only *seek* hate-speech. Before Lucifer can enact hatred his cognitive development requires a sense of self.

The narrative of *Genesis B* constructs Lucifer's cognitive presence beginning with a dialectical process of self-awareness that is very much embodied. His speech is simple, indirectly conveyed through the narrator, and only points to Lucifer's immediate sense of reality: "cwæð þæt his lic wære leoht and scene, / hwit and hiowbeorht" [he said that his body was light and shiny, white and bright].[4] This immediate awareness, grounded in embodiment, is the beginning of Lucifer's rise to individuality.

Spatially he is apart, physically he is different, and Lucifer, meaning "Angel of Light," in conjunction with the description of his physical illumination, implies that Lucifer emits his own light from within. This imagery alone is problematic in a Neoplatonic cosmos that holds God as the illuminating *source* of being.[5] This hubris is heightened as he reasons that,

> [Lucifer] thought to himself
> that he had more strength and strategy
> than the Holy God might have
> in his followers.[6]

Lucifer is too clever and too powerful to be a servant. Notice the line break between lines 270 and 271: It would seem initially to the audience that Lucifer is claiming himself to be mightier than the Almighty, until the qualifier is uttered in line 271. Lucifer is not referring to himself having strength and

intellect greater than God's, rather *his followers* may be stronger and smarter than *God's followers*. The audience is generally familiar with the mythos of the Devil, and so the word order plays with the first-time audiences' assumptions that Lucifer's hubris overshadows his sense of self within the ontological order. He does not yet believe himself to be greater than God, as audiences anticipate. The initial manifestation of his sense of self is simply an awareness that he is physically one, and that he may be equal to God only in acquired attributes. His intellect is capable of recognizing his rank in relation to the race of angels, but he cannot surpass the God he stands beside—not even imaginatively.

Gradually, his reason is tainted by pride: for if he is above the subservient angels, and if he is permitted to govern others, logically then, Lucifer too must be capable of the same authority as God. He does not believe that his ability to rule is superior to God's. It is in *opposition* to God's authority. Lucifer by nature cannot equal God, but in his puerile self-awareness, grounded in embodiment, he seeks to spatially orient himself in such a way that reflects such vanity:

> [Lucifer] thought through his own skill
> he could create a strong-built throne
> higher in heaven.[7]

Lucifer's desire to be enthroned implies a particular posture, one that is radically different from the one he currently assumes standing next to God. For one to sit is an indication of rest. In a cosmos that divides the sensual realm as a state of constant chaos and the intelligible realm as a place of peace, God is stillness. Only God is motionless because only God is complete in and of himself. God is enthroned, sitting as a symbolic gesture of rest, or perfection.

Only God may be seated, because God is the still center around which all of Creation revolves. The geocentric cosmos is actually (according to some Neoplatonists) an inversion of God's perspective. God is the true center, the fount from which all things originate, or, as Boethius envisioned, the center, source, and end.[8] Of course, from our geocentric perspective the opposite appears to be true; but this inverted cosmos and God's perfect central location is evinced by the motion of heavenly bodies (i.e. angels, in agreement with Plato's *Timaeus*). The angels who are closest to God move the slowest because they are closer to his peace, and closer than other creatures to his perfection. In fact, they revolve, turning ever inward on themselves, because they are imitating his perfection, for only something that is complete turns inwardly to itself. But their motion only imitates rest.[9] None can achieve stillness, for stillness indicates perfection and that belongs to God alone. Lucifer's desire for a throne, then, is not simply to have a symbol of his authority, but the posture of sitting is the equivalent of restful perfection. Lucifer seeks to create for himself a state that is similar to God's in posture and metaphysics.

Still, Lucifer cannot conceive of himself as a being that is greater than

God. According to some philosophers, such is impossible for any being. Anselm of Canterbury, in his ontological argument for the existence of God as "that-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought," explains that,

> …if some intelligence could think of something better than [God], the creature would be above its Creator and would judge its Creator—and that is completely absurd…[God must] possess existence to the highest degree; for anything else does not exist as truly, and so possesses existence to a lesser degree.[10]

Although Anselm was writing after the composition of *Genesis B,* in the 11th century, the notion that the very idea of the divine is the absolute limit of inferior intellects is not anachronistic. Humans are embodied, thus we are "calibrated" to understand things in time and space, but God is pure thought, pure goodness, and the origin outside of temporality. Humans and angels may intuit the divine nature, but it is absurd to think of anything greater than God, for if something greater can be thought, that thing is indeed God. Hence Lucifer cannot imagine his own superiority to God. It is ontologically impossible.

He can, however, imagine himself spatially located above God. Lucifer knows that as he stands next to God he is superior to the multitude of angels beneath him; logically then, if he climbs higher than God, his orientation implies superiority. Just as Lucifer relies on the physical manifestation and orientation of himself in order to become self-aware, his assertion of will is limited to physical rather than intellectual maneuvers. Lucifer further indicates his reliance on embodiment and spatial manipulation when "cwæð þæt hine his hige speone / þæt he west and norð wyrcean ongunne, / trymede getimbro" [he said that his mind lured him to begin work, west and north, to strongly construct fortresses].[11] Lucifer seeks now to create space within heaven for himself, but the notion that this would be a fortified structure implies that it is a space deliberately constructed in order to keep God out. Lucifer wants to detach himself entirely from God. To achieve such a feat would be impossible because Lucifer is in God's kingdom, and because if all that exists originates from God, then to deprive one's self of God entirely, one would become nothing.

Having been crowned by his thanes, Lucifer begins feuding with the Lord. In response, God banishes him and his demented *comitatus* to Hell. Lucifer is, perhaps ironically, given the very space he wanted to build: a fortified structure absent of God. The narrator explains that, "Feollon þa ufon of heofnum / þurhlonge swa þreo niht and dagas" [They fell out of heaven for as long as three nights and days].[12] According to Paul Binski, it was believed that the dead linger near their bodies for three days (hence the miracle of Lazarus' resurrection; his corpse is four days old, so the accomplishment is more impressive due to his absolute deadness).[13] God does not literally kill Lucifer

and his thanes, but the three-day-fall *symbolizes* death. Lucifer metaphorically dies during the fall and he is deprived of God and all goodness. His relocation to Hell is defined by negation. Lucifer still exists, but his existence is a constant reminder of the retraction and utter absence of the joys God had previously afforded him at the outset of *Genesis B*.

Despite this deprivation, his cognizance is maintained. The fall is experiential and intuited, particularly the contrast between Heaven and Hell. In Heaven, Lucifer knew only goodness, but his ability to act, articulate, and understand—in terms of human cognitive development—were being hindered because he could not grasp an existence other than the superiority he maintained above the other angels. Severed from all of this, Lucifer now knows that reversal of his conditions is possible. Terrible though the experience may be, the consequence provides an intellectual opportunity.

Knocked down to nothingness, Lucifer is afforded the means by which he might actualize himself. Having experienced the greatest spatial, social, and metaphysical heights, Lucifer is now degraded to the absolute lowest. The contrast between his lofty status and bitter damnation opens a space for introspection, awareness, and the emergence of individuality. The narrator explains that,

> That evil warps him within,
> down in that darkness, and afterwards it shaped him
> a name,
> the highest ordered that he should be called
> Satan afterwards….[14]

Evil reshapes him. He is renamed. But this *morðer* is new amidst the race of angels. It is other and it conflicts with the perfect goodness attributed to God. If God is good, and God is the origin of everything, *morðer* is absent of God. Yet it is present in Lucifer.

As previously mentioned, Lucifer's dialogue is transmitted through indirect speech. The audience only receives his words through the narrator's mediation. Previously his actions were inspired by a perceived sleight and a desire to attain what he believed to be his by right. Acting according to right, even if by misconception, Lucifer still followed a rational order. Lucifer still relied on reason to act against God, despite the fact that his reason was faulted. Even in defiance, Lucifer functioned in agreement with the ontological order implicated by God. Here in Hell, however, Satan is inspired by passion as, "Weoll him on innan / hyge ymb his heortan, hat wæs him utan / wraðlic wite" [It boiled inside him, his mind round his heart, as hot wrathful punishment surrounded him].[15] Now he is capable of an emotive response. It is this rage that issues forth, bursts, or bubbles from inside of him that is the true expression of his being. He is newly named; he is individuated; and for the first time, he speaks for himself:

> Is this an angel's place…He did not give us our rights
> that he has felled us to the fire bottom,
> to command hell, depriving us of the kingdom of heaven;
> He has commanded that it be occupied
> by mankind.[16]

The drastic reversal of his condition inspires anguish, an emotive response he can only understand in his fallen state. This emotion enables his individuality. He understands himself, and expresses himself as an individual. Now the text recognizes him and his dialogue through direct discourse. No longer Lucifer—having defined himself by defiance—Satan emerges with a new nature. The Devil is understood as a malleable being who, after evolving through the stages of his mythological development, continues to exhibit fluid traits of character. The mythological stages of development are easy enough to identify: He is created as Lucifer, the Angel of Light, and he is transformed into a devil during his three day fall from heaven. The shifts in his identity are not altogether physical, rather they are intentional, psychological, and an expression of his individuality.

Between Lucifer and Satan, the myth of the Devil is already marked by double identity, for he does not lose the angelic nature of his former self, but is forced to endure the torment of an altered demonic identity. The persistence of self under the duress of having fallen is a constant reminder of who he was and what he could have been. The Devil's identity is composed of irreconcilable selves—Angel of Light, Fallen Angel, and Father of Sin—thus the Devil's self is never at rest. His newfound nature resists his ambition.

But this very restlessness signifies individuality. Emotive restlessness and categorical resistance denies codification, conformity. To be an individual is to be capable of contrary conditions, to embrace dissonance. Logic, reason, and the divine order are understood as stillness, structures that hold all entities in their proper places according to *categoriae* that seek the happy rest of the divine center. A true individual is not defined by reason and structural orientation; rather an individual is identified by passion, a unique expression of self. The Devil's nature is an assertion of individuality because his identity, once devastated by the fall, is now autonomously malleable and upsetting to the metaphysical hierarchy. Individuality disturbs God's ontology because his actions defy the predetermination of a perfect and omniscient God.

Individuality is not predetermined; it is derived from passion. Individuality implies a will that acts of its own accord, freely. If an individual is defined by the choices one makes, then an individual must be free to choose. Peter Dendle explains that,

> The ontological anxieties being expressed are…rifts in the moral integrity of the cosmos, and by their very nature they

> cannot be expressed without a plastic and adaptable symbol…elud[ing] attempts at a precise specification…[thus] was the devil forged.[17]

Satan refused to be rational, and followed his passion against the divine order. He sought to be a self in and of himself, rather than a being whose identity is contingent on the role of a servant. Satan is an individual. His individuality is an expression of these very anxieties indicated by Dendle within an ontology that is defined by theology to hinder the free will of cognizant beings such as the Devil, particularly humans. As evinced by Lucifer's cognitive development, conscious decisions, and personal experience, the Devil was free to have fallen. Amidst this ontological quandary, however, the narrator grapples for control, moralizing, "Swa deð monna gehwilc / þe wið his waldend winnan ongynneð / mid mane wið þone mæran drihten." [Such will befall each man who will / begin to labor against his ruler / with wickedness against the Lord].[18] The Devil is chronically at the mercy of the narrator of *Genesis B*. Indirect discourse, imposed adjectives, and the moral condemnation above, bind the Devil with the authority of the narrator by denying his autonomy. The narrator's moral does not simply imply that one should align one's self with God or slip into depravity. The moral re-assimilates Satan to the ontology that his individual freedom seemed to have threatened.

Within a predetermined ontology, every being conforms to a particular nature and thus a proper Neoplatonic form. Satan's form is the same as any thane who would abandon the Lord. It is not simply a culturally unique lesson regarding the social order of the Anglo-Saxon audience. The narrator reassigns Satan a particular form, that of the treacherous thane, in order to subvert the threat of individuality to the ontological order. Every thane who rises against the ruler is participating in the perfect form of the Adversary, and is fulfilling a potential that ends in chronic flux and absolute privation of goodness. Satan is recuperated by the moral as a component of the very ontology that his seeming individuality would have upset. The narrator rejects Satan's individuality in favor of a predetermined form in God's unyielding ontology.

The audience is compelled to identify with and learn from the angels—even Lucifer. In fact, as *Genesis B* is situated within the debate of free will, the cause and consequences of the rebel angels directly affects the human condition. The audience is able to identify with Lucifer's psychology and to empathize with him because Lucifer, before the fall, expresses human desires, emotions, and motives. The audience resonates with his self-recognition and to some degree even his angst within a structure that does not accept, let alone value, individuality. The angels, as *Genesis B* explains, were created specifically to do the will of God. Although, by nature, angels and humans are metaphysically different, they are both considered to be divine by participation within the same Neoplatonic ontology.

Angels and humans alike are divine by participation because one is made happy by fulfilling one's nature because that nature accords with the one true

good—happiness, goodness, and divinity are synonymous—thus one who is happy has acquired divinity and (just as one is made just by securing justice) one is made divine by participating in divinity.[19] One's performance of the good is also a fulfillment of one's nature in accordance with the divine order. One is divine by participation by achieving one's potential. But this does not express one's individuality. Fulfilling one's nature leads to happiness and agrees with a divinely structured ontology, but one's nature is predetermined. The will is hindered because nature is an ontological ideal that logically one ought to conform to. Living logically in accordance with one's nature is not living passionately, freely, in and of one's self. This begs the question, then, to what extent is a being free to act against one's nature, and—in regards to concupiscence—does the divine order predetermine some, like the Devil, to fall?

The fate of the fallen angels is inexorably tied to the fate of humans. If the angels are capable of asserting their selves against the Father, then humans may also be ontologically free agents. The cause and condition of Adam and Eve's fall has some residual effect on human nature, hence baptism and concerns of original sin. But Lucifer's rebellion has *ontological* consequences. Textual emphasis on the Devil's interiority and experience locates him within the debate of predestination versus free will and reveals the soteriological moral of *Genesis B*. Adam and Eve, in particular, are forgiven and accepted into the heavenly realm (eventually), but this only tells the audience about *their* salvation. The human race is still burdened by the yoke of original sin, which is ever compounded by concupiscence; just because Adam and Eve were saved does not give the audience any reason to assume that the same holds true for the rest of the human race.

As the originator of sin, however, the cause and consequence of Lucifer's rebellion effects the fates of humans because he indicates the extent to which an individual has personal freedom within a defined ontology. If the Devil were predetermined to fall, then *Genesis B* can account for the origin of evil, which would directly influence the humans who will consequently be damned. In accordance with theories of predestination—contemporary with the composition of *Genesis B*—the salvation of a few humans has little soteriological effect on all humans. But the extent to which God controls the origin and agents of sin ultimately indicates the role of human choice within a clockwork universe.

Rosemary Woolf argues that the author of *Genesis B* approaches the subject of the fall with a psychological, rather than dogmatic, perspective. She believes that this, in combination with the sharp divergence from exegesis, the Hexaemeral poets, and *Heliand,* indicates that *Genesis B* (as well as *Mystère d'Adam*) may come from another source.[20] This theory is also posed by Sievers, who points to *De originali peccato* of Avitus as the possible source.[21] By contrast, A. N. Doane argues that the reason for the psychological realism in *Genesis B* is because the author is developing a narrative rather than dogma. From the audience's perspective, Christ has already been crucified and raised, thus there

is little need for a commentary on soteriology. Focusing on the textual treatment of Adam and Eve (just as Woolf does), Doane believes that particular attention is given to the proto-humans' psychological condition because their sin is rendered equal to anyone else's—their fall is "not antecedent or different."[22] Woolf and Doane are overcomplicating a very simple issue; it is difficult to prove that *Genesis B* has another source that separates it from every other Old English Hexameral poem and, regardless of the textual intricacies of Adam and Eve, Doane does not account for the Devil's psychological complexities.

The Devil's role in *Genesis B* reconciles the opposing sides of a long running debate; he embodies the human desire to be free within an ontology that is contingent on God's constant, unlimited governance. The debate of free will versus predestination had begun well before the Pelagian heresy of the early 400's; it was later revisited by Boethius who took up the topic in his fifth book of *The Consolation of Philosophy* around 525 A.D. Between 830-50 the rebellious monk and determined theologian, Gottschalk of Orbais, promoted the idea of *gemina praedestinatio* (twin predestination). To summarize, *gemina praedestinatio* is the belief that God, acting on both justice and mercy, divided humans into the elect and the condemned, and every individual's destiny is predetermined well before conception. Though many are baptized, not all are saved, therefore Christ died for the chosen, not the many.[23] Gottschalk's teachings were derived from the Pauline letters, Augustinian theology, and the belief that God governs Creation absolutely, leaving nothing to chance—or free will.[24] His argument seemed irrefutable because Gottschalk relied on the popular scientific method of the Carolingian school of thought, which consisted of noncontradictory statements from Church Fathers to construct doctrine. The problem with such beliefs is that one's individual actions have no effect on one's destiny, and arguably, if one commits immoral acts it is not truly his or her fault, for it has been preordained.[25] Sin, like salvation, is not a choice but a compulsion. Despite his proofs and agreement with Augustine, Gottschalk was tried multiple times, and ultimately sentenced to spend his remaining years in prison, but the controversy regarding human choice and predetermination had been rekindled with a renewed sense of vigor. Outraged, church officials enlisted Duns Scottus Eriugena to combat the issue.

In order to refute Gottschalk's proofs, Eriugena had to revamp the methods for such claims and reveal the very scientific method of the Carolingians to be faulted. Eriugena constructed a new, more sound, scientific method:

> The scientific method in four steps[,] for every science is made up of four main parts or methods: division, definition, proof, and recapitulation. A given whole is logically divided up into its parts and the units are defined. Then what is still implicitly contained in these statements is made clear by syllogistic proof, and finally everything is restated in terms of

> a single scientific foundation. There should be recourse to these four procedures in solving each and every *quaestio*, and not just to the proof from authority. Logical correctness, that is, demonstrability, is to a great extent identified with truth…ontic realities can be expressed adequately in logically correct propositions.[26]

Gottschalk began with the teachings of Church Fathers to make definite claims for predestination. Eriugena reorganized this method; beginning with scripture he applied reason to make deductions, then turned to Church Fathers to strengthen his claims. In doing so, Eriugena refuted Gottschalk's claims and the Church's seemingly contradictory teachings regarding predetermination and human free will.[27]

Gottschalk derived his proofs from Scripture and applied it to all people; one source governing every individual. Eriugena, on the other hand, because his scientific method requires syllogistic evidence, relies on experience; the shared experience of individuals constructs proofs that, when synthesized with Scripture, produces doctrine. This indicates, at least in part, the intellectual climate surrounding the composition of the Anglo-Saxon *Genesis B* (around the mid-ninth century).[28] Given the controversy concerning the free will of individuals that encompasses the approximate date of the text's composition, *Genesis B* is also implicated within the debate. Gottschalk's argument that human nature is governed by the divine order, and that every individual is predetermined to be saved or condemned is expressed by the *Genesis B* narrator who consistently reins in the Devil and governs his every expression with his narrative authority. The narrator favors predetermination, but the audience identifies with Lucifer, due to the textual insight regarding his psychology, his experiential individuation and development, and resonances with humanity.

The audience is given a glimpse of Lucifer's cognitive development and increased awareness of self. His psychology reflects the human condition; like Lucifer, humans desire to be free individuals. Rosemary Woolf explains that the Devil

> . . . could be viewed against the background of eternity as well as of time and yet arouse that sense of pity which is an essential element of tragedy: a sense of pity, which is not theologically justified, but which human sensibility stirred by great art cannot withhold from…the plight of Satan.[29]

Humans resonate with this fallen rebel because of the unspoken dialectical understanding of thwarted potential, unsatisfied passion, and pain. For the purposes of the debate of predetermination, the Devil represents free will, and the ability to choose to act against the divine order. Within the diegesis of *Genesis B* and the ontological structure it portrays, Lucifer's initial crime is not

pride or hubris against God—these offences follow. His first sin is the assertion of his individuality because it challenges the very ontological structure in which he is immersed. His development and initial defiance exemplify a human anxiety. It is not the origin of sin, alone, that affects humans and soteriology after the Devil's entanglement with Adam and Eve. Lucifer's desires and subsequent fall indicates the nature of God's ontology. Following the fall of the Angel of Light, *Genesis B* does not accord well with chance and free choice. Lucifer's rise to individuality and subsequent decision to oppose God is portrayed as a free choice, but after the rebel angels are cast into hell the text reorders their personal freedom along with their fallen condition. The focus is the freedom of the human will. It is not done so explicitly, but the narrative and abrupt moralizing indicates that God grants this fall, governs all psychologies, and predisposes every entity towards a particular end. The freedom of the human will is defined by the Devil's ability to act as an individual within the parameters of God's ontology.

Genesis B explains that the angels were formed by His handiwork, and that He gave to them their wit.[30] He is the *alwalda* from whom every element of the angels is derived; all things originate from a single source: God. Assuming that the Devil is inherent to the divinely established order complicates the issue of whether he is actually able to individuate himself from God. For if God is everything that is, to be anything at all is to be in some small way a participant in divinity.[31] It logically follows, then, that Lucifer and Satan each actually exist because God wills it to be so, and each by necessity participates in divinity by virtue of Lucifer's—and even Satan's—very being. Satan shares in the ontological structure that not only stems from God but *is* God at every metaphysical level. Consequently, the Devil is not able to individuate himself from God because everything that is, is God. If all that exists exists by virtue of God, and God is good, then all that exists is good as well; therefore, evil is nothing. By this logic, moreover, it is necessary that if the Devil exists, the Devil is good.

This is further evinced beyond the scope of *Genesis B*. The Devil is a necessary component to some hagiographies. He is what Peter Dendle refers to as a Saint-maker. The trials of overcoming the Devil temper the Saints, prove their worth, and exhibit the spiritual fortitude that makes them exceptional humans—those who have fulfilled their natures.[32] The Devil provides the test that renders the Saints perfect. His nature is necessary for the fulfillment of theirs. Although they may be in opposition, they are ontological compliments.

Still, the audience is compelled to want the Devil to be free, if not to maintain the belief that sin and damnation are not inherent qualities to a perfect God, then to affirm that all cognizant beings have free will. The Devil's cognitive development, emotive responses, and anguishing experience reflect the human condition because every human desires to be a free individual, but the narrator's authority and moral theory subject the Devil to the ontological structure. The Devil does not oppose this philosophical position; rather, the

Devil demonstrates the human condition, or the desire to actualize one's individuality within an ontology that is not conducive to individual freedom.

The Devil, though fallen, seems to have done so freely, but this freedom is an illusion. He is compelled by the narrative structure just as humans are compelled by ontology. Dendle argues that the Devil's ontological reality is connected to his linguistic manifestations, thus, "to acknowledge and articulate the nature of the devil is already to have conquered him."[33] But the literary manifestation of the Devil in *Genesis B* includes a complex interiority, demonstrating a will that is free to act in and of itself. The narrator thwarts this by imposing an ontology that restricts the Devil to his nature and subjects his will to predetermination. Ultimately, it is the audience who makes the decisive turn: the *ethos* of *Genesis B* presents an ontology that binds the Devil to the governance of God; the *pathos* is affected by the Devil's tragic humanity. Ethically, God's ontological structure must be maintained; empathetically, the Devil's freedom of will is indicative of humanity's.

The narrator's moral authority does not explicitly resolve the nature of the Devil. Whether his fall was free or preordained remains ambiguous, but ambiguity is an essential trait of the Devil—truly, any individual. The Devil's ambiguity is maintained, not by an indecisive or contradictory text, but because *Genesis B* depicts the fall of Lucifer in such a way that interpretation is pinioned between theology and the human condition.

Notes

1. Genesis B, 249.
2. Ibid., 252-6.
   …ænne hæfde he swa swiðne geworhtne,
   swa mihtigne on his modgeþohte, he let hine swa micles wealdan,
   hehstne to him on heofona rice, hæfde he hine swa hwitne geworhtne,
   swa wynlic wæs his wæstm on heofonum þæt him com from weroda drihtne,
   gelic wæs he þam leohtum steorrum
3. Ibid., 263-4.
4. Ibid., 265-6.
5. Boethius, III. Prose 10.
6. Genesis B, 268-71.
   þuhte him sylfum
   þæt he mægyn and cræft maran hæfde
   þonne se halga god habban mihte
   folcgestælna.
7. Ibid., 272-4.
   þohte þurh his anes cræft
   hu he him strenglicran stol geworhte,
   heahran on heofonum.
8. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy,* trans. Joel C. Relihan. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001) III.6.
9. Plato, *Timaeus*. trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 39e3-39e2.

10. Anselm of Canterbury, "Proslogion," *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works.* ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York: Oxford, 2008), 88.
11. Genesis B, 274-6.
12. Ibid., 306b-7b.
13. Paul Binski, *Medieval Death: Ritual and Representation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1996), 10.
14. Genesis B, 342b-345.

> Wearp hine on þæt morðer innan,
> niðer on þæt niobedd, and sceop him naman siððan,
> cwæð se hehsta hatan sceolde
> Satan siððan…

15. Ibid., 353b-5.
16. Ibid., 356-365.

> "Is þæs ænga styde…Næfð he þeah riht gedon
> þæt he us hæfð befælled fyre to botme,
> helle þære hatan, heofonrice benumen;
> hafað hit gemearcod mid moncynne
> to gesettanne."

17. Peter Dendle, *Satan Unbound: The Devil in Old English Narrative Literature* (University of Toronto, 2001), 118.
18. Genesis B, 297-9.
19. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy,* III.10.
20. Rosemary Woolf, "The Fall of Man in *Genesis B* and the *Mystère d' Adam*," *Studies in Old English Literature in Honor of Arthur G. Brodeur.* ed. Stanley B. Greenfield (University of Oregon, 1963), 187-8.
21. Eduard Sievers, *Der Heliand und die angelsächsische Genesis* (Halle, 1875), 22.
22. A. N. Doane, *The Saxon Genesis: An Edition of the West Saxon Genesis B and the Old Saxon Vatican Genesis* (The University of Wisconsin, 1991), 137-8.
23. Gottschalk of Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc d'Orbais,* ed. D. C. Lambot (Loouvain, 1945).
24. Doane, *The Saxon Genesis: An Edition of the West Saxon Genesis B and the Old Saxon Vatican Genesis,* 103.
25. Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 75.
26. Ibid., 77.
27. Ibid., 77-8.
28. The Norton Anthology of English Literature, "The Saxon Genesis," http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/middleages/topic_4/saxongen.htm
29. Rosemary Woolf, *Art and Doctrine: Essays on Medieval Literature,* ed. Heather O'Donoghue. (Ronceverte, WV: Hambledon Press, 1986), 13.
30. Genesis B, 250.
31. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy,* III.prose 10.
32. Dendle, *Satan Unbound: The Devil in Old English Narrative Literature,* 45-6.
33. Ibid., 119.

"Gods We Were": Rejuvenation as Social Metaphor in Interwar Pulp Fiction in Europe and the United States

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The Great War (1914-1918) took over ten million lives, and the influenza pandemic took millions more at war's end. But as grim as 1919 opened, there was at long last peace in Europe, and with peace came the exuberant social and political excesses that defined the new era on both sides of the Atlantic: the "roaring twenties"; the "careless twenties"; "*les années folles.*" Race, class, and gender relations all became very fluid, especially among the youth, who relished the freedoms of the times: jazz, gin, sex, and socialism. The aged, too, sought pleasures—desires of youth and sex, but more than a few were too exhausted by the recent hecatombs and political upheavals to indulge themselves. Modern medical rejuvenation science, men playing gods with their glandular (or hormone) therapies, however, provided new hopes to the aged and effete the world over.

Rejuvenation, scholars have argued, was a serious, albeit flawed, medical movement in the interwar years, practiced by sober experimental physicians—and many quacks.[1] The objectives were Faustian: to extend one's life, renew one's physical constitution, and, most popularly, reinvigorate one's former, often imagined, sexual prowess.[2] Rejuvenation clearly addressed age-old desires and was fodder for interwar culture, all the more so because in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when endocrinology was in its infancy and poorly understood, rejuvenation involved some new and, often, very weird medical science. One needs to look no further, for example, than to Charles Edouard Brown-Séquard (1817-1894), a seminal godfather of modern rejuvenation and an internationally esteemed professor of medicine at the College de France. In 1889, the 72-year-old Brown-Séquard, who for some time had been interested in the internal secretions of organs, especially the testicles, announced that he had injected himself with extracts from the testicles of guinea pigs and dogs. He claimed not only that he felt stronger,

more vigorous, and more mentally alert, but that he regained some of his sexual prowess.[3] His announcement was sensational. Many physicians followed his lead and began giving injections of extracts from other organs: thus was born organotherapy. Although organotherapy was briefly popular, it was soon discredited and largely forgotten; nevertheless, it anticipated further experimentation in rejuvenation science, leading many physicians straight to the gonads, which captured the imagination—and indignation—of physicians and novelists alike.

Two of the most culturally influential experimental physicians in the interwar years were Eugen Steinach (1861-1944) and Serge Voronoff (1866-1951). Steinach, working at the Viennese Academy of Sciences, studied sex glands, observing that castrated animals presented symptoms similar to senility. These same animals, or old animals, could be rejuvenated, especially sexually, if subjected to sex gland re-implantation. Steinach believed that it was not the reproductive function of the gland that regenerated the animal but the "interstitial gland," the puberty gland, which was most important. His most far-reaching conclusion from this belief was that man's own senescence could be reversed by a partial vasectomy. With such a procedure, the reproductive gland effectively atrophies while the puberty gland is stimulated, causing rejuvenation.[4] By 1918, the Steinach procedure was being performed to much imagined success, and it found champions around the world and was readily performed well into the 1930s when no less than W. B. Yeats had the procedure and was rejuvenated; Sigmund Freud too had the procedure.[5] Obviously Steinach's procedure was only for males, but he adapted it for females: X-ray treatments of the ovaries, he believed, would reduce their reproductive functions but stimulate the interstitial glands necessary for female rejuvenation.

Steinach's rival in the popular arena was the dapper, always newsworthy Dr. Serge Voronoff, a Russian émigré to France. Voronoff was a conventional, albeit fairly well-known doctor, when, just before the Great War, he began to be interested in tissue transplantations. During the war he acquired a good deal of experience in an army hospital doing bone grafts, but then he left public service and began to address the problem of aging and senility—and he soon made a startling announcement. In October 1919, at the annual meeting of the Congrès français de chirurgie, Voronoff claimed that his recent experiments grafting testicular glands into the scrotum of farm animals were efficacious: the animals rejuvenated.[6] It was the French press, responding to the peculiar postwar ennui, which sensationalized this barnyard experiment. Indeed, *Le Petit Parisien*, a popular daily, claimed that the Voronoff method, now associated with grafting monkey testicles into humans, could help men.[7] It did not matter that no such grafts had been done; they were imagined and soon Voronoff would do such experiments. Three years later, Voronoff showed off Edward Liardet, a man rejuvenated with monkey testicle grafts.[8] For the next half-dozen years, monkey gland grafts were believed efficacious both by the public

at large and by many staid medical practitioners throughout Europe and the United States.

More important for this paper than exploring the history of medical science, which is well studied, is to trace rejuvenation in the arena of popular literature. In fact, rejuvenation quickly became a multivalent theme in cartoons, songs, satire, and literature to address the Great War's destruction of Victorian and Edwardian certainty and respectability on both sides of the Atlantic. The old and the traditional had ostensibly lost all credibility on the Western Front, and with peace came a general celebration of the new: youth, vitality, and freedom from bourgeois propriety. The flapper, for example, challenged, if not redefined the very meaning of womanhood as youthful, carefree, and distinctly not matronly; sex would be for recreation, not solely for procreation. The adventurous would soak up the new syncopated beats of African-American jazz in New York, London and Paris and believe themselves renewed, if only fleetingly, on the dance floor. The classical aesthetic would fracture under the explosion of cubism, dadism, and surrealism.[9] And in the socio-political arena, Russia would offer but a very brief moment of optimistic revolutionary potential. Interwar literature, in general, mediated these postwar developments, and the pulp fiction, in particular, of Bertram Gayton in Great Britain, Gertrude Atherton in the United States, Félicien Champsaur in France, and Mikhail Bulgakov in the Soviet Union employed the possibilities that modern medical rejuvenation technologies offered as a trope to express caution, even pessimism toward the disturbing yet exhilarating changes in the reconstituted interwar gendered social, racial and political order.

It was in Great Britain that the first full-length fictive treatment of rejuvenation was published: Bertram Gayton's humorous and breezy, *The Gland Stealers* (1922). This improbable story's protagonist is an elderly "Gran'pa," an American, who now lives with his bourgeois grandson George in England; as George viewed it, Gran'pa was "a rather pathetic, bent old man, bowed with the weight of a great invisible something—a shadow—a menace!" not unlike postwar Britain.[10] Gran'pa came to life, however, when he read in his daily newspaper about rejuvenation. Indeed, the press on both sides of the Atlantic shouted the news of Voronoff's 1919 claim that he had rejuvenated farm animals by grafting the "interstitial glands" of young animals into older ones. Men, too, were now being rejuvenated: Dr. Leo L. Stanley captured headlines in the United States for doing gland transplant experiments on convicts using the testicles of executed prisoners. Evidently, human testicles were hard to access, and thus Voronoff turned to monkey glands, which seemed to be in abundant supply in the colonial epoch. As importantly, they solved the ostensibly ethical problem of harvesting human testicles, and they had the added market benefit of being easy fodder for the sensational press.[11]

Still, rejuvenation, especially with monkey gland grafts, was not easily embraced, and Gayton describes opposition to Gran'pa's desire for the surgical treatment. George feared it would lead to a compromised quality of life. In addition, he claims that "it seems inhuman to go about cutting up monkeys

and things to get hold of their glands."[12] In fact, rejuvenation in Britain was less well received than in France, for example, because of its very active anti-vivisectionist movement. The movement's principle organ, *The Abolitionist*, even led the fight against Voronoff's technique in England and did much to discredit his research. The French anti-vivisectionists, living up to stereotypes, seemed more interested in curbing the use of dogs in research laboratories than monkeys for rejuvenation. Regardless, the British anti-vivisectionist campaign did not prevent some from being rejuvenated, including Edward Liardet, an Englishman who famously extolled the monkey gland technique. In Gayton's novel, Gran'pa procures a monkey and has a thyroid graft. Thyroid grafting, less sensational than gonad grafting, was considered highly efficacious and was believed on both sides of the Atlantic to improve the capacity of the mentally inferior. This belief led the school board in Chicago in 1921 to begin feeding sheep glands to the "mentally inferior" to improve their aptitudes.[13] In the novel, Gran'pa has his graft and then rejuvenates, transforming into a man who is, ostensibly, about forty years old.

His glands renewed, Gran'pa fought against the "muffling embrace of Old Age."[14] His whole attitude changes, and he ceases to look backward or live with rancor. "There must be hundreds of old men like myself who are still looking backwards in the way I used to: Ah! If only I had my life to live over again! It's the saddest, the most wistful cry in the world . . . that 'might-have-been.'"[15] Rejuvenation was not to relive one's past; rather, it was to live in the present and for the future. For Gran'pa, this means helping others, not to live out Britain's or one's own past glory. Indeed, Gran'pa, youthful, audacious, and American by character, was going to change the world, one gland at a time. He concocts a plan to go to Africa in search of monkey glands to aid the flaccid and rancorous, which provokes anthropological reflection: "It's strange to think that millions of years ago we severed our connection with the apes and strode upwards into manhood; and now . . . we are returning to them again to save the aged of our race."[16] The 1925 Scopes trial may have put Darwinism on the stand in the United States at this very time, but for the aged it was Darwinian thinking that made the very idea of rejuvenation not just conceivable but realizable. In Gayton's imagination, nearly one hundred men accompany Gran'pa to Africa for rejuvenation. These men were chosen among the many dotards for their "enthusiasm, imagination, courage, and go."[17] These were to be modern optimistic men, men who will shape the future rather than sit in a rocking chair recounting the past. In Gayton's hands, Gran'pa then has a comic adventure in Africa and rejuvenates many in his troupe, claiming with the ultimate hubris, "We were carrying Youth and Life, Happiness and Power—the veritable concentrated essence of being—monkey glands. Gods we were . . . ."[18]

Perhaps they were gods, but false ones. Gayton represented the possibilities in rejuvenation as little more than a mirage; it could not even bring true youth: "What nonsense this business of rejuvenation was compared with the care-free ecstasy of those who were young in soul! What a terrible mockery

of the real joy of life . . . ."[19] The young had not experienced the Great War, the gas, the trenches, and the irony the war generated. For the mature, true youth could not be regained: it had been lost forever on the Western Front.

What's more, Gayton was skeptical if not prudish about rejuvenation re-awakening one's sexuality. Gran'pa's new glands did renew his sexual desires, which thoroughly disgusts George. "After a man or woman has reached middle age, it is absurd for them to delude themselves that they are still 'in love.' Affection, tolerance, understanding, sympathy, friendship—any of these lukewarm expressions may be applicable; but the hot, consuming fires of youth seeking youth—no!"[20] Modern sexuality, Foucault argues, took shape by the twentieth century.[21] But as Gayton suggests, English bourgeois propriety still viewed sex through a blinkered Victorian lens, and moreover, there was great discomfort with the mature woman's sexuality. Gran'pa renewed his relationship with an old flame, Sally Rebecca Froud, perhaps a pun on Freud, who, after much hesitation, allowed herself to be rejuvenated. But she could not or rather wished not to keep up with Gran'pa. Indeed, even her rejuvenation was slow, and despite exhibiting a "quaint girlishness," she also retained her emotional maturity, showing "a strange mixture of awakening motherliness and innocence and purity."[22] Rejuvenation made her more of a virgin-mother, the ideal bourgeois female, than a sexualized flapper. Not surprisingly, Sally Froud then rejects her rejuvenation and accepts tradition and the natural cycle of life: "Young people can never understand that it's no hardship to be old—if one is still well. It all happens so gradually. Nature is kind."[23] Sally, thoroughly British, re-enters the autumn of her life; the future, Gayton suggests by contrast, belongs to Gran'pa—an upstart American who was revivifying the world.

This banal, humorous novel is important not for its literary merit—it has little—but for its prosaic, albeit timely, metaphoric comment on British culture. England was stodgy and exhausted. Its sense of propriety and tradition did little to avoid the continued slaughter of the Great War, as proper gentlemen officers led men over the top to their slaughter. And after the war, the twenties may have roared in the U.S. and France, but England exhibited much less *joie de vivre*. It was in the autumn of its greatness and bourgeois tradition was too entrenched to allow it to embrace rejuvenation—at the individual or cultural level, perhaps to England's detriment in the modern world.

Despite a greater ambivalence in the United States toward rejuvenation than in Britain, there was a similar fear of the sexual awakening of the elderly woman. Gertrude Atherton's *Black Oxen* (1923), the main American novel about rejuvenation, explored the possibilities of a wholesale aesthetic and mental transformation through rejuvenation techniques. There was no better author for this novel: Atherton (1857-1948), herself, had the Steinach rejuvenation procedure for women and publicly expressed her satisfaction, indeed pleasure at the results of having her ovaries irradiated. Nevertheless, *Black Oxen* was an equivocal ode to female rejuvenation, one that expressed

significant cultural pessimism and the notion that a mature woman, even a rejuvenated one, would find greater appeal in power than sex.

Black Oxen was a story about New York "sophisticates" and the mystery woman of the season, the striking Madame Zattiany. Zattiany was young looking, mature in comportment, and wise beyond her apparent years, not unlike the rejuvenated Sally Froud. Zattiany, though, expressed disillusion with western civilization, a significant postwar ennui. Lee Clavering, a witty journalist bored with much of life and with most women, immediately took a shine to Zattiany, her looks, and her mature worldliness. Zattiany ultimately announced to Clavering and the sophisticates that she was really Mary Ogden, a former member of New York society who lived in Europe, married into European nobility, and, as a mature woman, had been rejuvenated, regaining her lost looks. Rejuvenation, she claimed, changed more than her body:

> [it produced a] renewed power manifest in mental activity, in concentration, in memory, but that distaste for new ideas, for reorientation, had entirely disappeared. People growing old are condemned for prejudice, smugness, hostility to progress, to the purposes and enthusiasms of youth; but this attitude is due to aging glands alone, all things being equal.[24]

Here, Atherton articulated the professed claims of the rejuvenation movement: it was less about sex than the body, mind, and spirit regaining their plasticity.

Despite their chronological difference in age, Zattiany and Clavering fell in love. This was, however, an asymmetric relationship, one where the male, Clavering, felt weak and powerless before the worldly, confident, and now beautiful Zattiany: "His manhood rebelled. If she had only flung herself weeping into his arms. If for once he could have felt himself stronger than she . . . ."[25] But he was not stronger. Indeed, in stories where women were rejuvenated, men felt subordinate aesthetically, sexually and even intellectually. The rejuvenated woman, symbolically here the modern woman who the war had emancipated in the economic and cultural sphere, challenged men's primacy in many spheres of activity—including the bedroom.

But Zattiany ultimately rejected Clavering, physical love and even youthful sex for something much greater: power and influence. She traded her flirtation with youth for a marriage of convenience to an older European prince who challenged her by saying,

> glance inward. Do you see nothing that causes you to feel ashamed and foolish? Do you—*you*—fail to recognize the indecency of a woman of your mental age permitting herself to fancy that she is experiencing the authentic passions of youth? Are you capable of creating life? . . . Have you the ideals of youth, the plasticity, the hopes, the illusions? . . . Your revivified glands have restored to you the appearance

> and the strength of youth . . . . [but] as young as you appear, you have no more illusion in your soul than when you were a withered old woman . . . .[26]

Atherton's novel of rejuvenation was, ostensibly, disturbingly modern, and some in the 1920s considered her depiction of beauty and sexual appeal as scandalous. *Black Oxen* was even censored in Rochester, New York.[27] But below the surface plot lines of the novel was a traditional, even conservative cautionary tale about propriety and female sexuality. Despite her own personal interest in rejuvenation, Atherton concluded that the mature modern woman ought to return to a traditional role: power through her husband and the subordination of female sexual needs, needs seen as only the trifling dalliances of youth. It would take another war, many more cultural changes, and the pill before women in the West could have both power and sexual satisfaction in their lives.

Perhaps the strangest work that employed rejuvenation as a trope was Félicien Champsaur's *Nora, la guenon devenue femme* [Nora, The She-monkey Becomes a Woman] (1929). In this roman à clef in which Voronoff is a character, Champsaur (1859-1934) employs rejuvenation as a caustic and pessimistic means to satirize and address issues current in French popular culture: race and sex in the Jazz Age.[28]

In Champsaur's fertile imagination, it is opening night of a "*ballet nègre*" at the Folies Bergère. Nora, a transparent parody of Josephine Baker, takes the stage, half-naked, wearing a skirt of bananas, and dancing: "[her] body is graceful, an admirable living statue, but disquieting, for it radiates an indefinable animality."[29] Indeed she is something of an animal: she is the child of a Jew who mated with an orangutan and had, when a simian-infant, gland transplants to become the woman that she is. Despite her grace, magnetism, and obscenely sexualized dancing, Nora is not represented as a classical beauty. "Nora certainly was not a beauty; she was much more, for she wonderfully symbolized a sort of animal voluptuousness, primal and corrupt."[30] Champsaur could not bestow upon Nora unequivocal beauty; classical beauty in the western imagination, at least since J. J. Winckelmann's Enlightenment study of aesthetics, was associated with a perfect, civilized soul, something representations of blacks lacked in French popular culture.[31]

Champsaur deprived Nora of beauty, not sexuality, and she, like Josephine Baker, had the power to sexualize others, even whites, which was dangerous. Men found in Nora a physical and emotional sensuality. As one of Nora's lovers said of her: "With this woman there is only sensuality. Nothing comes from the mind. Nora is a magnificent animal of pleasure. Nothing else."[32] Gland grafting, then, may transform the body and even restore one's spirit, but it could not refine one's spirit, especially for blacks. Developing this racial theme further, Champsaur depicted blacks as dangerously over-sexualized. When one effete intellectual sees Nora, he is smitten, and acknowledging his impotence, he runs off to a gland grafting clinic to win the girl: "alas, I am no

longer, as you say, up to it. Happily, science promises us a new youth."[33] It was, however, an attenuated youth: his efforts were too late. Not only did his love of the black lead to his death, Nora falls in love not with the intellectual but with a talking monkey, an absurd racist parody of intellectuals and the black male.

Champsaur's racism was transparent, associating rejuvenation with the Jazz Age, an epoch popularly defined by blacks and symbolizing, to many, western decadence. Indeed, this novel of race and rejuvenation was also very much an expression of cultural pessimism. Man, Champsaur argues, has lost his creativity; all that exists are "schools of artistic decadence . . . drunk on novelty."[34] If the fertile interwar culture was decadent in Champsaur's eyes, could man regain his creativity? Indeed, he expresses some cautious hope that man could be rejuvenated "by the graft, by a revitalization of his organs, by the development of his brain . . . ."[35] But this hope was not without ambivalence; those grafted, Champsaur suggests, will be little more than atavisms—and their sexuality would be dangerous, so dangerous it could lead symbolically to miscegenation, one paramount sign of decadence on both sides of the Atlantic in the interwar years.

Mikhail Bulgakov (1891-1940) develops the theme of decadence differently and politically, employing rejuvenation to address the Soviet Union's revolutionary experiment in remaking man and society in his biting satire, *Heart of a Dog*, written in 1925 but immediately censored and then not published for decades. Bulgakov, a medical doctor turned writer during the Revolution, was undoubtedly familiar with rejuvenation in the 1920s, as were many in Russia who read about it in the popular press.[36] But rather than praising it or rejecting it, in Bulgakov's hands rejuvenation was a vehicle to cast a wary eye on man's Faustian hubris—in both his laboratory experiments and, more importantly, his social experiments.

The plot of *Heart of a Dog* is straight forward, belying its complex and satiric genius. The two main protagonists of the novella are Professor Philip Philippovich Preobrazhensky, a "world celebrity," not unlike the Russian expatriate Voronoff who pioneered grafting, and his creation, Sharikov, a rejuvenated—actually transformed—dog. Preobrazhensky, whose very name in Russian means transformation, is a bourgeois doctor who does rejuvenation experiments on both bourgeois men and women. His greatest feat, though, is experimenting on a mongrel dog named Sharik. The dog has its testes and pituitary glands removed and replaced by those of a man, a proletarian scoundrel. As a result of the new glands, the dog transmogrifies into a man. Sharikov, as he is now called, begins to swear, act crass, violate women, and, of course, chase cats, all while attracting fleas. Sharikov causes havoc in Preobrazhensky's rational world of bourgeois propriety and material splendor. Renouncing the world of his creator, Sharikov won a job purging Moscow of stray animals, namely cats, and after killing the strays, the animals are turned into food for the proletariat. Sharikov's behavior so disturbs Preobrazhensky

that he removes Sharikov's human glands and replaces them with the original canine ones, returning the creation to its natural dog state.

In this parable, Bulgakov insightfully employs rejuvenation as a metaphor for exploring modernity, the limits and responsibilities of science, and the Faustian myth: "A new realm is opening . . . a homunculus was created without any of Faust's retorts."[37] Bulgakov's conclusions about this feat were, however, ambiguous. Preobrazhensky is clearly described as a great scientist, "a creator." But his morality is questioned on two levels: first, should man push science to the very limits of creation itself? Second, what responsibility does one have to one's creation? Preobrazhensky's crime, Bulgakov suggests, is not in trying to transform life. It is in being unwilling to assume full responsibility for his creation, a person expressing both Darwinian and Lamarkian traits: the inherent traits of a mongrel dog and the acquired traits of the human donor of glands, a petty thief and drunkard. Lamarkianism, it should be noted, was still popular in 1920s Russia, much less so in twentieth-century Western Europe, which accepted Darwin. Regardless how one understands how Sharikov gets his disagreeable traits, with more of a heart of a dog than a man, he is a creature out of control; Preobrazhensky, as creator, then assumes a morally ambiguous role by transforming Sharikov back into a dog, essentially killing the human. The ambiguity here is that Preobrazhensky is not castigated for his work. Rather, he, personally, rejuvenates by continuing his work. While Sharikov was wrecking havoc, Preobrazhensky withers and begins "looking like an aged Faust."[38] Once he rids himself of Sharikov, Preobrazhensky is reinvigorated and returns to his experiments, ostensibly undaunted and no longer wizened by his experience.

On a political level, it is easy to read Bulgakov's novella as a thinly veiled critique of the Russian Revolution, and indeed it was in 1925 when it was censored and, for a period, confiscated. In this interpretation, the transformation of Sharik is a metaphor for Bolshevism and the professed dictatorship of the proletariat. Preobrazhensky, or rather Bulgakov, unsympathetic to the Revolution and the proletariat, denigrates workers and their destruction of his middle class life and world. Moreover Bulgakov, in his use of rejuvenation, suggests that the Revolution and its radical experiment in remaking society would not ennoble the Russian worker; rather, he was a brute who could not be transformed overnight—if at all. Thus Bulgakov employs rejuvenation as a symbolic means to address the central issue in the Soviet Union: the wholesale transformation of society and people, and on this front, he was distinctly pessimistic.

The early interwar years were welcomed with much enthusiasm and hope on both sides of the Atlantic. And for many, especially the young, the interwar years were roaring. But for the mature, those whom the Great War wizened, peace alone and the culture it generated was not enough; they needed rejuvenation, which medical science ostensibly now offered. What was offered, though, outpaced the mores of culture in both Europe and the United States, and rather than being embraced, rejuvenation became a literary trope for

resisting change. The mature woman could now be sexualized, but novelists emphasized, if not reified, her traditional Victorian role of staid mother and helper. Sexuality was thus largely the provenance of the young or the black, both of whom were enlisted as symbols of the epoch. But these were ambivalent symbols, as much about decadence as rejuvenation. Dramatizing decadence was not, however, just a screed against cultural change; in Bulgakov's imagination, it was political: the proletariat, especially those the revolution transformed, could not rejuvenate Russia—only destroy it. Capitalists in the west would agree. These sober fictive responses to the new hopes medical science offered suggested that the radical changes of the interwar years lay on a foundation of traditional, even pessimistic thought. Sadly, medical science offered no hope for the socio-political, pathological hubris of the thirties in Europe, only for individual senescence. Today, with our narrowly defined pathologies, rejuvenation is much less problematic than in the interwar years. It is not just that medicines like Viagra are efficacious; rather, it is that physicians now offer just fleeting sexual rejuvenation and, perhaps to the chagrin of novelists, not the holistic rejuvenation once imagined. Gods, we are not.

Notes

[1] The literature on rejuvenation is voluminous. See David Hamilton, *The Monkey Gland Affair* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1986); Frédéric Pierre Augier, *Dr. Samuel Serge Voronoff* (Thèse, M.D., Université Claude Bernard-Lyon I, 1990); Jean Real, *Voronoff* (Paris: Stock, 2001); Eric J. Trimmer, *Rejuvenation: The History of an Idea* (London: Robert Hale, 1967); Merriley Borell, "Organotherapy and the Emergence of Reproductive Endocrinology," *Journal of the History of Biology* 18 (Spring 1985): 1-30; Jesica Jahiel, "Rejuvenation Research and the American Medical Association in the Early Twentieth Century: Paradigms in Conflict" (Ph.D diss., Boston University, 1992); Chandak Sengoopta, "Rejuvenation and the Prolongation of Life: Science or Quackery?" *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 37 (Autumn 1993): 55-66; Laura Davidow Hirshbein, "The Glandular Solution: Sex, Masculinity, and Aging in the 1920s," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 9 (July 2000): 277-304; Brett A. Berliner, "Mephistopheles and Monkeys: Rejuvenation, Race, and Sexuality in Popular Culture in Interwar France," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 13 (July 2004): 306-325.

[2] For a good introduction to rejuvenation and male sexual prowess, see Barbara L. Marshall and Stephen Katz, "Forever Functional: Sexual Fitness and the Ageing Male Body," *Body and Society* 8 (2002): 43-70 and Susan Squier, "Incubabies and Rejuvenates: The Traffic Between Technologies of Reproduction and Age-Extension," in *Figuring Age: Women, Bodies, Generations*, ed. Kathleen M. Woodward (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999), 88-111.

[3] See Merriley Borell, "Brown-Séquard's Organotherapy and its appearance in America at the End of the Nineteenth Century," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 50 (Fall 1976): 209-320; Merriley Borell, "Organotherapy and the Emergence of Reproductive Endocrinology," *Journal of the History of Biology* 18 (Spring 1985): 1-30; John R. Herman, "Rejuvenation: Brown-Sequard to Brinkley," *New York State Journal of Medicine* (Nov. 1982): 1731-1739.

[4] See Sengoopta, "Rejuvenation"; Hirshbein, "The Glandular Solution"; and Herman, "Rejuvenation."
[5] See Stephen Lock, "'O that I were young again': Yeats and the Steinach Operation," *British Medical Journal* 287 (Dec. 1983): 1964-1968.
[6] See Hamilton, *The Monkey Gland Affair*; Real, *Voronoff*; and Augier, *Dr. Samuel Serge Voronoff*.
[7] "Jouvence," *Le Petit Parisien*, October 8, 1919.
[8] See Richard Araps, "Les greffes humaines," *Le Temps*, October 10, 1922; Hector Ghilini, *Le Secret du Dr Voronoff* (Paris: Eugène Fasquelle, Éditeur,1926); Hamilton, *The Monkey Gland Affair*; and Real, *Voronoff*.
[9] For a thoughtful analysis of the trauma of the Great War and interwar culture, see Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990).
[10] Bertram Gayton, *The Gland Stealers* (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott, 1922), 13.
[11] See Hamilton, *The Monkey Gland Affair;* see also the *New York Times* for the 1920s.
[12] Gayton, *The Gland Stealers*, 29.
[13] *New York Times*, December 8, 1921. See also *New York Times*, October 19, 1921.
[14] Gayton, *The Gland Stealers*, 37.
[15] Ibid., 101.
[16] Ibid., 130.
[17] Ibid., 163.
[18] Ibid., 274.
[19] Ibid., 264.
[20] Ibid., 152.
[21] See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*. Vol I: *An Introduction*. Trans by Robert Hurley (NY: Vintage Books, 1978).
[22] Gayton, *The Gland Stealers*, 295.
[23] Ibid., 311.
[24] Gertrude Atherton, *Black Oxen* (NY: A. L. Burt Company, 1923), 140. For an excellent extended treatment of *Black Oxen*, see Erin Gentry Lamb, "The Age of Obsolescence: Senescence and Scientific Rejuvenation in Twentieth Century America" (PhD diss., Duke University, 2008).
[25] Ibid., 235.
[26] Ibid., 321.
[27] *New York Times*, October 4, 1923.
[28] For a more extensive discussion of *Nora, la guenon devenue femme* and Champsaur, see Berliner, "Mephistopheles and Monkeys."
[29] Félicien Champsaur, *Nora, la guenon devenue femme* (Paris: Ferenczi et Fils, 1929), 20. Translations of Champsaur's *Nora* are my own.
[30] Ibid., 24.
[31] On blacks in French popular culture, see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992); Pascal Blanchard et al., eds, *L'autre et nous, "scènes et types"* (Paris: Syros and ACHAC, 1995); T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, *Black Venus: Sexualized Savages, Primal Fears, and Primitive Narratives in French* (Durham: Duke UP, 1999); Jodi Blake, *Le Tumulte noir: Modernist Art and Popular Entertainment in Jazz-Age Paris, 1900-1930* (University Park, PA:

Pennsylvania State UP, 1999); and Brett A. Berliner, *Ambivalent Desire: The Exotic Black Other in Jazz-Age France* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002).
[32] Champsaur, *Nora*, 284.
[33] Ibid., 202.
[34] Ibid., 118.
[35] Ibid., 119.
[36] See Lesley Milne, *Mikhail Bulgakov: A Critical Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990), 52. See also Diana K. Burgin, "Bulgakov's Early Tragedy of the Scientist-Creator: An Interpretation of *The Heart of a Dog*," *Slavic and East European Journal* 22 (1978): 494-508, which influenced my analysis of Bulgakov's novella, and Yvonne Howell, "Eugenics, Rejuvenation and Bulgakov's Journey into the Heart of Dogness," *Slavic Review* 65 (Autumn 2006): 544-562. For a fine treatment of the Russian scientist Ilia Ivanov who conducted rejuvenation and eugenics experiments perhaps even more radical than Voronoff's, and who also likely inspired Bulgakov, see Alexander Etkind, "Beyond Eugenics: The Forgotten Scandal of Hybridizing Humans and Apes," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 39 (2008): 205-210.
[37] Mikhail Bulgakov, *Heart of a Dog*, trans. Mirra Ginsburg (NY: Grove Press, 1968), 63.
[38] Ibid., 94.

Hera > Rebecca, Medea > Rachel;
Greek Myth and the Jacob Cycle (Genesis 27-32)

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Gunkel, in his ground-breaking 1895 study, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit: Eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung über Gen. 1 un Ap. Jon 12*,[1] confirmed several different trajectories for future study of the Bible. He overwhelmingly demonstrated the relevance of other mythic traditions, that they can provide a context for analysis and interpretation of episodes in the Bible. He further showed how the Genesis tradition has responded to and adapted narratives that originated outside of Israelite culture, reworking them to fit the emerging monotheism. Since then it has become clear that Genesis also draws on and refashions other narratives and mythic traditions, not just Mesopotamian myth (e.g., *Enuma Elish*, *Atra-Hasis*, *Gilgamesh*), including Ugaritic myth (on which see especially Mark Smith 1990 and 2001),[2] and Egyptian narratives (e.g., *The Tale of the Two Brothers*). Perhaps less well studied, however, are Genesis' possible interconnections with, and even dependence on, Greek myth.

Genesis unambiguously points to Greek culture in its mention of Javan (Gen 10:2, 4; cf. 1 Chron 1:5, 7; Isa 66:19; Ezek 27:13; Zech 9:13). Though a modern audience may fail to digest the reference, Javan, Noah's grandson through Japheth, is, as Alter (2004: 55) notes, not only the same name as the Greek Ion, but serves, as does the Greek bearer of that name, as an eponym for Greek culture in general.[3] Euripides' play, named for its protagonist, concludes with Athena's retrospective prophecy (or *vaticinatio ex eventu*), in which she stresses that Ion will become famous throughout Greece (1575). He will have four sons, who will become the progenitors of four tribes, "For from this man, / four sons will be born" (1575-77). Their descendants will colonize the Cyclades, island cities, and the coasts (1582-84). The eponymic Ionians will become famous, inhabiting both Europe and Asia (1584-87). Athena's proclamation has much in common with Genesis' account of Javan, who will

also have four sons, from whom the people of the coasts and islands are descended, separated into their own countries" (10:4-5). Both accounts evidence a similar conception of Ion's/Javan's descendants as, in their populating Aegean islands and nearby coastal areas, broadly constituting eastern Mediterranean Greek culture. How do we account for this intersection of the two mythic traditions?

There are many other instances of common ground or intersections between Greek and Israelite myth that have recently attracted attention. Among those one might briefly note, Louden (2011:106-11)[4] analyzes how the story of Rahab in Joshua 2 has all the same elements as the story Helen tells of Odysseus' spy mission before the Sack of Troy, at *Odyssey* 4.242-58. West (1991: 349-50) observes the almost verbatim parallel between Agamemnon's pointed remark to Calchas, that he never prophecies anything except evil (*Iliad* 1.106-7), as Ahab also accuses Micaiah (1 Kings 22:18).[5] Yadin argues that Goliath's anticlimactic duel with David (1 Samuel 17) consciously uses Hector's duel with Aias in *Iliad* 7 as a subtext.[6] Of the all ancient narratives that have climactic recognition scenes between long-lost relatives, only the *Odyssey* and Genesis' account of Joseph in Egypt use the specific subtype of *postponed recognition*, in which the protagonist withholds disclosing his own identity until he has subjected the other family members to tests of their faithfulness.[7] There are many other recent studies that could be adduced.[8]

Within the larger context of the studies just cited, Genesis' narrative about Jacob, especially his relation with his mother Rebecca, his journey to Haran to win a bride, his negotiations with his devious step-father Laban, Rachel stealing her father's household gods and running off with Jacob in the middle of the night, and Laban's angry pursuit, all correspond to the Greek myth of Jason, Medea, and the Golden Fleece. There are homologies for several of the main characters in each myth, and close correspondences between definitive motifs. Perhaps closest of all are the parallels between Aietes and Laban, the cunning fathers-in-law, capped by their corresponding special possession, Laban's household gods and Aietes' Golden Fleece. In each myth the daughter steals her father's sacred item and flees with the young hero. The number of correspondences, both individual motifs and their larger concatenation, is too close to be a coincidence. I argue that Jacob's myth is in a dialogic relation with two Greek myths, Argonautic myth in general, but also *Iliad* 19's account of Hera tricking Zeus into blessing Eurystheus instead of Heracles. The link between the two Greek myths is Hera's role, corresponding to Rebecca's in the Genesis episodes under discussion.

Why would the Genesis tradition engage these Greek myths? I will maintain that Genesis intends its transformation of other cultures' narratives as *correctives*, on the one hand, serving a number of simultaneous purposes, and on the other hand, as large-scale polemics. Throughout, Genesis maintains a thematic focus on validating Yahwist religion. To do so entails denying the validity of other gods on the one hand, and of other religions on the other. One strategy for accomplishing these ends, which both Judaism and

Christianity are known to have embraced, is to employ various forms of euhemerism. Euhemerism asserts that the deities of other cultures are really just glorified accounts of mortals who, magnified over time, became worshipped as deities. Reference to the ancient Near Eastern god Ninurta, for instance may lie behind Genesis' mention of Nimrod (10:8-9). In the episodes under consideration here, refashioning myths about Hera to inform the story of Rebecca, reworking an episode about Zeus to depict Isaac, both function as instances of this larger agenda.

More pointedly, if an ancient audience were aware of the correspondences between Isaac and Zeus, and between Rebecca and Hera, additional ends are achieved. In Isaac's absurdly easy victimization by Rebecca, the Greek god, himself the center and focal point of a large religion, is, by implication, shown to be farcically fallible, thereby indirectly serving the larger narrative agenda of validating Yahwist religion, and polemically asserting it is the one true religion.

In this essay I focus on the links between the two corresponding females, Rebecca and Hera, the authoritative older females who deceive their husbands in order to advance their own cause, and Rachel and Medea, the assertive younger wives who steal their fathers' sacred possession to aid their husbands' cause. Within the Old Testament as a whole, and Genesis in particular, Rebecca and Rachel both stand out from most women, as proud, assertive, even transgressive females, who act contrary to male authority. The dominant role Rebecca assumes, her utter deception of Isaac, and her larger guidance, in the form of commands, that she gives to Jacob, all seem unusual for an Old Testament woman, and make better sense if we place her character in context with the Greek goddess Hera. The similarly willful nature assigned to Rachel, again, not only seems out of place in the wife of a Genesis patriarch, but her association with magic, a forbidden act in the Bible, comes into clearer focus if she and her acts are placed in context with the tale of Medea, for whom such acts are paradigmatic. Within this study, by myth I mean *a sacred, traditional, narrative, that depicts the interrelations of mortals and gods, is especially concerned with defining what is moral or ethical behavior for a given culture, and passes on key information about that culture's traditions and institutions.*[9]

Hera, Zeus, and Heracles at Iliad 19.91-133, and Odyssey 11.601-26; Rebecca, Isaac, and Esau in Genesis 27

Iliad 19.95-133 recounts how Zeus, intending to foster and promote his special son, Heracles, is unwittingly manipulated by Hera into doing so for Eurystheus, also his descendant, whom she prefers over Heracles. Though the myths serve very different functions in their respective cultural contexts,[10] *Iliad* 19, in its larger arc and its particulars, corresponds very closely to Rebecca's manipulation of Isaac into blessing her favorite son, Jacob, when Isaac thinks he blesses his own favorite, Esau (Gen 27). There are two key differences that may have prevented recognition of how many correspondences the two myths exhibit otherwise. 1. The *Iliad*'s account is set right before Heracles and

Eurystheus are supposed to be born, whereas Jacob and Esau are fully grown men when Isaac would perform his blessing. 2. While Hera executes the deception entirely by herself, Agamemnon's story assigns a larger agency to the goddess *Atê*, "Recklessness," whom Zeus hurls from heaven at the tale's end (19.129-31), whereas in Genesis, Rebecca designs Isaac's deception but Jacob executes her designs.

1. An extraordinary father announces beforehand that he proclaims a special future for his chosen son.

A father on a grand scale, father of humanity, in Zeus' case, father of a nation, in Isaac's case, declares his intended plans for his special son (*Il.* 19.100; Gen 27:4). Zeus does so at a divine council, before all the Olympian gods, on the day Heracles will be born (19.103). Isaac does so in private, as he thinks, to Esau. In each case, the special father's wife also hears the proclamation.

2. Their chosen sons share a number of specific characteristics.

Both are the more heroic of those two descendants to whom the father's special designs might apply. Heracles is the pre-eminent archer of Greek bow, depicted in action with his bow in *Odyssey* 11.601-26. Esau is a hunter (Gen 25: 27-28; 27:5, 39-40), who uses the bow (Gen 27:3), who is so hairy that Jacob must wear animal skins to resemble him (Gen 25:25, 27:11-24; Heracles actually wears a lion skin (Apollodorus, *Library*, 2.65-6, 74-5), and is known for his appetite, as is Esau (Gen 25:29-34). Like Esau to Jacob, Heracles is the first born of twin brothers, born the night before Iphicles (Apollodorus, *The Library*, 2.61; cf. Gen 25:23-26). These defining characteristics, uncommon in Old Testament myth, establish Esau as a typological equivalent of Heracles.

3. The father makes his designs clear in a formal speech-act.

Before all the Olympian gods Zeus first declares his intentions, then, at Hera's insistence, swears a great oath to affirm them (19.101-105, 108). Genesis presents Isaac's designs as his formal blessing of his chosen son, obsessively referring to the blessing throughout the episode (Gen 27:4, 7, 10, 12, 19, 23, 25, 28-20, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 41, 45; 28:1).

3a. The father declares his chosen son will rule over others around him.

Zeus proclaims that his descendant, who will born on this day (19.104-5),

> will rule over all those that dwell nearby,
> (being) one of the race of man that are of my blood.

The terms are restated in his sworn oath (19.109-11). In his blessing Isaac declares (Gen 27:29),

> May peoples serve you
> and nations bow down to you.
> May you be lord over your brothers,
> and may your mother's sons bow down to you.

Both myths result in the father's chosen son becoming subordinate to a relative the wife favors.

4. Both wives, on hearing the father's declaration, quickly launch counter agendas, so their preferred candidate will satisfy the terms of his declaration.

Hera immediately challenges Zeus' announcement, declaring (19.107) he lies, and challenging him to swear an oath specifying the terms of his designs for his chosen son. Rebecca, having overheard Isaac's announcement, immediately tells Jacob of Isaac's plans (Gen 27:5-13), getting him to appear before Isaac in the guise of Esau.

4a. Both wives are explicitly depicted as acting deceitfully or deceptively.

The *Iliad* characterizes Hera's acts here (19.106) as "planning deceit" (cf. 19.112, 19.97). The *Iliad*'s account emphasizes that Zeus is completely unaware of her deception (19.112-13). Similarly, Isaac is not only unaware of Rebecca's larger deception, he is not even aware that she overhears his original statement to Esau (Gen 27:5). While Sara also eavesdrops on her patriarch husband (Gen 18:10-15), which may initially suggest there is nothing unusual about Rebecca doing so, the sequel reveals a significant difference. As a result of her eavesdropping on Abraham, Sara puts into play no new agenda or act, but accepts her husband's course. Rebecca, on the contrary, now initiates a sequence of events intended to bring about the exact opposite of what her husband wishes, just as Hera in *Iliad* 19. While Rebecca acts to prefer one son over another, Hera, though not Eurystheus' mother, suggests a maternal relationship to him. In her manipulations of the two births, to conform to the requirements of Zeus' oath (*Il.* 19.118-19), she resembles a midwife.

4b. Both wives immediately and utterly subvert the fathers' intended design for their chosen sons.

In the *Iliad* Hera immediately descends to Argos, accelerates Eurystheus' birth, so he is born prematurely, and delays Heracles' birth (19.118-19).

Mission accomplished, she returns to Olympos and throws Zeus' terms back in his face, that today a noble man has been born, a man of his line, who will rule over the Argives, but it is Eurystheus, son of Sthenelos, son of Perseus (19.122-24). Rebecca directs Jacob in considerable detail on how to deceive Isaac into thinking he is Esau, by wearing animal skins, and bringing a meal Rebecca herself will prepare that will trick his father into thinking it results from his hunting skills (Gen 27:7-27). When Jacob is hesitant to take part in the deception (27:12: "Suppose my father touches me; he will know that I am playing a trick on him and I shall bring a curse instead of a blessing"), Rebecca assumes full responsibility for the consequences, "Let any curse for you fall on me, my son" (27:13). Rebecca is more concerned for Jacob than for her own husband (27:10: "so that he may bless you before he dies"). Absolutely deceived, Isaac goes on to bestow on Jacob the blessing he intended to bestow on Esau (Gen 27:28-29).

5. The father, when he learns how he has been deceived, is deeply hurt, knowing his mistake cannot be undone.

When Hera makes her triumphant declaration to Zeus of how she has subverted his plan, shifting Heracles' entire life from the glorious one Zeus had in mind to one of servitude and suffering, Zeus is deeply distressed, "And a sharp pain struck him in his heart" (19.125). Genesis depicts the same reaction in Isaac, but in his face-to-face meeting with Esau, when the truth suddenly dawns on Isaac, "'Then Isaac, greatly agitated, said, 'Then who was it that hunted game and brought it to me . . . I blessed him, and the blessing will stand'" (27:33).[11]

5a. An additional factor, Atê for Zeus, and blindness in Isaac, enables the wives to execute their deception.

In this respect Genesis 27's presentation of Isaac as blind (27:1) seems clearly intended as allegorical or metaphorical: he is blind (cf. the blindness of Dhrtarashtra in the *Mahabharata*) to his deception until after the fact, and, perhaps more importantly, blind to Yahweh's larger design for Jacob/Israel. This would be a necessary euhemeristic adaptation of *Iliad* 19's depiction of Zeus as under the sway of the goddess *Atê*. In both myths, while the wives instigate and carry out key parts of the deception, they could not be successful without the corresponding additional factor that weakens the father's ability to discern what is actually happening to him. Isaac remains completely unaware of Rebecca's actual role, and assumes Jacob is responsible for the deception, "'Your brother came full of deceit, and took your blessing'" (27:35). If the Genesis tradition has replaced the gods Zeus and Hera with mortal protagonists, it must also find a non-theistic way to depict *Atê*'s sway over Zeus, and does so in Isaac's blindness, each factor rendering the respective fathers fallible.

5b. He is painfully aware that his favorite son will now lead a difficult life.

The *Iliad*'s account concludes with a brief encapsulation of Heracles' future, from Zeus' perspective (19.132-33),

> . . . and he would always groan whenever he beheld his dear son
> having an unseemly labor as his task under Eurystheus.

As the truth dawns on Isaac, and he begins to realize the horrible mistake he has made, he asks Esau, "'Then who was it that hunted game and brought it to me . . . I blessed him'" (27:33). Then, like *Iliad* 19, the passage glances ahead to Isaac's perspective on Esau's resultant subordination under Jacob, corresponding to Zeus' comment about Heracles toiling his labors under Eurystheus, "By your sword you will live and you will serve your brother" (Gen 27:40). "By your sword you will live" thematically corresponds to Heracles performing his twelve heroic labors, while "you will serve your brother" provides an analogue to Heracles having to do so under his relative's command. Each chosen son, in spite of his father's favor, and his own physical endowment, is made subservient to the mother/step-mother's favorite.

6. The chosen son bitterly complains at how he has been cheated.

Homeric epic, which does not include a connected account of Heracles' larger myth, but only occasional references to individual episodes as they offer parallels for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, depicts Heracles' bitter reaction in a separate context in the latter poem. When Odysseus descends to Hades and sees, among others, his former comrades at Troy, his visit concludes with his dialogue with Heracles. Zeus' son addresses him, lamenting (11.616) his "evil fate" (11.618), and "measureless misery" (11.620-1). By all of which Heracles designates his subordination under Eurystheus. He concludes his account of his difficult life emphasizing how he had to serve a lesser man (11.621-22),

> For I was bound to serve a man much
> the worse, who commanded difficult labors

Esau's brooding comments, concluding his meeting with Isaac, provide a close correspondence (Gen 27:34-41),

> When Esau heard this he lamented loudly and bitterly . . . 'He took away my right as the firstborn, and now he has taken away my blessing' . . . Esau harbored a grudge against Jacob because of the blessing which his father had given him.

If we are correct in seeing the story of Jacob stealing Esau's blessing from Isaac as Israelite appropriation and adaptation of the Greek account of Heracles' subordination under Eurystheus, we can emphasize an overarching explanation for why this would be so. The redactor(s) would see the Israelite adaptation of the tale as a euhemerizing *corrective* on a number of levels. In Zeus' all-too-easy deception, Israelite culture would receive confirmation of the superiority of its own god, in depicting the chief god of a non-Israelite religion as fallible, even to an absurd degree, a ridiculous figure, rather than a deserving object of worship. Whereas in Israelite tradition, a *mortal* such as Isaac exhibits such lamentable shortcomings, but Yahweh, the one true god, is beyond these kinds of human failings.

Hera and Rebecca: Argonautic Myth and Genesis 27:41-31:55

Blamed by both Esau and Isaac for the deception, the former now threatening to slay him (Gen 27:41-42), Jacob, at Rebecca's urging, undertakes a journey to the east, initially to avoid Esau, but also, at Rebecca's insistence, so he can marry a non-Hittite woman. Rebecca's role, in initiating and guiding both the earlier stages and the goal of the journey, again corresponds to Hera's role in Greek myth, this time as mentor goddess for Jason in his quest for the Golden Fleece. Hera oversees much of Jason's enterprise, thematically lending invaluable aid, epic's standard mentor for the hero.[12] She does so, on the one hand, because of their earlier encounter at the river, his helping her when disguised as an old woman, to which the goddess herself later refers (*Argonautica* 3.66-73), chronologically right before the Argonautic myth begins. Hera continues to intervene and guide Jason's voyage throughout the myth (*Argonautica* 2.865, 3.7-112, 3.210-12, 3.1134-45, 4.20-22. 4.242-44, 4.507-10, 4.577-85, 4.636-40).

Hera finds a parallel in Jacob's myth in his mother Rebecca. Throughout Jacob's saga, as Hera is for Jason, Rebecca is a commanding, governing presence, repeatedly issuing directives to him. We have already witnessed her role in this respect in her deception of Isaac. Genesis emphasizes an unusual power and authority in her voice, "Listen now to me, my son, and do what I tell you"(27:8); "Do as I say; go and fetch me the kids"(27:13).[13] In Homeric epic only a goddess would be characterized this way, as in the epithet αὐδήεσσα ("possessed of voice") used frequently of Circe and Calypso (*Odyssey* 10.136, 11.8, 12.150, 449).[14] In so doing Rebecca parallels Hera's repeated interventions on Jason's behalf. Genesis itself associates Rebecca's role with that of a god. When Isaac is startled by how quickly Jacob has brought the venison he desired, he asks, "How did you find it so quickly, my son?"' While the audience is well aware that Rebecca has provided the food, Jacob replies, '"Because the LORD your God put it in my way"'(Gen 27:20), assigning divine agency to what Rebecca has herself planned and accomplished.

Hera's interventions in books 3 and 4 of the *Argonautica* are especially concerned with bringing Jason and Medea together, to which Rebecca's role in directing Jacob to obtain Rachel as his wife closely corresponds. Rebecca does so by complaining of the possibility of his marrying a Hittite woman, "If Jacob marries a Hittite woman like those who live here, my life will not be worth living" (Gen 27:46).

Jacob and Jason both receive crucial direction from a dominant female who influences events on their behalf as they undertake a journey to the east. Both will return from their trip with a wife who has stolen her father's sacred possession.

Medea and Rachel: Argonautic Myth and Genesis 27:41-31:55

Though Jason and Jacob both go abroad for reasons distinct from obtaining a wife, their cause for being abroad soon becomes intertwined with finding wives. Their larger journeys suggest successful maturation, a rite of passage,[15] perhaps an acquisition of knowledge that enables the protagonist to become a king or patriarch. Both soon encounter a figure common in Greek myth, the malevolent father of the hero's future bride.[16] Jacob's Laban has more than a little in common with Jason's Aietes as devious fathers of the young women the protagonists will marry only after accomplishing a series of difficult tests. On learning of Jason's quest for the Fleece, Aietes considers having the Argonauts slain then and there (3.396-99), before deciding to impose a series of tests upon him. He is to yoke two brazen-footed, fire-breathing bulls, using them to plough and sew dragon's teeth, from which will spring a race of armored men which he must then slay. If he accomplishes these labors Aietes says he will give him the Fleece.

Jacob's visit soon involves him with performing various labors for Laban (Gen 29:15), whereby Jacob agrees to work seven years for Laban's beautiful younger daughter, Rachel (Gen 29:19). In Jacob's myth the labors are explicitly to win his wife/wives, whereas Jason's labors for Aietes, as is his whole quest originally, are to win the Fleece. However, Jason's accomplishing of the labors soon involves him with Medea.

1. The bride is symbolically won when the hero is victorious in a contest.

Jason famously must accomplish a series of difficult labors and "contests," ostensibly to win the Golden Fleece, but ultimately his performance wins Medea for him as his bride.

In one of his labors, Jason hurls a great stone among the sewn men (3.1365-67), leading to his defeat over all of them.[17] When Jacob first arrives in Haran he encounters shepherds waiting to water their flocks at a well. Normally, they wait until all the shepherds have arrived before jointly rolling away the stone that rests on top of the well. But, as Jacob sees Rachel

approach with her father's flocks, he rolls the stone away by himself.[18] Implicitly, Jacob bests or defeats the other shepherd in so doing, and symbolically wins Rachel as his bride. As Jacob easily rolls away a large stone that normally requires a group of shepherds, so Jason hurls a great stone which four men together could have only raised an inch. After rolling the great stone off, Jacob waters Laban's flock for Rachel (Gen 29:7-10). Kissing her, he tearfully tells her he is Rebecca's son, her father's kinsman, whereupon she runs home to tell Laban (Gen 29:11-12). This first meeting between Jacob and Rachel corresponds with the first meeting between Jason and Medea in the *Argonautica* (3.956-1147).

2. The bride-to-be knows how to use magic.

Medea has considerable magic powers. The *Argonautica* specifies that Jason could not perform Aietes' tasks without her help (3.1247 ff; 4.143-61, 4.364-65). Rachel also uses magic, though it is a smaller component of her character than of Medea's. Unable to bear children after marrying Jacob, when she learns that Leah's first son, Reuben, has found some mandrakes (Gen 30:14), Rachel asks if she may use them, presumably as an aphrodisiac (Speiser 231, Alter 2004: 160).[19]

2a. Her magic involves use of the mandrake root.

Central to Medea's magic is *cutting roots*. Apollonius' fullest depiction of her preparing to employ magic (3.845-66) features her use of the "Prometheion," the root of which is said to resemble "newly-cut flesh" (3.857). The description juxtaposes the two terms, *cutting* and *roots* (ῥίζης τεμνομένης: *Argonautica* 3.865).[20] Hunter notes the Prometheion plant's likely identity (188),[21]

> Greek myth knew of many plants which grew from blood . . . and scholars have sought a real plant lying behind Apollonius' description . . . The most likely candidate is mandrake, around which there was extensive folklore.

Both young wives are thus depicted with the same plant, aware of its magical properties, but putting it to different uses in their differing contexts. Euripides' Medea knows how to use drugs to produce children as she so advises Aegeus (*Medea* 717-18). Mandrake is otherwise mentioned in the Old Testament only in the Song of Songs (7:13).

As noted, Jason could not perform Aietes' tasks without Medea's help (3.1247 ff; 4.143-61, 4.364-65; cf. Euripides, *Medea* 478-82). Her magic is crucial to Jason's success throughout the labors. She hands him the drug the night before (3.1013-14), giving her advice on how to execute the labors (3.1026-62). Her drug, which he is to apply after having steeped it in water, makes him virtually invulnerable for one day, strengthens his might, and

strengthens his weapons (3.1042-50). While Jason accomplishes Aietes' labors the drug repeatedly protects him from the blasts of the fire-breathing bulls (3.1305, 3.1313-15, 1326-27). Later Medea lulls the dragon to sleep with her spells, sprinkling juniper branches in his eyes (4.87-88, 149-51), again magic using freshly cut plants.

Jacob's own use of magic to accomplish his labors is pronounced. When Rachel gives birth to Joseph (an implicit consequence of the mandrake), Jacob wishes to take his wives and children and leave, suggesting that he keep, as his wages, "every black lamb, and all the brindled and the spotted goats" (Gen 30:32). Agreeing to these terms Laban has his sons remove all livestock meeting the specifications. So Jacob takes rods of poplar, almond, and plane trees, and strips of bark, and has animals mate before them, giving birth "to young that were striped and spotted and brindled" (Gen 30:39). In using a form of magic employing freshly cut plants he parallels Medea in her craft.

3. The Father-in-Law reneges on the Terms of the Labors.

When Jason completes the several labors Aietes required, the king nonetheless refuses to give him the Golden Fleece, breaking the very terms he himself had proposed. Laban more than once violates the terms he proposes to Jacob, first in giving him not Rachel, but her sister Leah as his bride (Gen 29:20-26), and again over the matter of which livestock Jacob may claim as his wages (Gen 30:25-43).

4. The bride steals her father's sacred possession (Golden Fleece, household gods).

Cheated by Aietes, Medea and Jason steal the Fleece, her magic again key: doors open magically at her song (4.41-42); the moon herself refers to Medea's crafty spells (4.59); she will put the dragon to sleep (4.87-88), using newly cut sprays of juniper to sprinkle the dragon's eyes (4.156). Feeling betrayed by her father, Rachel steals his household gods (Gen 31:19-35), closely corresponding to Medea helping Jason make off with Aietes' Golden Fleece. Her motivation[22] for doing so is how Laban has treated her (Gen 31:14-16). It is Rachel's idea to steal Laban's household gods, Rachel who actually steals them, an aggressive act reminiscent of Medea.

Jacob's myth never demonstrates the function or purpose of the household gods, nor does the *Argonautica* ever do so of the Fleece. Parallels in other myths can help us understand their function. Suggs offers a useful starting point (40), "Possession of the household gods insured safety and prosperity and possibly the right of inheritance." Alter (2004: 169) notes Vergils's relevant parallel, when Aeneas, commanded by Hector's ghost, takes the Trojan Penates as he flees Troy's destruction (*Aeneid* 2.289-95, 320-21). Theano also closely parallels many aspects of the myth when she hands over the Palladium, the sacred statue of Athena to Odysseus and Diomedes.[23]

Also apropos is 1 Sam 19:13-16. Here David, placed under garrison by Saul, the guards are ordered to kill him in the morning, escapes when his wife Michal, Saul's daughter, stages a deception using their household gods. As David escapes through a window, Michal places their household gods on the bed, setting some woven goat hair above its head, covering it with a cloak. Alter (1999:120) argues the episode is in a dialogue with Rachel's theft of Laban's household gods,

> The household gods (*teraphim*) are what Rachel stole and hid from her father when Jacob fled from him. Like Rachel, who pleads her period and does not get up from the cushions under which the *teraphim* are hidden, Michal also invokes "illness" (verse 14) to put off the searchers. Both stories feature a daughter loyal to her husband and rebelling against a hostile father.[24]

The juxtaposition of David's household gods with a twist of goat's hair gives them a visual similarity to the Fleece. Like Medea, Michal deceives her father to enable her husband's escape. Like Aietes, Saul then sends bands of men after David. In stealing her father's gods, Rachel replicates the central role Medea plays in Jason's obtaining the Golden Fleece from her father.

5. The Daughters Flee in the Night with their Husbands, his entourage, and their fathers' sacred possession.

Medea and Rachel both subsequently sneak off with their husbands, the sacred implements, and the rest of their entourages. In the face of such malicious fathers the daughters have little choice than to act as they do. The dynamics of their flights, the pursuit by the livid fathers and his sons, are quite close. Each father is enraged over the taking of the sacred article (Golden Fleece, household gods) and his daughter's role and flight. Each father launches a lengthy pursuit in which his son(s) also take part. In the more heroic style typical of epic, Aietes formulates his response in an assembly (4.212-36), threatening the lives of those present if they fail to bring Medea back.[25] As Green notes (301), Aietes focuses his anger entirely on Medea, not the Fleece or Jason.

After producing abundant flocks through his magical means, Jacob finds himself out of favor with Laban and his sons (Gen 31:1-2). Meeting with Rachel and Leah, Jacob informs them of his intent to return to Canaan, in accordance with a dream he had in which God told him to do so (Gen 31:4-13). The sisters agree to leave, complaining of Laban's treatment, "Does he not look on us as strangers, now that he has sold us and used the money paid for us?" (Gen 31:15). Only here are the household gods first mentioned (Gen 31:19), which Rachel steals after already deciding to flee with Jacob. In Jacob's myth, then, the theft of the household gods is subordinated under his decision

to leave, whereas in the *Argonautica* the theft of the Fleece requires the immediate flight. In both instances stealth is key, necessary due to the malevolence of the father-in-law.[26]

6. The Daughter profanes her Father's sacred possession.

In perhaps the most unusual of all the correspondences, both daughters, while in flight, profane their fathers' sacred possession by performing a bodily function on top of it (or claiming to do so). In the Fleece's only role in the *Argonautica* Jason and Medea make love on top of it, in the hurried consummation of their wedding in Drepane (4.1141-43). Rachel offers an intriguing parallel. When her father overtakes them (discussed below), she conceals the household gods by sitting on top of them (stashed in her camel's saddle), to evade Laban's search. When he demands to search their belongings, she claims that she cannot rise to be searched, because she is having her period (Gen 31:35). I argue (though I have no conclusive evidence for support) that the Genesis account is aware of how Medea and Jason employed the Golden Fleece, and intends a parody of the Argonautic version of the motif.

7. The Father-in-Law's Band Overtakes Them and Negotiates a Settlement

Apsyrtos, Aietes' son, leading a contingent of Colchians, and Laban and his sons, both pursue and overtake the two protagonists, with their wives, entourages, Aietes' Golden Fleece and Laban's household gods. Greatly outnumbered, the Argonauts make a covenant with the Colchians, to keep the Fleece, but that Medea is to be held until her status can be resolved (4.340-49).

Though Laban takes the lead in the pursuit, his sons, earlier depicted expressing an aggressive, even threatening attitude toward Jacob (Gen 31:1), accompany him.[27] In Apollonius, though it is Aietes' son, and others, who pursue, in earlier accounts Aietes himself pursued the Argonauts into Greece (Herodotus 1.2.2-3). In a speech which could easily be delivered by Apsyrtos on Aietes' behalf, if Fleece is substituted for household gods, Laban accuses Jacob of having deceived him, kidnapping his daughters, fleeing in secret, and stealing his household gods (Gen 31:26-30).

In both myths subsequent negotiations result in Jason and Jacob keeping the sacred article *and* the daughters, though the nature of the negotiations differs considerably. Since Jason satisfied Aietes' own terms for obtaining the Fleece, Apsyrtos, negotiating on Aietes' behalf, determines that he may keep it (4.338-49). More incensed by Medea's role (4.228-35), Aietes has Apsyrtos attempt to negotiate her return. Laban likewise criticizes Jacob at greater length for taking his daughters than for stealing his household gods, which the narrative entirely attributes to Rachel (Gen 31:19).

Despite differences in emphasis and tone (the *Argonautica* conforms to an epic modality), the myths of Jason, Medea, and Aietes, and Jacob, Rachel and Laban clearly utilize the same basic components. Both Greek and Israelite culture employ their corresponding narratives to depict the coming of age of a leader, his successful accomplishment of difficult labors, winning a wife who is the daughter of a foreign man of substance or property, and winning possession of a significant item which signifies the gods' favor. By taking the distinctive article away from his father-in-law, he acquires, in some sense, the latter's former prestige, power, or position. Greek myth depicts the coming of age with a hero as protagonist, while Israelite myth, as throughout Genesis, does so with a patriarch.

A number of elements, however, seem more typical of Greek myth than of the Old Testament, strengthening the likelihood that some form of Argonautic myth is earlier. There is greater *eros* between Jacob and Rachel than other Genesis patriarchs and their wives. Jacob impulsively kisses Rachel on first seeing her. It is near impossible to imagine Isaac's servant doing so with Rebecca, or Moses with Zipporah.

Laban's deviousness aligns him not only with Aietes, but with several other fathers in Greek myth who violate agreements with visiting heroes. From Laomedon, cheating Heracles out of promised horses (close to Laban's attempted shortchanging of Jacob's flocks), to Augeias, Minos, Oinomaus, and King Antiochus in *Apollonius, King of Tyre,* this is a common character type in Greek myth.

Rebecca corresponds to Hera in Argonautic myth, and in the *Iliad*'s account (19.96-133) of how she deceives Zeus to advance Eurystheus over Heracles. This sustained correspondence, paralleling Hera's roles from *two* separate myths, suggests Israelite culture euhemerized the Greek goddess in these acts by the key Genesis matriarch. Hera is already figured as Jason's helper in *Odyssey* (12.72).

Differences between Israelite and Greek versions of this myth suggest they are intentional. Genesis transforms the myth to reflect its Israelite preferences. Argonautic myth employs Greek myth's favorite protagonist, the hero; Genesis has a pastoralist patriarch, following. Genesis modifies Argonautic myth's typically heroic acts to fit Genesis pastoralists. Jason sails the Aegean and Black Seas; Jacob travels by land, on foot. Jason harvests a crop of warrior men from dragon teeth; Jacob harvests spotted goats. Medea steals Aietes' Golden Fleece, Rachel steals Laban's *teraphim*. Medea has sex on top of the Golden Fleece; Rachel sits on the *teraphim*, claiming she has her period.

Israelite adaptation also serves to criticize Greek culture, especially in Jacob's defeat of Esau. Esau is figured as heroic, a hunter. Like Heracles, he uses the bow, so hairy that Jacob wears animal skins to pass for him. Jacob's defeat of Esau, the more heroic figure, reflects a broader cultural preference visible throughout Genesis, and in David's easy defeat of Philistine Goliath. Can we assume that some members of the ancient audience would have seen Esau as a Heracles figure? If so, Jacob's victory is implied criticism of Greek

values, and defeat, if by proxy, of its mythic protagonist, and founder of its culture. Rebecca's repeated correspondence with Hera, the same figure plotting to victimize Heracles/Esau in multiple myths, supports this interpretation. Carr's study of Genesis argues that Jacob's myth "show[s] signs of once having existed independently" (257), having undergone extensive adaptation to fit its present location in Genesis. If Carr is correct, an earlier independence of Jacob's myth strengthens the possibility that it has origins outside of Israelite culture. Some signs of the myth's original independence remain in Laban's household gods, in their polytheism.

Argonautic myth itself is clearly very ancient. While Homeric allusions to individual episodes abound, some question how complete pre-Homeric versions could have been, since the Homeric epic does not name Medea. Others, however, assume that the *Odyssey* forms Circe, Nausikaa, and Antiphates' daughter, by adapting a Medea figure. We are left, I suggest, with the distinct possibility that Genesis constructs its two most proud matriarchs on the foundations of the great goddess Hera, and the legendary witch Medea.

Notes

[1] Hermann Gunkel, 1895, *Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton*. trans. K. William Whitney Jr., Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006.

[2] *The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel*, San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1990; *The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel's Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[3] Robert Alter, *The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.

[4] Bruce Louden, *The Odyssey and the Near East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[5] Discussion in Bruce Louden, *The Iliad: Structure, Myth, and Meaning*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 159-60

[6] Azzan Yadin, "Goliath's armor and Israelite collective memory." *Vetus Testamentum* 54/3 (2004): 373-95.

[7] Louden, *The Odyssey and the Near East*, 13, 14, 324.

[8] Cf. Bruce Louden, "Euripides' *Alcestis* and John's Lazarus (John 11:1-44, 12:1-8)", *Interdisciplinary Humanities* 28.1 (2011): 21-31.

[9] Cf. Louden, *The Iliad: Structure, Myth, and Meaning*, 9; *The Odyssey and the Near East*, 7; and Kirk 1974, 27.

[10] Within the *Iliad*, Hera's manipulation of Zeus is subordinated under Agamemnon's claim that his own mistake in judgment over Achilles is to be expected , if even Zeus can err. In Genesis the same mythic type plays a more central role, giving an etiology for why Jacob has Yahweh's favor, essential if he is to become the father of the twelve tribes.

[11] Cf. Alter's rendering (2004), "And Isaac was seized with a very great trembling."

[12] For discussion of gods as mentors to a hero see Bruce Louden, 2005, "The Gods in Epic" (= pp. 90-104 in *A Companion to Ancient Epic*, John Miles Foley, ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 95-96),

[13] Cf. Alter's translation (2004) of 27:13, "Just listen to my voice and go."

[14] James H. Dee, *Epitheta Deorum apud Homerum: The Epithetic Phrases for the Homeric Gods*, Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 2001.

[15] Cf. R. L. Hunter, *Apollonius of Rhodes: Argonautica, Book III*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 15: "Jason's story is one of a number of Greek myths concerning young heroes who undergo terrible ordeals before claiming their rightful place in adult society; generational passage is secured by the successful accomplishment of difficult tasks"; 16, "The central challenges of the expedition are presented in ways which make their initiatory aspects clear . . . his preparations for the contest (3.1256-64) recall the *pyrrhiche*, the armed dance particularly associated with young men in their training for war"; 83, "the presentation of the Argonauts as a group of young men undergoing a kind of initiation."

[16] Other analogous figures include Oinomaus, as Hunter (58) notes, "Like Aietes, Oinomaus . . . his evil plans are thwarted by his daughter's love for a stranger." Cf. Minos, though Theseus and Ariadne do not marry, and King Antiochus in *Apollonius, King of Tyre*.

[17] Medea originally advises him to hurl a stone (3.1057); presumably Apollonius changes this to *solos* to enable him to allude to the athletic games in *Iliad* 23.

[18] Cf. Alter's comment on the episode's heroic or epic modality (2004: 153), "The 'Homeric' feat of strength in rolling away the huge stone single-handedly."

[19] E. A. Speiser, *The Anchor Bible: Genesis, Introduction, Translation, and Notes*. New York: Doubleday, 1962.

[20] Cf. νεοτμήτῳ . . . ῥίζα: 3.857; δυσπαλέας ῥίζας: 4.52; ἀρκεύθοιο νέον τετμηότι θαλλῷ 4.156, and Sophocles' play, the *Rhizotomoi*, *The Root Cutters*, which according to Gantz (366), focused on Medea tricking Pelias' daughters into slaying him. A surviving fragment again juxtaposes the two terms, κίσται ῥιζῶν κρύπτουσι τομάς, "boxes conceal the cuttings of the roots" (Lloyd-Jones frag. 534). Gantz, Timothy. *Early Greek Myth*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

[21] Peter Green, 2007, *The Argonautika: Apollonius Rhodios. Translated, with an Introduction, Commentary, and Glossary. Expanded Edition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 274, adduces additional authors assuming mandrake is meant, though himself argues no actual plant is meant, and sees a Homeric precedent in *moly*.

[22] See David M. Carr, *Reading the Fractures of Genesis*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 262, on some of the narrative motives for the theft.

[23] Discussion in Louden, *The Odyssey and the Near East*, 111-13.

[24] Robert Alter, *The David Story: A Translation with Commentary of 1 and 2 Samuel*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999.

[25] Cf. Agenor, father of Kadmos, grandfather of Phineus, ordering his sons not to return home without Europa (Apollodorus, The *Library*, 3.1).

[26] Cf. Alter, 2004, 169, in Jacob's case, "In heading for Canaan with his wives, children, and flocks, Jacob is actually taking what is rightly his . . . but he has good reason to fear that the grasping Laban will renege on their agreement, and so he feels compelled to flee in stealth."

[27] Cf. Alter's comment on Laban's sons (2004: 166), "Here they are used to dramatize in a single quick stroke the atmosphere of suspicion and jealousy in Laban's household: they make the extravagant claim that the visibly prospering Jacob 'has taken everything of our father's,' thus leaving them nothing. The anonymous sons would presumably be members of the pursuit party Laban forms to go after the fleeing Jacob."

Interview with cover artist Juan Obando

Shawn R. Tucker
Elon University

Juan Obando started working in his native Bogotá in 2003, where he received a BA in Industrial Design with a minor in Architecture and Urbanism from Universidad de los Andes. In 2005 he started the ongoing BZC Media Corporation Project *(an international art unit based in Bogotá, with cells in Venezuela, the U.S., and The Netherlands)* and has subsequently been exhibiting throughout the U.S., Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Colombia and Venezuela. His work has been selected twice for Colombia's "Salon Nacional de Artistas" (2008, 2010) and reviewed by different international publications, including the Madrid-based journal Artecontexto and the South African magazine Itch. In 2011, his work was included in the Narco-Nations exhibitions at Duke University. He recently developed an editorial piracy project as part of his residency at Casa Tres Patios, in Medellín, Colombia, and was recently awarded one of the prestigious 2012 Rhizome Commissions for his MUSEUM MIXTAPE (Dirty South Edition) project.[1]

SRT: Where did you start with art?

JO: I was really into music when I was an adolescent, and especially punk rock. It wasn't just the music that attracted me but the entire culture around music, including the record covers, the posters, and the clothing. I started playing music with my friends, and when we needed posters or covers or flyers, I always put those things together. When I was ready to go to college, I had never really thought of studying art as a major. I had read about architecture and design theory in high school, so when I went off to college I majored in industrial design with a minor in architecture. Since I ended up getting a double major, my undergraduate degree took me seven years. By the time I was done, I was really fed up with commercial architecture and with the

commercial aspects of design. What really turned me off about this was that there was no critical component. If you ever introduced anything critical, they would immediately shut you down. At about the same time, in 2003, I worked on the Internet as well as producing podcasts. Podcasts were really new in Colombia at the time, and I created a character similar to Stephen Colbert. He had a professorial air, and he was called Professor Basuco. It was something that I did with my friends, and it was a way for us to mock Colombian culture by using this pretentious and self-important persona. This was important to me because the success of Professor Basuco led to the emergence of an art collective. This put me in contact with a lot of artists with very different ideas and approaches. They appreciated what I was doing as art and helped me to see it as art.

SRT: So was this what inspired you to get an MFA?

JO: Yes. The collective helped me see the art elements in what I was doing but I wanted to learn more about that. So I decided to go to school in the United States to learn more about art and contemporary art practices. I went to Purdue University, because I knew another Colombian artist who was studying there, and he put me in contact with some of the professors. I also had the chance to teach while I was going to school.

SRT: So tell me about some of your most recent work.

JO: Right now and over the summer I'm working on a piece called Museum Mixtape. It is a Rhizome 2012 Commission. What it is is an album, a series of videos, and a website created with local rappers from the southeastern United States performing freestyle rhymes in different museums. I'm doing this piece because what I believe is happening in art right now is that creative people in the younger generation are in conflict with art museums and institutions. In a certain way, this could be understood as a lack of humility, in the sense that these artists don't just accept what is given to them. It is not just that they don't want to follow past approaches, but that they see what they do as completely disconnected from places like museums. In the past, our institutions could set the tone and the parameters for the discussion. Now those institutions have to pay attention to what is happening outside and in places like on the Internet and other non-institutional art making venues.

SRT: Do you see an emerging dialogue between institutions and outside artists and creative people?

JO: Right now, not yet. I still think that it is pretty awkward and uncomfortable for everyone involved. We have examples where people like Lil B (the contemporary rapper) recently performed at the New Museum of Contemporary Art and also gave a talk at New York University. But in general

I think that things like this are not happening. Museums are still doing things the way that they've done them for a long time. For example, if you go to the North Carolina Museum of Art, as you get close to the museum you see a lot of signs about community engagement. But what you find once you get into the museum is very few people from the wider community. Outside the museum it might say that everybody's welcome, but once you get in you realize that you still need a certain level of education and come from a certain perspective in order to digest and dissect what is being showcased there. It's really not for everyone.

SRT: So is that where your work comes in?

JO: Exactly. The hip-hop community is huge in the South. When I first moved to North Carolina, one of the most exciting things was attending hip-hop shows in Greensboro and other places. In fact, the kids there reminded me of when I was young and into punk rock. The art that I saw there had that same aesthetic, with clashing colors and awful fonts and poor reproduction instead of the slick, commercial stuff that one sees all around. The excitement of these places is great. And then you have watercolor day at the museum: that is not going to bring people from the wider community to the museum. So then, when people say that you should tell the people in Congress to support the National Endowment for the Arts, my question is why. Why should people from the community support art that is disconnected from them? In other words, if art is a lot of rich people standing around and drinking wine while the outside community is going to hip-hop shows and kids are on the Internet making images and sharing them around, why would the outside community support art?

SRT: Does that mean that there is something humbling about your art?

JO: The museum is still such a powerful figure in the local culture, and I want to call into question some of that power. When I have approached some of the rappers who are part of my project and when I told them that we were going to videotape them at the museum, they say things like "oh my God, it's going to be in the museum?" Once I picked up a rapper to go videotape at the museum, and he was all dressed up.

SRT: Like he was going to church?

JO: Yeah, exactly. That's how powerful those spaces are. I wanted him to just come as he was, to dress the same way he does every day or to dress as if he were going to a show. He was a local rapper from the area, and he lived within a mile of the museum, but he'd never been inside. And he didn't care.

SRT: Do you see your work as playing between those different worlds, or as leaning towards one over the other?

JO: I think that I work more inside the institution. My work is being supported by Rhizome. Also, the rappers aren't nearly as excited when they're with me videotaping in the museum during the daytime than they are when they're with the girls and the audience and the music at night at their shows. They like doing it because it's a way to promote their work, and self-promotion is a really important part of what they do. In fact, this part is really amazing. When I started contacting rappers, for example, I would call up some obscure, local rapper, who might work as a waiter in the daytime, and try to set up a time to talk about my work and what I wanted him to do, and he would say, "Oh, you need to call my manager." Even young, new rappers have a manager. That is part of the whole culture around hip-hop. The manager might just be a friend who takes care of his e-mail, but you have to work through the manager. That is just part of the system. It's humbling for me because I have to respect their craft, including the craft of the social circuit that they work within.

SRT: Do you find it frustrating to work within those parameters?

JO: At first I did find it frustrating, but now I understand those parameters as part of their craft. In fact, I really see a big part of what I do as working within the parameters of both the hip-hop artists and institutions. Working with the museums is as difficult as working with the rappers. With both of them there's a lot of e-mail that goes back and forth, and both are very protective about the amount of information that's going out and how it impacts their image. Even though I have the support of Rhizome, that also means that those institutions want to see what I'm doing and what it is going to say about them. When I tell them that it's a video that can be shown all over the country with a rapper that criticizes them, then they really want to know what it's going to say. They're very cordial and very polite, but it's very important for them to protect their image. In fact, the social navigation is what I see as my craft.

SRT: Is that social navigation then in some ways your medium?

JO: Absolutely. I don't focus on drawing or painting, and I know how to make videos, but the most important thing for me is the devising of these social situations and negotiating with these different parties. In the end, all of this results in a situation that wouldn't happen otherwise, like a rapper going into the museum and starting a freestyle critique of their collection. The final product brings together these different powers, the rappers, their music, and their culture brought together with the institution of the museum by me, as an artist, trying to make something that I envision. The museum and the rappers become material that I use to create the work of art.

SRT: This idea of art as social navigation and bringing different perspectives together seems to be part of some of your previous work as well.

JO: Yes, exactly. Another way I do this is by doing what I call human interventions in a context where it is not welcome. When we film in the museum, for example, our presence is still disruptive. The museum will have a curator or a director of education standing by and watching. That person is usually uncomfortable and not particularly glad that we are there. I like that about it. I think that the museum is too powerful to create a dialogue, because the alternative perspectives are never as powerful as those institutions. Still, what's going on isn't really comfortable for anybody. The rapper is not comfortable in the museum, and the guide or the director who standing there isn't comfortable either.

I've done something like this before, but with me as the performer. In 2009 I did a piece where I went to a parade that would celebrate Colombian pride in New York City. For me the parade had a really, really dark undertone. The parade was part of a huge whitewashing or public relations campaign by the Colombian government. At the time, the Colombian government was actively supporting right-wing paramilitary groups in its fight with rebels. But instead of addressing the real problems of social injustice in Colombia, the government set up a huge campaign called "Colombia is Passion." This was an English language campaign completely tailored to change the image of Colombia in the world without changing the real conditions. The campaign depicted Colombia as an exotic place where all the women are beautiful, everybody's happy and drunk, partying and dancing. The government invested billions of dollars in this campaign. They hired a designer to create a logo that shows a heart in flames. The entire campaign was sadly ironic, because it talked about how happy Colombians are, and coming from Colombia you know the genuinely dark reality of Colombian violence.

SRT: So what did you do?

JO: There was a carnival coming to New York City as part of the "Colombia is Passion" campaign, and everybody was wearing the colors and the logo of the campaign. At the time I was studying art and culture under the Third Reich. Let me just say that I would be the first to criticize how easy it is to compare things to the Nazis, but I found an uncanny resemblance with how the Colombian campaign would be something that Joseph Goebbels would be proud of. The whole parade was a show of nationalism with Colombian branding with the message that Colombians are special, that God has given us our land, that we are always dancing to tropical music, and that our land and people are blessed by God. It was all quite scary; the whole thing was so over-the-top. I have never seen people in Colombia like that, and there was a sort of over-tropicalization about the whole thing.

So I thought to myself that if this is too much, how can I turn it up a notch? So I disguise myself as the Colombian Tropical Nazi, and I started to play with Nazi iconography, creating these mash ups of logos and colors from the Colombian campaign with those from Nazi Germany. What emerged was a really interesting fusion that initially invited people to agree with the imagery. I went to the parade and started to participate as the Colombian Nazi, I had a sombrero and I had my Colombian Nazi armband, and pamphlets about how Colombia would be the next great world power. The pamphlets praised how the world was going to be mastered by Colombians. For me it was all really funny. It created a really uncomfortable situation for everyone involved, and I'm really interested in creating those sorts of uncomfortable situations.

I would add that I feel like my work has matured in that I don't need to be so confrontational, but I still get excited about work that creates tension for everyone involved. In this respect I think that the work for the Rhizome commission creates that interesting and useful tension. I like, for example the tension that comes through in the e-mails or that is evident when the rapper shows up at the art museum and the museum director tries to be cordial. It is evident, in the situation, that the rapper really doesn't care about the museum or the director, and there is clearly a conflict. So I see this art as an intervention, as an intrusion into different places, and I get excited about the aesthetic possibilities and results of those intrusions.

[1] http://www.elon.edu/directories/profile/?user=jobando@elon.edu

Notes on Contributors

Sherrie Barr, currently Associate Professor and Director of Dance at Michigan State University, received her MFA from University of Wisconsin-Madison and is a Certified Laban Movement Analyst. She has been on the faculty in dance programs at various universities, including University of Oregon and Potsdam State College of New York. In 1999, she was the recipient of a Fulbright Lecturing award at The Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal. In 2011, she received Michigan State's "All-University Excellence in Diversity Award" in the category of individual: emerging progress. Her scholarship, focusing on the juncture of pedagogy and contemporary choreography, has been presented at numerous national conferences and international conferences. Publications have appeared in various scholarly journals, including *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, *Journal of Dance Education* and *Research in Dance Education*. Her research continues to be a vital spark for choreographic and writing projects, and most importantly, her teaching.

Brett A. Berliner is an Associate Professor of History at Morgan State University, an HBCU in Baltimore, Maryland. He teaches lower-division survey courses on World History and upper-division courses on Modern European History. At the Graduate level, he teaches courses on race and racism in Europe. He is a cultural historian who has written a couple of articles and one monograph on racism and exoticism in interwar France. He has also published articles on the post-World War I (re)introduction of American baseball in Paris. He is now researching Franco-American amity in the interwar years.

Megan Dailey graduated from Michigan State University with a BA in Communication and a minor in Dance. Through her diverse coursework, she was inspired to discover the connection between her two programs of study. Megan looks forward to continuing her involvement with dance in the community. She is passionate about her commitment to making positive,

impactful change through movement. She is currently living in South Carolina and working as a recruiter for a local staffing agency.

Patricia S. Gordon recently received her BS from Michigan State University with a major in Applied Engineering Sciences and a minor in Dance. She is intrigued by the knowledge that resides within movement and the connections that exist between science and art. During her undergraduate tenure, she participated in community outreach and research projects supported by the College of Arts and Letters to explore coaching practices, engaged learning environments, and the creative process. As she begins her career in operations engineering, she remains involved in the arts. She hopes to continue engaging with and developing from all that she learned through her two distinct yet connected university programs of study.

Bruce Louden received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. His specialty is Homeric epic, on which he has published three books: *The Odyssey: Structure, Narration, and Meaning* (1999, Johns Hopkins UP), *The Iliad: Structure Myth, and Meaning* (2006, also John Hopkins UP), and *Homer's Odyssey and the Near East* (2011, Cambridge University Press). He also has published on topics including Indo-European myth and poetics, the Bible, the Rig Veda, Greek tragedy, Greek lyric, Roman Comedy, the *Aeneid*, *Beowulf*, Shakespeare, and Milton, in journals such as *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, *Classical Antiquity*, and *The Journal of Indo-European Studies*. He currently is at work on two books, one on intersections between Greek myth and the Bible, and another on Shakespeare's participation in the Renaissance's reception of Greek literature. Dr. Louden has received research fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington D.C. He teaches courses on Latin and Greek languages and literatures, the Bible, Renaissance drama, classical Indian literature, and ancient philosophy. He is currently Interim Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas El Paso.

Rhonda L. McDaniel holds the position of Associate Professor and Graduate Advisor in the Department of English at Middle Tennessee State University. She earned her Ph.D. from Western Michigan University in 2003 with a specialization in Old and Middle English Languages and Literature. While teaching courses in medieval English literature at both undergraduate and graduate levels, McDaniel pursues research in the representation of gender in Old English translations of Latin saints' Lives and also in the function of memory in the shaping of virtuous character in Old and Middle English works. She was selected to participate in an NEH Summer Seminar led by Richard Newhauser at the University of Cambridge, UK, in 2004 to study the development and conceptions of the Seven Deadly Sins during the Middle Ages and has previously published on the topic of Pride.

Elan Justice Pavlinich is founder of the online resource *Contemporary Old English*, which provides a modern aesthetic to foster the learning of a medieval language. He is teaching at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, before pursuing research interests in Anglo-Saxon theories of cognition at University of South Florida, Tampa.

Brett Scharffs is Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University and Associate Director of the International Center for Law and Religion Studies. His teaching and scholarly interests include comparative law and religion and philosophy of law. He is a graduate of Georgetown University, where he received a B.S.B.A. in international business and an M.A. in philosophy. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he earned a B.Phil in philosophy. He received his J.D. from Yale Law School, where he was Senior Editor of the Yale Law Journal. Professor Scharffs was a law clerk on the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, and worked as a legal assistant at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague. Before teaching at BYU, he worked as an attorney for the New York law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell. He has previously taught at Yale University and the George Washington University Law School. In his fifteen year academic career, Professor Scharffs has written more than 75 articles and book chapters, and has made over 200 scholarly presentations in 25 countries. His casebook, LAW AND RELIGION: U.S., INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, co-written with his colleague, W. Cole Durham, Jr., published by Aspen and WoltersKluwer in 2010 will enter its second edition in 2013. He regularly teaches comparative law and religion at Central European University in Budapest, and has helped organize Certificate Training Programs on Religion and the Rule of Law at Peking University and Vietnam National University.

Kaity Sinke is a senior undergraduate student at Michigan State University, studying psychology and dance. She is devoted to the Dance Program and is an integral member of Orchesis, MSU Dance. She has been on the executive board for three years, currently holding the position of president. Kaity places great emphasis on community outreach projects and believes much can be learned from such in-service learning, through theoretical research and the creative process. Currently, her research focuses on facilitating creative movement workshops with diverse populations and their impact on her own choreographic endeavors. Her career plans are to obtain a graduate degree in Dance/Movement Therapy from Columbia College Chicago.

Jessica L. Tracy is an associate professor of psychology at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, where she is also a Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research Scholar and a Canadian Institute for Health Research New Investigator. She completed her undergraduate degree at

Amherst College in 1996, and her Ph.D. at the University of California, Davis, in 2005. Her research focuses on emotions and emotion expressions, and, in particular, on the self-conscious emotions of pride, shame, and guilt. She was lead Editor of *The Self-Conscious Emotions,* a comprehensive volume of theory and research published in 2007 by Guilford Press, and she is currently an Associate Editor at the journal *Emotion*. Tracy has published over 60 journal articles, book chapters, and theoretical reviews, and regularly publishes in the leading psychology (e.g., *Psychological Science, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*) and cross-disciplinary (e.g., *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, PLoS-ONE*) journals. In 2005 she won the James McKeen Cattell Dissertation Award from the New York Academy of Sciences; in 2010, the International Society for Self and Identity Early Career Award; and in 2011, a University of British Columbia Killam Research Prize. Her research has been covered by hundreds of media outlets, including ABC's "Good Morning America", NPR's "All Things Considered", *The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe, The Economist, The New Scientist,* and *Scientific American*.

Elizabeth Urban is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Brandeis University. She focuses particularly on the social, political, and religious history of early Islam, including such topics as slavery, conversion, family structures, and expressions of political identity. Her teaching and research are driven by a great passion for understanding humanity and human societies, and she believes deeply in the importance of interdisciplinary dialogue within and beyond the humanities. She hopes to guide her students and readers to consider how studying Islamic history teaches us about our collective identity as human beings and about the tools all humans use to construct their realities.

Aaron C. Weidman is an M.A. student in social-personality psychology at the University of British Columbia. He primarily studies the motivational properties of emotions, such as pride, as well as the relation between personality traits, such as conscientiousness, and achievement. He has published articles in peer-reviewed psychology journals and has presented posters at multiple national psychology conferences. He is supported by a University of British Columbia fellowship as well as research grants from the UBC Faculty of Arts. He completed a B.A. at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, in 2007.

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