Lone Wolf Radicalization in a Post-ISIL World

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Introduction

Everyday there are numerous news headlines depicting atrocities performed by the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) on people around the western world. In particular, Islamic lone wolf terrorism has recently become a more serious threat with the increase of these attacks in the United States are becoming more evident. In June 2016, Omar Mateen entered a night club in Orlando, Florida and killed over 40 people and injured over 50 others. More recently in September 2016 many bombs were found, with some detonating, in New York and New Jersey. These bombs did not result in any deaths, but did cause 30 injuries. Ahmad Khan Rahami has been identified as the suspect and like Mateen is believed to be an Islamic lone wolf terrorist and not part of a terrorist cell. Both Mateen and Rahami were motivated by radical Islamic ideology from ISIL and al-Qaeda.

Examining the radicalization process will help give a complete view of these terrorists. Recent terrorist attacks have brought more attention and concern for this type of threat. Lone wolf terrorists are typically harder to detect than other forms of terrorism because of the lack of involvement of co-conspirators. Islamic lone wolf terrorists have been through a radicalization process with the act of terrorism being the final step in said radicalization process. The New York Police Department was one of the first organizations to develop a process to examine the radicalization path for Islamic terrorists. At the time the NYPD focused on al-Qaeda and its efforts in radicalizing individuals and groups of people. Al-Qaeda was also successful in using the internet to further their recruitment efforts. In 2007, when the NYPD report was written al-Qaeda
was a large threat and the most well known, effective Islamic terrorist group in the world. Therefore, the focus on al-Qaeda by the NYPD report is understood.

Yet, the rise of ISIL and their sophisticated recruitment methods might have changed the validity of the NYPD radicalization report and many others. The limited research and commentary on the impact of ISIL leans towards the assessment that the lone wolf terrorist threat will continue to persist, if not worsen, due to the organization’s widespread campaigning on social media and the internet. Therefore, this paper will examine the following question: to what extent the NYPD terrorism model depicts the radicalization processes of Islamic lone wolf terrorism in a post ISIL world. After examining the case studies cited in this paper against the NYPD terrorism model, the radicalization process is still useful in a post ISIL landscape. The case studies might not completely match each step in the radicalization process, yet the model is still useful.

**Literature Review**

*Radicalization*

In this paper Islamic lone wolf terrorism will be defined as an individual, or a small number of people, such as a couple, who commit acts of terrorism; they can be influenced or inspired by a radical Islamic group, but cannot have any contact with them or material support. The critical distinction between a domestic lone wolf terrorist compared to a traditional domestic terrorist is that the lone wolf terrorist’s actions are motivated by a foreign terrorist organization and/or its ideology, even if he or she is not directly or officially associated with the group.
Individuals can be radicalized in a variety of methods and are susceptible to be radicalized for a variety of reasons. After the terrorist attack in New York City on September 11th, 2001, groups like al-Qaeda gained recognition and used that newfound notoriety to recruit and radicalize individuals. Rather than being recruited into al-Qaeda, many of its foreign members actively sought out the group; or affiliated groups. To these individuals al-Qaeda is seen as more than an organization, it’s an ideology and a way to defend Islam through jihad. These recruits also are usually looking for a way to define themselves and al-Qaeda has been able to turn this inner destination into one of violence (Venhaus 2010). The attack on September 11th, 2001 helped al Qaeda radicalize men in the Middle East, Northern African, and even some Western individuals. However after 10 years of fighting, the war on terror, and the death of Osama bin Laden the recruitment by al Qaeda has slowed significantly (Watts 2012).

A lone wolf terrorist is radicalized, without joining a group or being affiliated with any group, yet still inspired by an extreme warping of an ideological viewpoint. Whether the individual is an Islamic extremist or a left wing antigovernment terrorist, the same type of distorted thoughts stem from a deep psycho-social affliction in that person. The rise of terrorism and the ability to see any viewpoints on social media and the World Wide Web allows for the attachment to those views by anybody, anywhere. A more thorough understanding of lone wolf terrorism is needed to defend against this threat (Scott 2016). Therefore, the rise of ISIL and their unique approach to recruiting members has been able to influence people from around the world, including the United States. Their ability to use social media and the internet as a recruitment tool has led to the attraction of thousands of recruits and helped make Syria and Iraq the destination
for this generations Islamic extremists. There have been 17 individuals in the US arrested in connection with ISIS and other extremists groups. The US is currently investigating over 150 individuals who have traveled to Syria, with a large number of them going to join these groups (Homegrown 2014).

After the Bataclan theatre attack of November 2015 in Paris, many other high profile terrorist attacks have been linked with ISIL. Yet, while ISIL has taken credit for these attacks; they do not appear to be initiated by the central command of ISIL. Instead these attacks are more likely to just be inspired by ISIL and carried out by other groups or lone wolf actors (Ji-Hyang 2016). The Islamic State unlike any previous terrorist organizations has utilized Twitter and social media to recruit new members and send their message all over the world (Bodine-Baron 2016). The common saying that a picture is worth a thousand words holds true, as evident by ISIL effectively using pictures and images to recruit western youths. ISIL proposes a message of defending the caliphate, therefore their images resonate that message with their targeted recruits. While this simplistic approach might not initially be considered dangerous, one must factor in that large corporations like Nike have been using simple images and slogans successfully worldwide (Speckhard 2015).

_NYPD Report_

The New York Police Department’s 2007 report labeled ‘Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat’ was described by then Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly as a “report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in
Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process” (Silber 2007, pg. 2).

At the time the report was published, not much had been written about the radicalization process. The report examined 5 cases inside the United States and 5 cases abroad, in which all subjects had been convicted of committing or plotting to commit terrorist acts. These individuals also all followed the jihadi-Salafi Islamic ideology. The question in the report was simple, how did those individuals become radicalized?

The NYPD report concluded that there were four distinct phases in the radicalization process: pre-radicalization, self-radicalization, indoctrination, and jihadization. Pre-radicalization is an individual’s life before they are exposed to and start adopting jihadi-Salafi Islam as their belief system. Most of the people prior to radicalizing had led normal, ordinary, unremarkable lives and also had committed little if any criminal acts. In the self-radicalization phase the individuals are influenced by internal or external factors, start to explore the Salafi ideology, and gradually start to move away from their own previous ideology and one step closer to jihadization. The reason for this self-exploration is usually a type of crisis, which weakens ones previous beliefs and opens them up to new ways to view the world. Examples of types of crisis are economic, social, political, and personal. Any type of event or change can trigger a crisis in an individual. Next is the indoctrination phase where the individual gradually intensifies their beliefs, accepts jihadi-Salafi ideology, and comes to the realization that action is required to further the cause of jihadi-Salafi Islam. That action being militant
jihad. The final phase in the radicalization process is jihadization. In this phase the individual will see himself or herself as a holy warrior and will begin planning and attempt to commit a terrorist act (Silber 2007). Below is a diagram of the NYPD radicalization process.

![Diagram of the NYPD radicalization process](image)

*Figure 1 (Silber 2007)*

Interestingly, the NYPD report did take into account the effect of the internet on the radicalization process. The NYPD report labeled the internet as another ‘radicalization incubator,’ which serve as types of hangouts that espouse radical fodder. Potential incubator locations include mosques, cafes, prisons, and student associations.
The internet is just a virtual form of a radicalization incubator that allows for the same type of fuel for radicalization (Silber 2007). According to the NYPD the “internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization. In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology. It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-Salafi message they have encountered. During the Indoctrination phase, when individuals adopt this virulent ideology, they begin interpreting the world from this newly-formed context. Cloaked with a veil of objectivity, the Internet allows the aspiring jihadist to view the world and global conflicts through this extremist lens, further reinforcing the objectives and political arguments of the jihadi-Salafi agenda. In the Jihadization phase, when an individual commits to jihad, the Internet serves as an enabler—providing broad access to an array of information on targets, their vulnerabilities and the design of weapons” (Silber 2007, pg. 8-9). However, the report fails to mention any influence by social media in the radicalization process; this is mainly because social media was still a fairly new tool at the time. But, now groups like ISIL have been using social media to do much of their recruiting and it also a key way in which they spread their messaging. With this new tool it is important to reexamine the NYPD radicalization model, and again to pose the central question to what extent the NYPD terrorism model depicts the radicalization processes of Islamic lone wolf terrorism in a post ISIL world?
Analysis

Case Study 1: Faisal Mohammad

On November 4th, 2015 Faisal Mohammad committed an act of radical Islamic lone wolf terrorism. Around 8am that morning, Faisal entered a classroom on the campus of the University of California Merced and stabbed a student. Then as he fled the classroom he stabbed three other individuals on campus, until he was finally shot and killed by campus police officers (Swankie 2016). Faisal ended up injuring 4 people, but his attack resulted in no fatalities except his own.

Examining Faisal’s background is important to understanding the reason for this attack. Faisal was born in the United States and went to high school in Santa Clara, California. According to statements made by people who knew him in high school or at college, Faisal was quiet and did not have a large group of friends. “Andrew Velasquez, who shared an on-campus suite with Mohammad, told Fresno television station KFSN-TV that his suitemate was quiet and anti-social. Mohammad would ignore him if he tried to talk to him, Velasquez said. The same was said about Mohammad’s time at Wilcox High, where he graduated in June. Jennifer Dericco, a spokeswoman for the Santa Clara Unified School District, described Mohammad as a “good student” who was ‘not very involved on campus.’ He did not have a large social circle, and it does not appear he made many connections with students currently at the school” (Gomez 2015, pg. 1). Furthermore students who lived in the same residence hall as Faisal noted that he generally kept to himself (Gomez 2015). Yet, even though he did appear to exhibit signs of anti-social behavior, investigators did not find any links to mental health issues affecting Faisal (Elias 2015).
The motivation and reason behind the attack initially did not point to any ties or inspiration by a terrorist group. Faisal was carrying a backpack during the attack which contained zip ties, glass breaker, and a knife among his belongings; he was also carrying a 2 page manifesto detailing his intentions for the attack (Swankie 2016). In his manifesto Faisal detailed his anger about being excluded from a study group he was a part of at school; this grievance was initially believed to be the only reason for the attack (Elias 2015). However, later in the investigation FBI "investigators developed information that he may have self-radicalized and drawn inspiration from terrorist propaganda. His laptop contained pro-ISIL propaganda, and he had visited ISIL and other extremist websites in the weeks prior to his attack. The FBI uncovered information that indicated Mohammad began his preparations for the attack at least one week prior to the assault. During this investigation no information has been developed that Mohammad was working with, or directed by, anyone in conducting this attack” (Swankie 2016, pg. 1). Faisal also carried a printed out ISIL flag in his backpack during the attack (Swankie 2016). The FBI concluded that Faisal Mohammad had been self-radicalized and was inspired by ISIL.

*Case Study 2: Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik*

Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik were a married couple who were responsible for the San Bernardino terrorist attack on December 2, 2015. That Wednesday morning Farook’s coworkers from the County of San Bernardino Department of Public Health were attending an event in a conference room in the Inland Regional Center. Farook had originally been at the event but left early. Farook and his
wife, Malik, returned to the conference room around 11am. They entered the room in masks and combat gear and fired 65-75 rounds from their semi-automatic rifles. Within minutes later the couple had left the scene in a rented black SUV. Around 3pm police cornered the couple in the vehicle and killed both Farook and Malik in a firefight. The attack resulted in the death of 14 people and injured 22 others (NY Times 2015).

Syed Rizwan Farook was a 28 year old US citizen who worked as an environmental health specialist for the County of San Bernardino Department of Public Health. According to his own dating profile he was a religious man, who enjoyed cars and shooting guns. Farook also seemed to be well liked by his coworkers. Tashfeen Malik was born in Pakistan, but grew up with her family in Saudi Arabia. According to her friends she was a social, hardworking student whom did not show any signs of religious radicalization. The couple met in 2013 during a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, after contacting each other online, and in June of 2014 Malik came to the US on a Pakistani passport. The couple would be married soon after in Riverside County California. In September 2014 Malik applied for permanent residency and received her green card in July 2015 after background checks by the FBI and homeland security (BBC 2015). By many accounts this couple seemed to be an average American family with no clear signs of radical leanings.

However, according to FBI Director James Comey the couple had been radicalized before they met each other online (Peralta 2015). Friends of Malik noted that around 2009 she began to focus less on her university studies and became more religious. Malik is believed to have visited an extremely conservative madrassa daily that taught the same ideology used by radical Islamic jihadists (BBC 2015). A friend of
Farook’s, the same individual who purchased the weapons used in the attack, told the FBI that he and Farook had planned an attack in 2012; however, they had eventually decided against it. The FBI currently has not charged this person with any crime; yet, these accounts do show that both Farook and Malik might have been radicalized well before they met each other. Director Comey has also stated that private online messages between the couple in 2013, before they had met in person, did discuss jihad and radicalized ideology. Malik also posted her allegiance to ISIL the morning of the attack (BBC 2015). Therefore, if they were not radicalized years before they met each other, it seems that Farook and Malik were at a minimum becoming radicalized, or open to the concept, individually before they started communicating online in 2013.

*Case Study 3: Omar Mateen*

On the early morning of June 22, 2016, Omar Mateen entered the Pulse night club in Orlando, Florida and committed the deadliest shooting by one person in US history. At 1:58am, Mateen entered the nightclub and began firing his weapon; he was armed with both a rifle and a handgun. He briefly exchanged fire with an off duty police officer who was working inside the club. After the exchange Mateen moved into a bathroom to take cover and also gained hostages. Then, after a long standoff, around 5am a police assault team breached the nightclub and killed Mateen. In total Mateen had killed 49 people and injured another 53 (BBC 2016).

Omar Mateen was born in New York City to Afghani immigrant parents. The 29 year old lived and worked in Florida, where he had been working as a security guard
since 2007. He previously worked as a correctional officer in a juvenile detention center and he even applied to a police academy. Even though Mateen was working in law enforcement, he did have a history of violence and negative comments towards certain groups. One of his former coworkers noted that Mateen would often talk about killing people and hated gays, blacks, women, and Jews. His ex-wife also described him as emotionally unstable, mentally ill, and as having a general hatred towards everything. She also claimed he was physically abusive towards her. The imam at the mosque Mateen attended said that he was socially disassociated from the community. ISIL relies on angry and socially isolated individuals and Mateen fit that profile perfectly (Scott 2016).

Unlike the previous two cases Mateen had been investigated by the FBI on multiple occasion for possible connections to terrorism and/or terrorist organizations prior to committing his terrorist act. The FBI first investigated Mateen in 2013 after he made comments claiming that he had ties to the terrorist community. In 2014 he was investigated again for a possible connection to Abu Salha, the first US citizen suicide bomber in Syria. Yet, neither of these investigations showed that Mateen had any ties to terrorist organizations. In total Mateen was interviewed 3 times by the FBI and in his previous positions as a correctional officer, armed security guard, and his application to the police academy also all required background checks, which Mateen passed. The FBI’s inability to determine that Mateen was radicalized is not surprising. ISIL has a thriving online presence that teaches its member how to blend into society. Lone wolf terrorists also do not show any signs or tendencies displayed by conventional terrorists.
Nevertheless shortly after his attack began at the Pulse night club, Mateen called 9-1-1 and pledge his allegiance to ISIL (Scott 2016).

**Findings**

To determine if the NYPD radicalization model is still useful in a post ISIL world, the case studies mentioned previously must be examined to see if they fit the four radicalization phases of the model. The first phase in the NYPD radicalization model is that of pre-radicalization. This is the initial phase and equates to the life of a person before they begin the radicalization process, most individuals in this phase are living an ordinary or unremarkable life; and these individuals have committed little to no crimes (Silber 2007). Faisal Mohammad was a normal college student with no criminal history. Farook and Malik were living a pretty normal life of a married couple with a child, also with no criminal history. Mateen was living an average life as well and although he was said to be violent and hateful to groups of people, he had no criminal history. Therefore, all three of these cases fit perfectly into the pre-radicalization phase.

The next phase of the NYPD radicalization model is the self-identification phase. “Self-Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for this “religious seeking” is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one’s certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews” (Silber 2007, pg. 6). Faisal Mohammad fits this stage with his ‘crisis’ being his exclusion from his study group on campus. This exclusion apparently had a large effect on Faisal and was mentioned as a cause for the attack in
his manifesto. For Farook and Malik there was no clear trigger or crisis for their catalyst into radical Islam. It is unclear if one event or a series of events caused the couple to radicalize or not. Another factor is that the couple appears to have been radicalized prior to meeting each other, with Malik being radicalized abroad. Therefore, with this gap in knowledge Farook and Malik cannot be placed into the self-identification phase. But, Omar Mateen does not perfectly fit into this phase either. There was a report that he grew angry at seeing two men kiss. And, he was known to have a hatred of gays, blacks, Jews, and women. Mateen was even rumored to be gay himself, which might have contributed to his attack. But, again there is not enough information to know if there was one triggering event. Therefore, Mateen cannot fit into the self-identification phase either.

The third and perhaps most crucial phase in the radicalization process is the indoctrination phase. “Indoctrination is the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad” (Silber 2007, pg. 7). Faisal Mohammed was looking at and researching ISIL websites and was carrying a printed out ISIL flag in his backpack during his attack. According to the FBI Faisal also had planned this attack for over a week (Swankie 2016). If he was just angry about being kicked out of his study group, he likely would have attacked only that group of students. And, it also seems unlikely he would have waited a week for the attack if his only reasons was anger with the study group. Therefore, the conclusion from the FBI that this was an Islamic lone wolf terrorism act (Swankie 2016) is clear and Faisal fits into
the indoctrination phase. Farook and Malik were discussing jihad and radical Islam when they first met online. The FBI notes that the couple continued to radicalize while in the US (BBC 2015). Their acceptance of radical Islam and jihad make Farook and Malik fit into the indoctrination phase. Omar Mateen was investigated multiple times by the FBI for his possible connection to terrorist organizations. Even though these investigations did not return any evidence at the time of their conclusion (Scott 2016). It is clear Mateen did have radical leanings. According to the FBI and President Obama Mateen was radicalized online, but minimal information on the method of his radicalization has been released (BBC 2016). Therefore, while it is likely Mateen fit into the indoctrination phase, it is difficult to put him in it with certainty.

The fourth and final phase of the radicalization process in the jihadization phase. Jihadization is the phase wherein individuals see themselves as holy warriors and to perform jihad or an act of terrorism (Silber 2007). Faisal Mohammad committed an act of terrorism and carried an ISIL flag. Farook and Malik committed an act of terrorism and pledged allegiance to ISIL the day of the attack. Omar Mateen committed an act of terrorism and pledged his allegiance to ISL during the attack. Each of the cases fit exactly into the jihadization phase.

After examining each case study against the four phases of the NYPD radicalization model, it is unclear if the model is still current in a post ISIL world. The main reason for this assessment is the lack of information given in some of the cases mentioned. The self-identification phase is based on a triggering event that makes individuals seek out the radical Islam ideology. But, in the three cases examined, only Faisal Mohammad had a clear triggering event. The other two cases might have had
triggering events, but there is no evidence that points to one thus far. Therefore, instead of focusing on one specific event that triggers an individual; examining the person’s views and lifestyle might be more beneficial in this model, given the lack of information available in finding a triggering event.

The indoctrination phase also proves difficult, as in two of the case studies, to fit individuals into neatly. But, when you factor in the last phase, jihadization, it is obvious any person who makes it to the last phase; must have gone through the indoctrination phase as well. Any individual who commits jihad is fully invested into that ideology; and ipso facto fits within the indoctrination phase. The issue with identifying individuals that have been in the indoctrination phase is again the lack of information on these cases. But once that person commits an act of terror, the indoctrination phase has clearly been met. Therefore, in general the phases as presented by the NYPD appear to remain accurate in a post ISIL world. There should, however, be increased awareness that sometimes there is not enough information available until a person completes the radicalization model, ending with a terrorist act.

The broadness of the radicalization model can be an issue. The first phase of the model, pre-radicalization, can fit pretty much any person who has not committed a crime and is considered normal. That is a huge amount of the population. The model could be more effective if its initial phase had tighter metrics and could thus limit the amount of individuals in this phase to a more manageable number. Yet, even with these issues the NYPD radicalization model is still effective in a post ISIL world. ISIL has changed the potential radicalization landscape because of their social media presence and ability to reach anyone around the world. However, social media can be viewed as another
radicalization incubator. “Critically important to the process of radicalization are the different venues that provide the extremist fodder or fuel for radicalizing—venues, to which we refer to as ‘radicalization incubators.’ These incubators serve as radicalizing agents for those who have chosen to pursue radicalization. They become their pit stops, “hangouts,” and meeting places. Generally these locations, which together comprise the radical subculture of a community, are rife with extremist rhetoric” (Silber 2007, pg. 20). The NYPD report already included the internet as a virtual incubator and social media is just another extension in the virtual arena. Moreover, while the tools in the radicalization method might become more advanced, the process remains the same.

**Conclusion**

The United States is the number one western target for lone wolf terrorists and the frequency of attacks continues to grow. While lone wolf terrorist attacks are less common than other types of terror attacks, the US must still take this threat to national security seriously (Alfaro-Gonzalez 2015). The US has been fairly successful at stopping terrorist cells from committing terroristic acts in the US. However, Islamic lone wolf terrorism is the most difficult type of terrorism to stop because of the simple fact that the individual committing the terrorist act is usually working by themselves or with only one other person. And, since they have no affiliation with a terrorist organization, even if they claim allegiance to such an organization, identifying potential lone wolf terrorists is a difficult task. Perhaps due to these difficulties in identifying lone wolf terrorists there has been a number of high profile lone wolf attacks in the US recently.
With the recent rise in these types of attacks, it is necessary to look at the radicalization process of an individual who commits the acts.

Looking at the radicalization process closely will help give a complete view of the problem. The New York Police Department was one of the first organizations to develop a radicalization model for Islamic terrorist. At the time the NYPD focused on al-Qaeda and its efforts in radicalizing individuals and groups of people. Al-Qaeda was also successful in using the internet to further their recruitment efforts. In 2007, when the report was written al-Qaeda was a large threat and the most well known, effective Islamic terrorist group in the world. Therefore, the focus on al-Qaeda by the NYPD report was understood and warranted.

Yet, the rise of ISIL and their massive social media efforts might have changed the effectiveness of the NYPD radicalization report and many others. Therefore, it was vital to examine the NYPD terrorism model to see if it still could accurately depict Islamic lone wolf terrorist after the rise of ISIL. As seen in the analysis section, the NYPD terrorism model is still a useful tool in depicting the radicalization process. Even with the NYPD model’s current effectiveness the rise of social media influenced radicalization is still a concern.

The NYPD report highlighted the internet and al-Qaeda’s successful use of it in radicalizing individuals all over the world. Now with the rise of ISIL, new studies and analysis of Islamic radicalization should highlight the effect of social media. Omar Mateen was radicalized online and able to stay undetected even though the FBI interviewed him three times (Scott 2016). It is difficult to know an individual’s thoughts, biases, beliefs, and hatreds; moreover, it is extremely difficult to identify a lone wolf
terrorist prior to attacks. ISIL has tremendous online and social media presence and a powerful propaganda machine. The Brookings Institute notes that ISIL has 50 members that operate thousands of Twitter and Telegram accounts. ISIL is able to spread news and messages through its social media and mobile applications (Scott 2016). ISIL likely will use Mateen’s actions to inspire further lone wolf acts in the United States.

In examining radicalization in a post-ISIL world there must also be recognition that, while social media is currently a massive tool for Islamic radicalization, that it is just the latest tool in the radicalization process. When al-Qaeda was rising the internet was the latest tool in helping radicalize individuals. Now social media is just the newest and most advanced tool to help terrorist groups radicalize individuals. Therefore, it is important to recognize the importance of social media, but not to solely focus on social media in the radicalization process.
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